d` Outline Depot: Common law vs. MPC, tables of when liable vs. not liable. Crim Law Outline 30 states have adopted MPC, but not California. Special verdict: jury finds facts but defers verdict to judge. Common Law MPC Actus reus Potential exception if not -There must be at least one last ingredient in offense voluntary act of D which is physically capable. -Includes: habit, possession, seizures (Decina: had seizure while driving, convicted.) -Does Not Include: reflex or convulsion, hypnosis, sleepwalking Mens rea Crim neg /= civil neg. Use crim neg unless specified otherwise. Omission to Act There must be duty to impose act via law. Dudley v. Stephens (eat boy on boat) A. Deterrance argument (punish to prevent greater evil) fails because would not deter death with more death. B. Retributive argument (punish because morally guilty) fails because alternative would be that 4 people died. Preclude punishments for unsuccessful attempts b/c D did not successfully commit wicked act. C. Consent is not defnse to murder. D. Holding: Yes, murder. E. Law: No Necessity defense exists for murder. Dolinko does not find any of the arguments for punishment persuasive, however. F. Policy: Absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence. G. Hypos: Trolley problem (can switch trolley to alternate track and save 3 lives); Surgeon problem (can kill 1 person for his organs to save 4 people) Basic Requirements for Criminal Liability I. Actus Reus: Culpable Conduct A. Can be results oriented. B. Requirement of Voluntary Action 1. Martin v. State: P convicted of public drunkenness when carried out by police. Holding: Involuntary action does not satisfy actus reus! a. Law: criminal law depends on voluntary acts, and here a voluntary appearance was presupposed when in fact P was involuntarily 1 taken out. (Drunkenness is not indicative of involuntary actions; involuntary acts are limited in crim law to spasms, sleepwalking, etc.) b. MPC: Act = bodily movement. Conduct is criminal if includes Martin: bodily act. Body movement that is not product of actor is not voluntary. Involuntary So under MPC, Martin would be convicted. action is d. Does not include violations (A has blackout and runs stop sign defense while driving, still liable for motor vehicle violation because MPC 2.01 does not apply to violations.) e. Policy for not punishing involuntary acts: no utilitarian deterrence benefit for future act; no retributive arg for involuntary acts. c. Hypo: Martin threatened into street by father? Still voluntarily went into street. d. O’Sullivan v. Fisher: Police ordered drunk person into street and then arrested him for public drunkenness. Conviction affirmed. e. People v. Lowe: possession of meth in jail was involuntary b/c brought into jail f. Dolinko: Elements of public drunkenness include (i) being drunk, (ii) public, and (iii) boisterous. Voluntary in just one element is sufficient for voluntary status. Court should have required that all elements be involuntary for involuntary defense to be successful. 2. People v. Newton a. Factual ambiguity: was Newton already injured when he shot Officer Frey? b. Not guilty = guilt not proven beyond reasonable doubt c. Holding: Unconsciousness can be used as homicide defense. (Otherwise there is prejudicial error. Should open possibility of not guilty.) d. MPC: ―Where not self-induced as by voluntary intoxication, unconsciousness is defense to homicide.‖ Newton: e. Rationale: ―People whose involuntary movements threaten unconsciousne others do not present problem of correction.‖ ss is defense f. Voluntary Action must be proved by P; Involuntary Action is aff defense and must be proved by D. So D will want to be charged under Voluntary Action to minimize chance of conviction. g. Habit = voluntary. Hypnosis =/ voluntary. h. People v. Decina: Decina was culpably negligent when he started driving a car and created a risk he shouldn’t have. As a result of that risk, people were killed. His knowledge of self’s epilepsy = voluntary, reckless driving and manslaughter. i. Hypo: Drinking at bar and fought with police, claims unconsciousness due to alcohol? No—intoxication is not defense to homicide. j. Proximate Causation: sufficiently, direct result of your actions. In Martin, ―creating mere opportunity‖ =/ Decina’s ―direct cause‖ . 2 k. Retributive arg: involuntary act happens to people; it is not something that people do. l. Duress is another excuse, separate from involuntary act. Examples: 1) Seizure while driving: voluntary act to drive, knowing have eplipsey 2) But if took necessary precautions, then seizure was not negligent and can mount involuntary defense 3) Voluntarily taking drugs is not excuse. 4) D dragged into post office and voluntarily commits crime. 5) Dragging D involuntarily into street, happens to be drunk 6) Unconscious while shooting police – involuntary movement 7) Mother asleep while killing child – involuntary (somnambulism) Under MPC, hypnotism and habitual acts are involuntary. II. Omissions A. Jones v. United States a. Law: Situations where failure to act is breach of duty: (i) statute imposes duty of care, (ii) special relationship to another, (iii) assumed contractual duty to care for another, (iv) voluntarily assumed care for another and secluded helpless person to prevent others from rendering aid, (v) create harm then have legal duty of care. b. Holding: Jones did not have contract with mother to take care of baby. Jury was not instructed as to needing to find duty of care; jury error. c. Mere thoughts are not considered omissions. B. Pope v. State a. Law: Pope convicted of child abuse: court said Pope did not have supervision duty over child. Pope also convicted of misprision of felony. Maryland says no crime because would impose too broad of duty. Common law says this is a crime. i. Misprison of felony, under federal law, is only a crime when it’s active. b. Holding: Evidence is insufficient to meet requirement for duty of care. Court is not saying that Pope is not required to take care of child; court is saying that proven facts are insufficient. c. ―Commission by Omission‖ – crime is causing something by failure to act. d. Hypo: bystander at poolside watches child drown without liability or duty of care. e. Rationale for No Liabilty Due to Omission: (i) draw line for amount of peril required before liable, and (ii) protection of personal liberty to be free from interference in life (ex: see crashed bystander but do not want to be bothered to call 911) f. Vermont Rule: specific situations in which ―shall give reasonable assistance unless that assistance is provided by others, to extent can give aid without harming oneself‖ 3 C. J. Kleinig, Good Samaritanism III. Mens Rea A. Regina v. Cunningham: D convicted of having old lady next door ingest gas. a. Broad mens rea: blameworthy, morally bad state of mind. This doctrine is inferior to statutes, and is outdated. Narrow mens rea: mental state required by particular crime; knowledge of existing circumstances (recklessness); purpose to injure someone, etc. b. Law: Malice = (i) intent to do harm that was done, (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not; (iii) knowledge of risk of harm and recklessness in taking that risk. Malice is not ill will. c. Application: (i) must know gas will harm someone, or (ii) simply maliciously cause someone to ingest gas without knowledge of imminent harm. D convicted b/c had wicked mind to release gas. d. Malice = (i) actual intent to cause the harm that was done, or (ii) forseeing harm. Does this mean foresee ingesting of gas, or of harm caused? Dolinko says ambiguious. e. Common law is messy with terminology, while MPC distinguishes specific intent = (i) with some additional intention; (ii) actual knowledge of some attendant circumstance of crime like bulgarly – against general intent, which is actus reus performed with any intent. f. Ex: theft, bulgarly, and receiving stolen property are all specific intent crimes. But should D intend all elements of each specific crime? g. Hypo: Assisted suicide is intent to commit that crime. h. Cunningham statute: unlawfully or maliciously administer any poison so as to endanger person’s life, or inflict upon person any grievious bodily harm endangering their life. Dolinko says does ―malicious‖ apply to all parts, or just ―administer‖? Ambiguious. i. (i) [factors that relate to jurisdiction] + (ii) [MPC’s material elements which includes negative factors] are used to burden prosecution. But in practice, only material elements(elements which when combined with law results in crime) are used. (Material elements can also be listed in aff defenses to burden D.) j. Social Harm = conduct element (harmful result not necessary; offense is complete regardless of harm) + result elements (offensive result defined by law) + attendant circumstances k. Relevant Material Elements of Cunningham Statute: (i) Conduct: administer poison, or cause poison to be administed, or causing person to take poison. (ii) Result: endangering victim’s life, or inflicting grieveious bodily harm on victim. l. MPC Malice = (i) intending harm, or (ii) forseeing harm and taking action regardless of risk. (i) corresponds to purpose, while (ii) corresponds to reckless. m. So analyzing Cunningham statute under MPC, either Purpose or Reckless combined with (i) or (ii) would satisfy definition of Malice. 4 n. MPC Reckless: consciously disregarding substantial and unjustified risk. Disregarding it is gross deviation from standard of conduct that reasonable person in that situation would observe. o. MPC presumption: mens rea applies to all elements, unless contrary purpose plainly appears (like strict liability of sexual conduct with persons under 10, where no knowledge is required). MPC Purpose: (i) conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result and (ii) he is aware, or believes, or hopes of such circumstnaces. Subjective desire for element. MPC Knowing: (i) aware that his conduct is of that nature [Attendant Circumstance], (ii) practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result [Result Aspect].