Nuclear Arms Control: The Environmental Dimension Lakshman D. Guruswamy Jason B. Aamodtt [T]he United States pledges before you-and therefore to the World-its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma-to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life.' Dwight D. Eisenhower I. INTRODUCTION International arms control efforts have reduced the nuclear balance of terror and even offered a glimpse of the much-vaunted but elusive peace dividend.2 These efforts are among the few remaining bipartisan foreign policy issues embraced by conservatives and liberals alike.3 This * Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, and Director of the National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute. t Jason B. Aamodt, Research Fellow, National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute. We are indebted to Daniel Curran, Senior Policy Fellow at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute for his substantial assistance. We would also like to thank Pro- fessors Barbara Bucholtz, John Hicks, Marla Mansfield, and Marvin Will for their con- tributions during a faculty colloquy at the University of Tulsa, in January, 1999. 1. The remarks of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in an address before the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1953. 2. See ARMS CONTROL: TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey A. Larsen & Greg- ory J. Rattray eds., 1996); KERRY M. KARTCHNER, NEGOTIATING START: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AND THE QUEST FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY (1992). 3. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post Cold War Transformations in National Security and Separation of Powers-Beating Nuclear Swords into Plowshares in an Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 337 n.15 (1997); Marian Nash (Leich), Arms Control and Disarma- ment: Nuclear Materials Security and Warhead Dismantlement, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 268 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y [Vol. 10:2 "motherhood and apple pie" objective has purposefully been pursued by succeeding administrations, and it is regarded by many as one of the great foreign policy achievements of our time. And so it is. We are, however, witnessing the unraveling of unforeseen, albeit serious, consequences of Russian-US arms control, in the form of nu- clear pollution. This Article addresses one aspect of this phenomena by examining how the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),4 perhaps the most important and successful arms reduction treaty between Russia and the United States, has affected the nuclear pollution of the Arctic Ocean, particularly in the area of the shallow Barents and Kara Seas. Unlike earlier arms control agreements that focused on test bans5 and preventing the spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear countries, START, for the first time in post-cold war history, aimed at reducing the number of nuclear weapons and warheads including submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Since the reduction of SLBMs necessarily entails the disarming and decommissioning of many US and Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a legislative environmental impact assessment (LEIA) was produced for START. 6 It was, however, con- fined to environmental impacts within the United States and did not ex- amine the extraterritorial impact of the START-ordered reduction of SLBMs. The assessment thus did not address the decommissioning of thirty-one Russian nuclear submarines and the waste streams resulting from this exercise on the internationally-important Arctic Ocean. A fuller environmental evaluation may have avoided or eased some of the difficult and expensive environmental problems that now confront the implementation of START. 92 (1997); J. Stephan Wood, The Breakdown of Weapons Control Regimes?, 89 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 380, 392 (1995). 4. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, entered into force Dec. 5, 1994, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 16 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B., app. II, 450 (1991) [hereinafter START]. 5. See ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, ARMS CONTROLS AND NATIONAL SECURITY, AN INTRODUCTION 25 (1989). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks H (SALT 111972-79) put caps on the number of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) allowed on each missile, as well as limitations on the number of missiles overall (MIRVs are small warheads located inside a larger missile). SALT I (1969-72), however, limited the number of missile launchers without limiting warheads or other weapon technology. See id. See also Astrid Wendlandt, Pacifying Russia: InternationalAid and NATO Ex- pansion, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 134 (1998). 6. See discussion infra Part V.B (regarding legislative environmental impact statements and the National Environmental Policy Act). 1999] Nuclear Arms Control Part II of this Article will review the extent of past nuclear dump- ing in the Arctic, and discuss future concerns. It will analyze the extent to which the disarmament and consequent decommissioning of nuclear submarines pursuant to START have added to existing environmental problems caused by past nuclear dumping. Part III will discuss the pres- ent environmental quality of the Arctic based on recent studies of radio- active pollution. Part III also will examine Russia's lack of facilities to deal with present and future nuclear waste. Part IV will review the inter- national bi- and trilateral measures taken to address the environmental problems of the Arctic. It will focus on the billions of dollars being spent by the United States to remedy environmental problems that obstruct the implementation of START. Part V contends that an environmental impact assessment of the international effects of START would have revealed these problems, which then could have been dealt with more efficiently. Although American case law indicates that future treaties may not be subject to legally mandated environmental impact assessments, Part V argues that the United States should nonetheless adopt a more comprehensive ap- proach to the future international environmental impacts of arms control treaties. Some form of global environmental impact assessment for arms control treaties is a political and environmental necessity that the United States has ignored at considerable cost. The present global hazards caused by nuclear pollution in the Arctic cannot be solved just by the United States, Russia, and Norway. It is an international problem that calls for international cooperation. International environmental impact assessments, by drawing attention to Russia's inability to remedy its abuse of the Arctic, will likely elicit greater international cooperation than has hitherto been the case. II. THE RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN Soviet nuclear pollution of the Arctic is well documented.7 The pollution has been caused by accidents on land that released radioactive 7. See, e.g., A.V. Yablokov et al., Facts and Problems Related to the Dumping of Radioactive Waste in the Seas Surrounding the Territory of the Russian Federation: Materialsfrom a Government Report on the Dumping of Radioactive Waste, Commis- sioned by the President of the Russian Federation, Oct. 24, 1992, Decree No. 613 (Greenpeace Russia trans., 1993) [hereinafter Yablokov Report] (on file with the Colo- rado Journal of InternationalEnvironmental Law & Policy). 270 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y [Vol. 10:2 material into the Arctic environment, 8 by land-based discharges of ra- dioactive pollutants into rivers that later migrated into the neighboring Arctic seas; 9 and by the Soviet Navy. The.Yablokov Report, written af- ter the Fifteenth Consultative Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, documents the frightening extent to which dumping of various kinds took place be- tween 1958 and 1992.10 The report recounts how the huge Russian nu- clear fleet, the largest in the world, used the shallow Barents and Kara Seas of the Arctic Ocean to dispose of its nuclear waste, including un- safe reactors. Russian submarines remain a significant source of pollution. The fleet of over 140 retired nuclear submarines moored in the Russian naval graveyard ports of Murmansk, in the Barents Sea of the Arctic Ocean, and Vladivostok, in the Sea of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, are of par- ticular concern.11 These shipyards do not have safe facilities for storing the spent nuclear waste generated by nuclear submarines. While military 12 secrecy surrounds their operations, informed observers conclude that13 they are not managed according to recognized international standards. The dangerous waste generated by the reactors in Murmansk is stored or disposed of under unsafe conditions in a manner that presents a danger to human health and to the natural environment both on land and at sea. The United States and Norway have discovered, at considerable finan- cial cost, that retiring thirty-one submarines under START cannot be ac- complished without addressing the larger issue of the Russian nuclear fleet's pollution of the Arctic. 8. See discussion infra Part V.A. (discussing the Chernobyl accident). 9. See infra note 31 (discussing the Mayak Nuclear Materials complex). 10. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7. 11. See id. See also discussion infra Part II.C (for an in depth discussion of these concerns). 12. One of the most prominent of these is the Bellona Foundation of Norway, whose reports are cited throughout this paper. Bellona describes its mission thus: "Bellona Foundation was founded as an independent ideal organization in 1986. The Foundation is a science based environmental organization whose main objective is to combat problems of environmental degradation, pollution-induced dangers to human health and the ecological impacts of economic development strategies." Bellona, An In- troduction to the Bellona Foundation (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.bellona.org/e/bellona/index.htm>. Experts at Bellona possess detailed in- formation about the Russian nuclear submarine crisis.