Philosophers’ volume 12, no. 7 Oh, Thou, who didst with Pitfall and with Gin march 2012 Beset the Road I was to wander in, Imprint Thou wilt not with Predestination round Enmesh me, and impute my Fall to Sin? —The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Verse LVII 1. Introduction Manipulation and Moral A prominent recent strategy for advancing the thesis that moral respon- sibility is incompatible with causal determinism has been to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for responsibility can never- theless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. If mor- Standing: An Argument al responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, so the thought goes, it must also be compatible (for instance) with the thesis that a given agent designed the world at some past time precisely so as to make it causally inevitable that one performs the particular bad actions for Incompatibilism one performs. In short, compatibilism has it that our responsibility is consistent with the thesis that all of our actions, down to the finest de- tails, are the inevitable outcomes of the designs of some further agent “behind the scenes”. According to the incompatibilist, however, once we became aware that agents had been “set up” in this way, we should no longer judge that they are responsible for their behavior, nor should we hold them responsible for it by blaming them, in case what they did was wrong. Manipulation arguments so far have thus focused on what our response to manipulated agents should be. Incompatibilists allege that, intuitively, we should no longer regard such agents as responsible. Patrick Todd And, on the whole, compatibilists have disagreed. Such is the state of University of California, Riverside the debate over manipulation arguments. In this paper, I aim to shift the debate onto different terrain. The fo- cus so far has been simply on what we may or may not permissibly say or do concerning manipulated agents. But I believe a powerful new incompatibilist argument can be mounted from considering whether © 2012 Patrick Todd the manipulators can justifiably blame the agents they manipulate in This work is licensed under a Creative Commons compatibilist-friendly ways. It seems strikingly counterintuitive to Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. suppose that they may do so. The argument of this paper, however, <www.philosophersimprint.org/012007/> is that incompatibilism ultimately provides the best explanation for patrick todd Manipulation and Moral Standing why this is so. As will become clear, the crucial issue at work in this the thesis under consideration — namely, that everything that happens, paper concerns the conditions under which an agent has or lacks the including our bad actions, has long ago been irrevocably determined moral standing to blame a particular wrongdoer. In short, I argue that by God to occur, and that God moreover stands ready to judge us for compatibilists must accept the claim that (some) manipulators may performing those very actions.2 The question before us is not whether justifiably blame the agents they manipulate, or they must provide a compatibilists must agree with this unhappy tradition that God exists plausible theory of moral standing that blocks this result. Accepting and does both determine what we do and blame us for doing it, but this first claim would be a (previously unnoticed) severe cost of com- whether compatibilists can adequately explain what I take to be the patibilism. With respect to the second possibility, I will argue that no fundamental injustice of the picture it puts forward. If they cannot, then such compatibilist theory will be forthcoming. Furthermore, though I think this constitutes a serious cost for compatibilism. I believe that articulating this new incompatibilist argument is the primary goal of asking these questions will reveal deep issues about the compatibility this paper, I believe that considering these issues uncovers important debate that have so far been neglected. questions about the notion of moral standing itself, and I intend this First, I discuss some terminological preliminaries. I then present paper to be an independent contribution to the (small but growing) the case that will allow us to begin considering these issues: Mele’s literature on this topic as well. “Zygote Argument” scenario. Of course, the manipulators at work in the various manipulation thought experiments proposed so far have been purely fictional enti- 2. Preliminaries ties. Our actions do not actually trace back to the workings a team of In this paper, I will rely on the distinction between an agent’s being neuroscientists, as Derk Pereboom has asked us to imagine, nor has responsible for a particular action and someone’s holding that agent re- a goddess intentionally designed the world long ago so as to make it sponsible for the action. It is hard to say anything substantive about inevitable that you read this paper at this precise moment, as in an these issues that will please everyone, and so I aim to say very little. example put forward by Alfred Mele.1 The point is that these are con- In short, suppose a given agent is morally responsible for performing ceptual possibilities the compatibilist must address, and the same, I say, some morally wrong action. As I will have it, it thus follows that the goes for the scenario I will place at the heart of this paper. In my sce- agent is to some degree blameworthy for performing it. But it is a fur- nario, God will (for various reasons) take the place of Diana, and the ther issue whether some other given agent may hold her responsible question will be whether God can determine us to perform an action for performing it by blaming her. It might very well be that an agent is and blame us for performing it. Here, of course, it is worth noting that blameworthy for performing an action, but that no one has the moral there is a long tradition in Western philosophy and theology that has standing to blame her. affirmed not simply the conceptual possibility but the actual truth of 2. Arguably, this tradition begins with St. Paul in the New Testament, and, in broad strokes, continues on through the late Augustine, perhaps receives its 1. See Mele, Alfred, Free Will and Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), most notorious expression in the Reformation theologians Luther and Calvin, p. 188; and Pereboom in Fischer, J., R. Kane, D. Pereboom, and M. Vargas, Four was later supported by Leibniz, and indeed continues to enjoy wide support views on free will (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), p. 75. Note, however, that to this very day. Perhaps the “unifying theme” of this tradition is an opposition Mele does not consider his scenario to be (strictly speaking) a “manipula- to libertarian accounts of free will on grounds that such an understanding of tion” scenario. Rather, it is what he calls an “original design” scenario. For my freedom would compromise an adequate account of God’s omnipotent provi- purposes here, I will construe “manipulation” broadly so that what Mele calls dential control over what happens in the world. The details of this tradition, “original design” scenarios are a subtype of manipulation scenarios. however, lay beyond the scope of this paper. philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 12, no. 7 (march 2012) patrick todd Manipulation and Moral Standing What counts as “holding” an agent morally responsible? This is a dif- actually culminates in, say, Ernie’s responsibly doing A. If this causal ficult question. Here I simply stipulate that one holds an agent morally sequence can be brought about by mere naturalistic factors, then, in responsible if and only if (1) one responds to the agent’s behavior with principle, it seems that it also could be brought about by intentional the relevant so-called reactive attitudes, such as resentment, anger, and design. That is, if it is consistent with responsibility that the state of the indignation or (2) one punishes the agent, even if one does not respond world 5 billion years ago (together with the laws) necessitates one’s to the agent with the reactive attitudes. (For purposes of this paper, I actions, it must also be consistent with responsibility that the state of focus only on blame, punishment, and the associated negative reactive the world 5 billion years ago was arranged to be that way precisely so attitudes.3) Thus, it is necessary for holding responsible that one does that one would do what one actually does. In other words, the mere more than simply judging that the agent is responsible (or is blame- fact that the world was once intentionally arranged in this way should worthy). Concerning the reactive attitudes, such responses, as I will be irrelevant to the facts of responsibility. have it, need not be expressed directly to the agent in question. One It is this fact that Mele’s Zygote Argument exploits. The argument might hold a wrongdoer responsible by becoming inwardly angry with relies on the following background information, where Diana is a god- him, or by expressing one’s outrage to a friend. Lastly, I assume that an dess who oversees a deterministic world: 4 agent’s being responsible (or being blameworthy) for a particular action Diana creates a zygote Z in Mary. She combines Z’s at- is a necessary condition for the appropriateness of someone’s holding oms as she does because she wants a certain event E to that agent responsible. In other words, in the sense of ‘appropriateness’ occur thirty years later. From her knowledge of the state at stake, it is never appropriate to blame or punish an agent who actu- of the universe just prior to her creating Z and the laws ally isn’t responsible; no one ever has the moral standing to blame the of nature of her deterministic universe, she deduces that innocent.