The Napoleon Series The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 17, Part X By: Maurice Weil Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 (after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna) _____________________ THE ALLIED CAVALRY DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 ________________________ CHAPTER XVII. OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED GREAT ARMY AGAINST THE MARSHELS UP TO THE MARCH OF THE EMPEROR ON ARCIS-SUR-AUBE. -- OPERATIONS AGAINST THE EMPEROR UP TO THE REUNION WITH THE ARMY OF SILESIA. -- OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA FROM 18 TO 23 MARCH. -- OPERATIONS OF THE EMPEROR AND THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING THE DAY OF MARCH 24. _________ ARCIS-SUR-AUBE. Eventual disposition for 23 March. --The official documents allow, moreover, to certainly see the mindset and perplexity of the higher command during the day of the 22nd. Ignoring the direction taken by the Emperor, fearing on the other hand in awaiting further information, that he hoped to receive from minute to minute, the movement orders to be sent not too late to his lieutenants, Schwarzenberg decided to write and send, in the course of the afternoon of 22nd, three possible dispositions for the operations of the 23rd, provisions, despite their length, we believe useful to reproduce, instead of summarizing. First dispositions for 23 March 1814. --"In the case where the enemy marches on Châlons." "The Vth Corps follows the road of Châlons, camps on the height in front (to the North) of Sompuis, pushes up to Faux-sur-Coole with its advanced guard passing by Coole and communicating with Vitry. The vanguard will seek to provide positive information on the march of the enemy. The VIth Corps crosses the Puits and camps between Dosnon, Trouan-le-Grand, Trouan-le-Petit and La Folie. Its advanced guard will occupy Mailly and push on the road from Sommesous to Châlons towards Vitry and from there from Semoine on Fère-Champenoise." © 1995 – 2016 The Napoleon Series "The VIth Corps crossing the Puits at Dampierre, strongly occupies Ramerupt and heads on Lhuître. If the enemy remains until the arrival of the VIth Corps at Lhuître, in its position at the mouth of the defile of Arcis, the VIth Corps crossing the defile of Lhuître will move against Le Chêne to attack and chase out the enemy. However, we must wait for going beyond Lhuître for the IVth Corps to arrive at Dosnon and at Trouan. The VIth Corps will remain in constant communication with the IVth Corps in order that, at the time of the attack, it can detach off the road from Dosnon to Arcis a column that will debouch on to the rear of the enemy. This column will present a respectable force, including a considerable proportion of cavalry in order to effectively turn the enemy and take advantage of the terrain. If it manages to throw back the enemy, the VIth Corps will establish itself on the road, taking into account the direction that the enemy has given its retreat. It will seek to occupy Herbisse if at all possible and will connect with the IVth Corps beside Mailly." "The IIIrd Corps will remain until further notice at Arcis in order to guard the defile." "The guards and reserves are established between Le Meix-Tiercelin and Humbauville. The division of Crenneville occupies Troyes and monitors the road from Troyes to Nogent-sur-Seine." "The headquarters is in Saint-Ouen. The movement will begin at 9 o'clock. The troops will have eaten soup before setting off." Second disposition for 23 March 1814. --"In the case where the enemy march on Vitry." "The Vth Corps advances towards Vitry and settles in the vicinity of Perthes. Its vanguard pushes as far as possible in the direction of Vitry and reconnoiters the position of the enemy or the direction it has followed. The Vth Corps will cover its left flank by occupying the ancient Roman road near Sompuis and sending a detachment to Coole." "The IVth Corps will be placed in echelon, its right at Meix-Tiercelin, its left at Les Fenus. Its advanced guard will occupy Mailly and Poivres and observe Soudé." "The VIth Corps will march in accordance with the first disposition with this difference however, that it will cross the defile of Lhuître when the IVth Corps has occupied Les Fenus because that corps will have to support at that time by a column charged with turning Arcis." "The guards and reserves will go between Sommesous and La Verpillière." "The rest as in the first disposition." Third disposition for 23 March 1814. --"In the case where the enemy retires on Montmirail and where its troops occupied Vitry, Châlons and Reims." "The Vth Corps, passing by Humbauville, will camp in battle order on the height of Sompuis. Its vanguard will occupy Coole, Soudé-Sainte-Croix and Soudé-Notre Dame and detachments towards Châlons, Vitry and Fère- Champenoise." "The IVth Corps passing the Puits, will try to gain the heights of Poivres by the shortest route. It will camp there with Poivres and La Mothé in front of its facing. This movement will be executed when the left wing (VIth Corps) has begun its attack before Lhuître. The IVth Corps having arrived at Trouan will consequently stop there until the retirement of the enemy allows it to occupy the height (to the east) of La Mothé." "The IVth Corps is charged with supporting the offensive movement from there of the VIth Corps. The movement orders for the VIth Corps differ from those contained in the first disposition, in that this corps will have to start crossing the defile of Lhuître as soon as the IVth Corps has arrived at Dosnon. The VIth Corps in this case seeks to push on Herbisse, Semoine and Salon." "The rest is as in the first disposition, except that the headquarters will be in Lhuître." © 1995 – 2016 The Napoleon Series By sending Wrede these three dispositions, saying he would be more able than anyone to choose between one of the three to which he should comply, Schwarzenberg, to avoid unnecessary waste of time, recommended to the Bavarian-Marshal to come to Barclay de Tolly, at Jasseines, with the one that should be applied because of the information gathered. He invited further, that Wrede give immediate notice to the Crown Prince of Württemberg and to inform him of the detailed measures he would have to take for the subsequent execution of orders so that, in turn, he could act knowingly. It therefore follows from the sending and the establishment of these three dispositions, that despite the numerous cavalry and light infantry that was available, one had absolutely lost contact with an enemy that still stood well in the defile of Arcis. It was left to Wrede, because he had been pushed so far forward on the right bank of the Aube, the task of educating the Generalissimo and to choose between the three dispositions. Anyway, in any of the three cases, there was only little activity to impose a large movement. Finally, almost unbelievably, there seems to have been no knowledge of the presence of Macdonald at Dosnon. The dispatch sent by Schwarzenberg, 22 March at 9 o'clock in the evening (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III ad. 402), to the Emperor of Austria, also proves that he was not better informed in the evening than during the day. At the same time, however, the Generalissimo, summarizing for Blücher the events from the 19th and indicating the positions of the corps of the Great Army the 22nd in the evening, ended his letter with these very characteristic sentences: "As soon as I have accurate information about the movements of the enemy, I will follow with my whole army. Anyway, I will again approach from the Marne to make my connection with Your Excellency, attack the enemy with our combined forces, and fight a great battle that will decide the fate of Europe."1 The avowal contained in the two dispatches addressed by Schwarzenberg to the Emperor of Austria and to Blücher is formal. The statement of the Generalissimo leaves no doubt about his intentions either, nor on the reasons for his inaction. When the Generalissimo sent these dispatches, more than three hours had passed since the Emperor, seeing the whole Great Army massed before him on the plateau of Mesnil-la-Comtesse, suddenly stopped fighting. For thirty hours, a feeble rear-guard brigade masked the movement of the French army and alone defended the debouchment of Arcis. And once again, as after La Rothière, as after Laon, (the Allies) allowed the advantage of the initiative, the choice of the direction it chose to imprint on its operations to be stolen from them. Since the 20th, the cavalry of Ozharovsky scoured the country on the right bank of the Aube. Since the 21st, in the afternoon, one saw the troops engaged in front of Arcis filing towards Dosnon and Sompuis. The movement continued without significant interruption for the day of the 22nd, yet the night of the 22nd one is still reduced to suppositions and assumptions. Without accurate and capable scouting reports at the headquarters, one was forced to have once again used three dispositions that could accommodate three paths which the Emperor could have chosen, and it is one of the corps commanders that was obliged with the responsibility to opt for different events, from these three dispositions. Also, all those who, starting with Clausewitz, so severely condemn Napoleon's movement on Saint- Dizier, show proof of impartiality by reserving much of their criticism to his opponents and making at least justice to the strength of character, to the indomitable energy, to the audacity, at the same time of the Emperor.