RALEIGH CAVERO FORESHADOWING THE NEO CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY’S 1973 TERM AT THE UNITED NATIONS To many contemporaries, William F. Buckley’s decision to accept his 1973 nomination to the United States’ UN delegation came as a surprise. The prominent conservative com- mentator had risen to fame in part for his criticism of the international organization. However, as Raleigh Cavero ’15 examines, Buckley’s acceptance of a role on the Third Committee ofered him the opportunity to promote his interventionist, anti- Communist stance through a framework of human rights. Delving into the highly fraught spheres of national and international politics in the dé t ente era, Cavero identifies how Buckley’s eforts to promote democracy on the UN floor laid the groundwork for an emergent alli- ance between conservatives and the branch of ex- liberals who, favoring Buckley’s unapol- ogetic anti -Communist stance, came to be known as neoconservatives. Though Buckley himself finished his term disappointed by inefectiveness, his powerful rhetoric through- out his UN term would come to have long lasting implications on the domestic politics of the United States. By Raleigh Cavero, SY ’15 Winner of the Prize Faculty Advisor: Beverly Gage Edited by David Shimer, Emma Fallone, Eva Landsberg, and Emily Yankowitz 141 FORESHADOWING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE INTRODUCTION: WALTER MITTY GOES TO THE UNITED NATIONS On a summer day in 1973, walking through New York City’s streets, William F. Buckley had a “pure, undiluted moment of ‘Walter Mittyism.’”1 He envisioned pleading for Soviet ballet dancer Valery Panov, exposing Chinese concentration camps, and hosting Al- exander Solzhenitsyn in the UN for a triumphant speech to a global audience. In that mo- ment, Buckley decided to accept the ofer to become a US delegate to the United Nations.2 Just a few hours before, Buckley had resolved to reject the proposal. His first re- action when the US ambassador ofered the position: “Had he read what I had written in the past about the United Nations?”3 Buckley, like many conservatives, had criticized the United Nations for being anti-Democratic and inefectual—a “surrealistic organization whose entire role is Aesopian.”4 5 Buckley was a prominent national figure in the conservative movement, which his- torian George Nash says had just achieved “symbolic success” in 1970: Buckley had earned an Emmy in 1969 for his debating show Firing Line, where he showcased his famous—or, for his opponents, infamous—debating style. Buckley’s brother James was newly elected to the New York Senate, and there had been a surge of interest in conservative journalism as well as in the Young Americans for Freedom, a conservative youth organization that Wil- liam F. Buckley founded.6 He was also the founding editor-in-chief of the flagship conser- vative magazine, National Review.7 Conservatism, and William F. Buckley, were on the rise. Buckley had catapulted onto the national stage as a conservative firebrand soon afer graduating from Yale with the publication of his God and Man at Yale in 1951; Mc- Carthy and his Enemies followed three years later, cementing his reputation by supporting Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-Communist investigations.8 In 1955, when he founded National Review, Buckley felt that conservatism was an embattled minority in the national political landscape. Historian David Farber asserts that Buckley thought he was fighting conventional wisdom and powerful intelligentsia with National Review, providing a conser- vative intellectual opinion magazine to combat the predominantly liberal media.9 Buckley would become one of the great leaders of the conservative movement, intertwining its three warring factions—traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti-Communism—and helping it rise in the postwar years.10 The last of these factions, anti-Communism, was shared across the political spec- trum in the 1950s.11 Liberals preferred to focus on containment, or restraining the spread of Communism.12 Conservatives, especially intellectuals like James Burnham, advocated more aggressive policies against what the Right called “evil” states, using “victory” rhetoric to press for military intervention and “rollback” in places like Cuba and Vietnam—ideas which liberals called “wildly irresponsible.” Buckley responded that the “continuing blind- ness of liberals” to Communism was neither accident nor neglect, but a “deep psychological 142 RALEIGH CAVERO problem producing paralysis.”13 Buckley’s strain of anti-Communism was especially intense, demonstrated in his vigorous defense of Senator McCarthy’s increasingly marginalized anti- Communist campaigns.14 With Buckley at the forefront, conservatism continued to cham- pion the fight against Communism for decades. In fact, historian Lisa McGirr argues that anti-Communism helped “cement” myriad constituencies together under the conservative umbrella during the postwar period because so many Americans worked in the Cold War industry.15 However, by the 1970s, the Vietnam War was beginning to disillusion the public with anti-Communism, leading both conservatives and liberals to alter their viewpoints. Previously conservatives had argued for pushing the Communists back from their territorial gains, while liberals had advocated containment. In the 1970s, the bloody foreign war was pushing the conservatives toward containment and liberals away from anti-Communism all together, preferring isolationism. The popular press began to describe liberalism’s phi- losophy as “back to isolationism via pacifism,” and conservatism began to more and more resemble older containment policies from the mid-century Lef.16 However, a small, em- battled group of Democrats remained fervently committed to anti-Communism, and they fought to regain control of their party throughout that decade. They soon came to be known as the neoconservatives. Ultimately, the group would fail in their “battle for the soul” of the Democratic Party, aligning themselves instead with the Republicans in 1980.17 In the United Nations in 1973, Buckley’s conservative anti-Communist rhetoric strikingly mir- rored what the Democratic neoconservatives were arguing simultaneously, just on the other side of the aisle. Both Buckley and the neoconservatives borrowed from President Truman’s mid- century rhetoric, which he used while expanding America’s presence in the postwar era. In the 1970s, Buckley and the neoconservatives co-opted his language to argue for diplomati- cally confronting and militarily containing Communism. Measures like the Jackson-Vanik amendment exemplified their aims: confronting the USSR on human rights and supporting American interventionism. Buckley and neoconservative leaders like Daniel Patrick Moyni- han used their UN seat to urge the Nixon administration to take a stronger stance against the USSR—at times with grave consequences, because their words threatened to compro- mise the State Department’s overarching policy of détente, a foreign afairs mindset of the late ‘60s and ‘70s aimed at relaxing tensions with the USSR and moving “from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.” The Nixon administration worried that détente could be compromised if rhetoric from Buckley or the neoconservatives humiliated or con- demned the Soviets.18 In 1973, the State Department prioritized its foreign policy—which had just helped win a re-election—far over Buckley’s desires to highlight Soviet human rights abuses.19 The American UN delegation repeatedly vetoed and silenced his speeches. However, his frus- 143 FORESHADOWING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE trated rhetoric prefigured a growing bridge between the neoconservatives and the con- servatives, based upon anti-Communism and international interventionism. Buckley’s statements at the United Nations in the fall of 1973 foreshadowed the neoconservative- conservative alliance that would come to fruition in 1980. ROOTS ON THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT At the 2010 Organization of American Historians, a panel discussion was devoted to the topic, “How Should Historians Study Conservatism Now That Studying the Right is Trendy?”20 The last twenty years have seen a surge of interest in conservatism among historians, and much of this new body of literature argues with the traditional view of conservatism as “backlash politics.”21 Previous histories had traced the twentieth century’s development in terms of the civil, gay, and women’s rights movements, portraying the right as an ever-present pushback to progressive forces. These writers saw conservatism as isolated and marginalized in the national political arena. Even Ronald Reagan’s presidency, which most historians call a climax for conservatism in the 20th century, had been described as a backlash against black militancy, the gay rights and women’s rights movements, and Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society.22 However, in the last two decades, a new wave of scholarship has begun to paint conservatism as a powerful parallel movement, developing alongside liberalism in constant contest and struggle. Conservative histories now describe a movement with original policy beliefs—a force that debated liberalism, rather than simply opposing it. Many historians now accept that significant parts of the American population opposed liberal reforms like the New Deal and the Great Society. Kim Philips-Fein argues that within this popular base, widespread support for conservative ideas like Reagan’s had been building for decades.23 She writes that 1980 represented a shif in American politics toward the right,