Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict DAVID L. ROUSSEAU Stanford University Press 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page i Democracy and War 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page ii This page intentionally left blank 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page iii Democracy and War Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict david l. rousseau Stanford University Press Stanford, California 2005 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page iv Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2005 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rousseau, David L. Democracy and war : institutions, norms, and the evolution of international conflict / David L. Rousseau. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-8047-5081-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. War—Political aspects— Case studies. 2. Democracy. I. Title. jz6385.r68 2005 327.1Ј17—dc22 2004018552 Original Printing 2005 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Typeset by G&S Book Services in 10.5/12.5 Bembo 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page v For Ellie, Nate, and Lynn 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page vi This page intentionally left blank 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page vii Contents List of Tables and Figures xiii Acknowledgments xvii 1. Introduction: Domestic Institutions, Political Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict 1 Central Questions 4 Methodology 11 Overview of the Book 13 Significance of the Project 14 Notes 15 2. The Impact of Institutions and Norms in International Crises 18 Structural Explanations of the Democratic Peace 20 Normative Explanations of the Democratic Peace 27 Testing the Arguments 29 The Dependent Variables 34 Specific Hypotheses and Operationalizations 38 Analysis and Results 43 Case Studies 48 The Suez Crisis: Why Don’t Monadic Norms and Institutions Constrain? 49 Motives for British Intervention 51 Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the British 53 International Considerations for Britain 56 Motives for French Intervention 57 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page viii viii Contents Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the French 58 International Considerations for France 59 Motives for Israeli Intervention 60 Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the Israelis 61 International Considerations for Israel 62 Conclusions from the Suez Crisis 63 The Ecuador-Peru Dispute: Conflict in a Democratic Dyad 66 Background 67 Recent Crises 68 Conclusions from the Ecuador-Peru Case Study 79 Conclusions 79 Appendix 2.1: Dropping the Aggressive Leader Assumption 80 Appendix 2.2: Crisis Data Set: 337 Conflict Dyads in 301 International Crises 83 Appendix 2.3: Crises from the ICB Data Set That Have Been Deleted or Merged 89 Appendix 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis 91 Notes 92 3. International Disputes and the Evolution of Conflict 100 The Dispute Data Set 103 Hypotheses and Analysis 105 Case Studies 116 Israel and Egypt in the 1967 Six Days’ War 117 Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus and the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus 121 Conclusions 129 Appendix 3.1: Dispute Data Set—223 International Conflicts 130 Appendix 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis Displaying Results with the Inclusion of Additional Control Variables 133 Notes 133 4. Institutional Constraint Versus Regime Type 139 The Institutional Constraint Model 140 Recent Research 145 Variables and Specific Hypotheses 148 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page ix Contents ix Analyses and Results 151 Case Studies 157 India Versus Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh Independence War 158 Motives for Indian Intervention 158 Domestic Factors 160 International Considerations 162 Decisions to Intervene 163 El Salvador Versus Honduras in the 1969 Football War 166 Institutional Structures in El Salvador 167 Motives for Salvadoran Intervention 170 Domestic Factors 172 International Considerations 173 The War and Its Consequences 173 The United Kingdom Versus the Soviet Union During the Russian Civil War 174 Motives for British Intervention 175 Domestic Factors 179 Constraint and Two Monarchies: Saudi Arabia and Jordan 182 Saudi Arabia 183 Jordan 187 Conclusions 191 Appendix 4.1: Nested Versus Nonnested Models of the Democratic Peace 193 Notes 194 5. Political Norms Versus Institutional Structures 201 A Typology of Norms 206 Test 1: New Political Norms Variables for the Statistical Model 208 Test 2: Testing Political Norms with a Logit Model 214 Test 3: A Laboratory Experiment 219 Hypotheses 222 Research Design 225 Experimental Findings 227 Case Studies 232 Middle East Campaign, 1941 (United Kingdom Versus Iraq), and Occupation of Iran, 1941 (United Kingdom Versus Iran) 233 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page x x Contents Motives for British Intervention in Iraq 233 The Crisis 235 Motives for British Intervention in Iran 237 Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force 239 Bay of Pigs, 1961 (United States Versus Cuba) 241 Motives for U.S. Intervention 242 Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force 243 Consequences of Intervention 247 Invasion of Grenada, 1983 (United States Versus Grenada) 250 Motives for U.S. Intervention 250 Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force 253 Conclusions 256 Appendix 5.1: Scenario Wording by Dimension 257 Appendix 5.2: Experimental Survey Instrument 259 Notes 260 6. Democratization and International Conflict 268 Mansfield and Snyder’s Theoretical Argument 268 Critics of Mansfield and Snyder’s Original Analysis 270 Mansfield and Snyder’s Response 271 Regime Change, Norms, and Structures 272 Conceptualizing Regime Change 274 The Data Set, Hypotheses, and Variables 274 Case Studies 281 Somalia Versus Ethiopia 281 The Teschen Crisis, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Poland), and the Hungarian War, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Hungary) 292 Conclusions 300 Notes 301 7. The Evolution of Conflicts, Institutions, and Norms: An Agent-Based Simulation 306 Strengths and Weaknesses of Agent-Based Computer Simulations 307 Cederman’s Agent-Based Model 309 Adding Domestic Politics to the Simulation 314 Expanding Phases of Conflict 314 Incorporating a Trait Structure 315 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page xi Contents xi Traits 315 Mutation 318 Learning 318 Incorporating Domestic Political Opposition 319 Simulation Results 321 Conclusions 326 Appendix 7.1: DomGeoSim Parameter Dictionary and Comparison of Parameters with GeoSim 328 Notes 337 8. Conclusions 339 Synthesizing Across Cases: The Breakdown of Structural and Normative Constraints 341 Future Research 347 Notes 349 Bibliography 351 Index 375 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page xii This page intentionally left blank 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page xiii Tables and Figures tables 1.1 Regime type versus regime change 9 2.1 Regime type and war involvement, 1816 –1982 19 2.2 Probit analysis of the democratic peace model using the crisis data set 43 2.3 Marginal effects on the democratic peace model using the crisis data set 45 2.4 Ecuadorian elections for the unicameral legislature, April 1979 73 2.5 Peruvian legislative elections, May 1980 74 2.6 Combining militarism and internationalism 82 3.1 Probit analysis with aggressive use of force dependent variable and dispute data set 107 3.2 Marginal effects with aggressive use of force dependent variable and dispute data set 109 3.3 Sensitivity analysis with the dispute data set, 1960 – 88 112 3.4 Distribution of seats in the Israeli Knesset in 1967 118 3.5 Seats in the lower house of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1961–73 126 4.1 Correlations between institutional constraint and Polity IV measures 151 4.2 Probit analysis using the aggressive use of force dependent variable and the international dispute data set, 1960 – 88 152 4.3 Marginal effects of the estimated coefficients from the institutional constraint model 153 4.4 Example of interactive “no legislature” term 155 4.5 Refugees from East Pakistan living in India, 1971 160 4.6 Seats held in the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha), 1967–71 162 00-S3154-FM 1/27/05 7:44 AM Page xiv xiv Tables and Figures 4.7 Legislative elections in El Salvador 168 4.8 Allied interventions in the Russian Civil War 175 4.9 Nested comparison of democracy and institutional constraint models using the aggressive use of force dependent variable and the dispute data set, 1960 – 88 193 5.1 Categorization of norms 207 5.2 Probit analysis incorporating the political norms variables 212 5.3 Marginal effects of the full model with the normative variables 213 5.4 Unordered logit analysis of crises and disputes 217 5.5 Balance of military forces and willingness to use force 228 5.6 Opponent’s regime type and willingness to use force 229 5.7 Domestic political position and willingness to use force 229 5.8 Opponent’s regime type and willingness to use force when facing a favorable military situation 230 5.9 Opponent’s regime type and willingness to use force covertly 231 5.10 Opponent’s regime type and willingness to use force after a first use of force by the opponent 232 5.11 Distribution of seats in U.S. Congress, 1961 248 5.12 President Kennedy’s approval rating, 1961 249 5.13 Timeline of the U.S. invasion of Grenada 252 5.14 Distribution of seats in U.S. Congress, 1983 253 5.15 President Reagan’s approval