PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS by Adam Curran Reid A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Queen's University Kingston, Ontario, Canada August 2010 Copyright c Adam Curran Reid, 2010 To Tina Vashistha: I could never have come this far without your love and support. For your strength, your inspiration, and for always believing in me, even when I doubted myself, I dedicate this to you. xo, always - Adam Abstract The following thesis is concerned with the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of phenomenal consciousness (viz. subjective experience, or qualia). My primary aim is to adjudicate the ongoing dialectic between dualists and physicalists regarding the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness|physical or nonphysical|by examining the two major arguments most commonly deployed against physicalism: namely, the zombie argument (Chalmers), and the knowledge argument (Jackson). I conclude by showing that once physicalism has been shorn of the various doctrines that it need not and ought not accept|that is, once we are clear about what, precisely, the fundamental doctrine of physicalism actually is|it becomes clear that these arguments do not go through, and that dualism has not made its case. I also argue that the task of actually disarming these arguments (in the right way) is critically instructive to contemporary physicalists, as this helps to nourish a clearer overall understanding of what physicalism (properly understood) is, and is not, committed to. In Chapter One I lay the groundwork for the aforementioned anti-physicalist arguments by explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase \phenomenal consciousness" and its various synonyms. I then briefly summarize the mind-body problem and articulate the so-called explanatory gap therein. Chapter Two looks at the zombie argument (as articu- lated by David Chalmers, 1996) and finds that the argument itself, as stated, actually has very little to do with defending dualism against physicalism, but rather is ultimately an argument for epiphenomenalism|which, I argue, is untenable. Chapter Three examines Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism. Here I show why the argument itself fails to support property dualism, but also why the standard physicalist objections to it fail. I argue that Mary does indeed learn facts about the world upon her release, and that physicalists must face up to this squarely. I then show that physicalism (properly understood) is entirely compatible with this admission. Chapter Four examines a kind of rehabilitated version of the zombie argument in the context of a larger discussion about the relation between conceivability and possibility. i Acknowledgements First and foremost I would like to thank the Department of Philosophy at Queen's Uni- versity, for its generous financial assistance during the year, and for its commitment to providing a friendly and intellectually supportive atmosphere in which to pursue graduate studies in philosophy. Looking back on the experience, the past year has provided ev- erything I had hoped for from a Master's degree: lasting friendships; strong philosophical instruction and lively debate; and, above all, a solid foundation and hunger for more study. Thanks also to the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, whose financial support in the form of an Ontario Graduate Scholarship helped to make this year possible for me. Special thanks to my supervisor, Deborah Knight, whose enthusiastic comments and helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this manuscript were of great assistance. As a super- visor, Deborah struck exactly the right balance between gentle guidance and firm nudging, and I'm convinced that my argument is clearer, more persuasive, and more original because of this. Thanks also to Deborah for first introducing me to the philosophy of mind in gen- eral, and to the `hard problem' in particular. It was her engaging lectures on the subject that first ignited my philosophical curiosity for these questions as a senior undergraduate student, so it's fitting that our many discussions throughout the course of this project have served only to deepen my interest, and to kindle my enthusiasm all the more. I would also like to thank the Queen's Philosophy graduate student community. Por- tions of this thesis were presented as works-in-progress at the Graduate Colloquium, and I am grateful to Katherine Wayne for organizing this series, and to all who participated in making it a success. In particular, the comments and suggestions raised here were invalu- able in showing me where the structure and development of my argument could be made clearer or more direct. I must also give special thanks to my friends and family for all their love, patience, and support throughout the past year. In particular I would like to thank Catherine French, Torin Doppelt, and especially Tina Vashistha | all of whom have generously participated in more late-night philosophical conversations about qualia, zombies, and imaginary super scientists named Mary than any sane person should have to endure. To be sure, virtually nothing worth reading in contemporary philosophy is ever produced entirely in isolation, and this thesis is no exception. ii Finally, as with any undertaking of this size and scale, this project owes a singular debt to the various philosophers whose ideas I discuss | in particular David J. Chalmers, whose absorbing book The Conscious Mind is the touchstone work that this thesis explores. Though the final argument defended here is fundamentally critical of Chalmers' overall account, the exceptional clarity and rigor with which he consistently expresses and defends his position were both instructive and inspiring in my efforts to formulate an alternative stance on the consciousness debate. Indeed, as someone who, in recent years, actually thought himself to be an aspiring political philosopher, it was the experience of reading The Conscious Mind, more than anything else, that taught me what a truly fascinating field of study the philosophy of mind can be. iii CHAPTER ONE Experience and the Explanatory Gap In his classic paper \What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel provides the following widely employed analytic definition of phenomenal consciousness. No doubt it occurs in countless forms unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behaviour of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism|something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience.1 Excluding any potential misgivings about the philosophical merits of such armchair theorizing across species, few deny that Nagel's definition helpfully describes a phenomenon that actually exists in the world|even if we can only really be sure that it exists in the case of human beings.2 However, despite such consensus at the purely descriptive level, there is much debate in contemporary philosophy of mind surrounding the ontological status of 1Thomas Nagel, \What is it Like to be a Bat?", in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 435-50. p.436. Emphasis in original. 2I confess, to my mind restricting the special scope of phenomenal consciousness to human beings alone seems little more than bald anthropocentrism. This particular debate, however, falls outside the scope of this treatise, and I will not consider it here. 1 CHAPTER 1. EXPERIENCE AND THE EXPLANATORY GAP phenomenal consciousness. This is because Nagel's definition—namely, that a mental state is a conscious state just in case there is \something it is like" to be in that state|is, by itself, \topic-neutral" with respect to the further question of whether the nature of the phenomenon described is, ontologically, physical or nonphysical in kind. On one end of this debate are those who insist, in varying degrees and with various arguments, that it is just obvious that consciousness is irreducibly ontologically distinct in kind from, say, tables and chairs, since what it means for something to be physical is, fundamentally, for it to be spatially extended. Proponents of this view, called \dualism," typically preface their arguments by highlighting the following sorts of considerations. Con- sider the brain. The average human brain weighs 14oz, is dull grey in hue and is probably somewhat soggy to the touch. More to the point, each of these attributes clearly betokens the fact that the brain is an extended and hence a physical thing. But what about the mind? Quite unlike the brain, the mind is something that is defined in terms of such seem- ingly intangible phenomena as thought, belief, perception, memory, and so on. Now, on the face of it, it seems pretty clear that all of these phenomena are not the sorts of things that one can plausibly describe as extended. It would be absurd, for example, to wonder how much a given thought or memory \weighs." Likewise, even though there is no doubt some very specific neurophysiological event(s) taking place inside my head when I experience, say, a green afterimage, there is certainly no corresponding \green spot" on my brain|rather, there is just so much whirring microscopic electro-physiochemical activity. But where, then, does the afterimage occur? The reason I draw the reader's attention to these remarks is to underscore the consid- erable raw intuitive force of the classic Cartesian stance on the mind-body problem, which holds that while the brain is a material thing that exists in both time and space, the mind is immaterial in nature, and thus exists in time but not space.