Russia and Europe (1547–1917) by Martin Aust Over the last five centuries, Russia and Europe have been closely interconnected politically, economically and culturally. Particularly from the 18th century onward, the relationship between Russia and other European countries and societies extended beyond dynastic links, political alliances, economic trade and individual cultural transfers. The relationship between Russia and Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was characterized by a high degree of cultural interconnection. Over the past three centuries, Russia and Europe were observed and commented upon in relation to one another in travelogues, the press, literature, the philosophy of history and historiography. Thus, comparisons between the two regions must be incorporated into a history of reciprocal perceptions and interactions. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction 2. Moscow and Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries: Pragmatism and Opening 3. Russia and Europe in the 18th Century: Empire and Civilization 4. Russia and Europe 1789–1855: Revolution, Nation and Empire 5. Russia and Europe in 1855–1917: Empire and Globalization 6. Appendix 1. Sources 2. Literature 3. Notes Indices Citation Introduction In the historiography, the topic of "Russia and Europe" has a tradition of its own. The depiction of this relationship occurred in constant correspondence with politics, the press and also mythical motifs, and reflected changing cognitive maps (➔ Media Link #ab) of Russia and Europe (➔ Media Link #ac). In the first half of the 19th century, the university disciplines of history, Slavic languages, and geography brought an end to the European perception of Russia as being in northern Europe. These disciplines, but also popular publishing, now located Russia in the east of Europe.1 This created the cognitive map on which the university discipline of "eastern European history" – which emerged in the late 19th century initially in Berlin and Vienna – located Russia.2 However, opinion regarding the positioning of Russia with regard to the present and history of Europe was not only important in Europe. For Russian historians in the 19th century, it was equally central. From 1818 onward, Nikolai M. Karamzin (1766–1826) (➔ Media Link #ad) published a history of the Russian state in which he depicted the emergence of autocracy as being unique and specific to Russia on the one hand, while on the other hand describing the history of Russia as being of equal importance to the national histories of other European states.3 Sergei M. Solovev (1820–1879) (➔ Media Link #ae) viewed Russian history from a Hegelian perspective as following a general pattern of progression which can be observed in world history – but under specifically Russian conditions. In the enormous territory of Russia, he argued, historical processes move at a slower pace than in the smaller spaces of Europe.4 In his comprehensive account of Russian history, Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii (1841–1911) (➔ Media Link #af) pointed out that even before Peter the Great (1672–1725, reigned 1682/1689–1725) (➔ Media Link #ag) a noticeable Europeanization of Russia had occurred, with baroque culture and humanist ideals of education being transferred to Russia from Poland and the Ukraine.5 In 1925, Sergei F. Platonov (1860–1933) (➔ Media Link #ah) described the extent of contact between Muscovite Russia and Europe in the 15th to the 17th centuries, impressively summarizing the state of knowledge on this subject in pre‐revolutionary historiography.6 ▲1 Soviet historiography only related the history of Russia to European contexts in an indirect way. It was primarily concerned with the historical legitimisation of the October Revolution and of the first socialist state in the world. The historical genealogy of that state was traced with reference to the Marxist model, which viewed feudalism, capitalism and socialism as following in sequence. Explicit comparisons between Russia and Europe did not fit into this historiographical endeavour. However, this Marxist image of history made the history of Russia appear as a concept developed with reference to European examples.7 ▲2 Over the past fifty years in Europe, the historiography has been heavily influenced by three approaches to the history of Russia when considering the Russian relationship with Europe: (1) social, economic, and everyday history (Alltagsgeschichte);8 (2) the history of ideas and (3) cultural history. In individual cases, there was also a degree of overlap between these three approaches. Social and economic history viewed the history of Russia through the prism of its supposed backwardness in comparison with Europe and the west. Modernization theory provided the reference points of a capitalist economy, bureaucratic governance, a state based on laws and societal self‐organization, milestones which the history of Russia had supposedly not yet reached. Thus, the history of Imperial Russia could be written as a history of state reforms, which almost invariably did not yield the desired results and most certainly did not close the developmental gap between European societies and Russia.9 "Gesellschaft als staatliche Veranstaltung" (society as a state event) and "geborgter Imperialismus" (borrowed imperialism) were phrases which neatly encapsulated these views.10 World‐system historical approaches attempted to explain the supposed backwardness of Russia not endogenously, but in terms of interdependence in a global economic division of labour between peripheries, semi‐peripheries and core societies in the modern period. In this model, Russia, as an important exporter of raw materials and a great power, was viewed as an example of a semi‐peripheral society.11 ▲3 In the 20th century, the history of ideas worked its way through all of the historical‐philosophical material which the reciprocal Russian and European discourses of self‐reassurance in the 18th and 19th centuries had produced.12 Imagological research should also be mentioned in this context.13 Additionally, social‐historical approaches to the history of the Russian intelligentsia were also explored, comparing this group with intellectuals in France, Germany and Poland.14 ▲4 Since the 1990s, cultural history has fundamentally changed the view of Russia and Europe. Research into cognitive maps has brought a new awareness of the cultural construction of concepts of space into historiography. The shifting of Russia from the north to the east of Europe in European perceptions of the other in the first half of the 19th century is a prime example of this.15 Cultural history has replaced social‐historical and economic‐historical comparisons and the focus on high culture and imagology, which was typical of the history of ideas, with cultural transfer. Transfers to Russia, but also the reception of Russia in Europe and the world are now central research topics.16 Finally, the status of actors, their options for action and their autobiographical practices have received far greater importance in recent research. "Russia and Europe", "west and east" now no longer appear as structural constraints, but as contexts in which actors choose to position themselves in particular ways.17 ▲5 Once again, experiences in the present, such as the end of the Soviet Union and the transformation of cognitive maps which resulted from it, have demonstrated how much they can influence academic knowledge. In the American academic system, Eurasia has increasingly emerged as a region in which the history of Russia is located.18 Finally, global history deserves mention as the most recent factor in the depiction of the history of Russia and Europe. For about the last two decades, historiography has been dominated by a world and global history which seeks to counteract Eurocentrism. The imperative of provincializing the category of Europe, including the removal of its normative position with regard to other regions of the world, has also affected depictions of the long‐running topic of "Russia and Europe".19 The history of the relationship between Russia and Europe can no longer be enclosed within the borders of Russia and Europe, which are in any case not unambiguous. There are obvious world and global historical contexts. This becomes clear when Russian elites appear outside Europe as proponents of a European civilizing mission, and, conversely, when in African and Asian perceptions Russia is categorized as belonging to Europe.20 ▲6 The chronological depiction below of the relationship between Russia and Europe primarily attempts to examine popular concepts of Russia and Europe in a more nuanced way. Instead of drawing a hard distinction between the supposedly closed Muscovite Russia and the Europeanized empire ruled from St. Petersburg from the 18th century onward, I will attempt to point out multiple contrasts. The central focus is placed on perceptions and interactions in the areas of politics, economics, religion and culture. In this, travellers also appear as important intermediaries. A number of transfer processes can be identified for Muscovite Russia of the 16th and particularly the 17th century, while many trends in the 18th century demonstrate how keen people were to experiment with European influences. Finally, in the second half of the 19th century, Russia increasingly participated in processes of internationalization. ▲7 Moscow and Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries: Pragmatism and Opening Moscow and Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries: Pragmatism and Opening For foreign travellers, it was no easy task to gain