Yi T’oegye on Transcending the Problem of Evil: A Neo-Confucian and Interreligious Perspective Edward Y. J. Chung Acta Koreana, Volume 22, Number 2, December 2019, pp. 249-265 (Article) Published by Keimyung University, Academia Koreana For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/756405 [ Access provided at 30 Sep 2021 00:21 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] ACTA KOREANA Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019: 249–266 doi:10.18399/acta.2019.22.2.003 Yi T’oegye on Transcending the Problem of Evil: A Neo-Confucian and Interreligious Perspective EDWARD Y. J . CHUNG Evil is a key concept in Confucianism and other world religions. The problem of evil is therefore central to our interreligious discussion of human nature and the world. In Western scholarship, however, Confucian moral idealism is occasionally criticized for being too optimistic or unable to articulate the nature of evil; it is philosophically or theologically weak, also due to the absence of an omnipotent, omniscient God (divine law-giver). If we take the Confucian doctrine of innate human goodness for granted, how do we explain the active presence of evil in the human world? This article discusses the heart of T’oegye’s thought by focusing on the problem of evil and the way to transcend it. Yi Hwang 李滉 (T’oegye 退溪, 1501– 1570) was an eminent Korean thinker who greatly influenced Neo-Confucian ethics and spirituality. By using a textual and interpretive approach, I present his major works including the Sŏnghak sipto 聖學十圖 (Ten diagrams on sage learning), Chasŏngnok 自省錄 (Record of self-reflection), and “Four-Seven Debate Letters.” T’oegye eloquently criticized the origin of moral evil and emphasized a self- transcending way to remove evil and do good. What is important about his EDWARD Y. J. CHUNG ([email protected]) is Asian Studies Director and Professor of Religious Studies, Department of Religious Studies, University of Prince Edward Island. * This article is the revised version of a paper I presented at the International Conference on Good and Evil in Korean Philosophy, Religion, and Spirituality: Korean Ideas and Their Global Implications, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, June 14–15, 2018. I am pleased to have organized this conference in collaboration with the NAKPA (North American Korean Philosophical Association). In particular, the conference was generously funded by an international Seed Program for Korean Studies grant (AKS–2017– INC–2230001) through the Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service (KSPS), the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS). 250 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019 interpretation and how does it enrich our global understanding of good and evil? I conclude by considering this and related questions from a comparative and interreligious standpoint. Keywords: T’oegye, Yi Hwang, Korean, Neo-Confucian, evil, interreligious, comparative I. T’oegye on the Problem of Evil The problem of evil is discussed in Korean Neo-Confucianism, especially T’oegye’s famous works such as the Sǒnghak sipto (Ten diagrams on sage learning), Chasŏngnok (Record of self- reflection), and Four-Seven debate letters.1 In general, the Confucian tradition developed a theory of “moral evil” in terms of human nature. It affirms the presence of evil acts in human behaviour and the world. In Korea, T’oegye studied and debated not only textual and philosophical questions about the problem of evil in terms of human nature, emotions, and cravings, but also the proper understanding of the difference between good and evil and its implication for moral and spiritual self-cultivation. The challenging question for T’oegye was: what causes evil? T’oegye affirms the teaching of Mencius (372–289 BCE): “If one becomes evil (K. pulsŏn, C. bushan 不善), it is not the fault of one’s natural endowment” (Mencius 6A:6, my translation; see also Lau trans. 1970, 163). In other words, evil not inborn because it comes from one’s neglect to express our natural goodness inherent in the mind-and-heart (K. sim, C. xin 心) So evil is due to one’s failure to practice one’s good mind-and-heart (Mencius 6A:8, Lau trans. 1970, 165) or to control bad internal or external influences. In the Zhu Xi 朱子 Neo-Confucian context, this is because human existence is continuously subject to various material, physical, psychological, and social factors, which can lead to either good or evil. As articulated by T’oegye, Mencius’ belief in “the original goodness of human nature” includes the “mind-and-heart” (K. sim, C. xin 心) of commiseration and that of the moral discernment of right and wrong, which are the “beginnings” (K. tan, C. duan 端) of our innate virtues such as benevolence and wisdom, respectively; therefore, All human beings have the mind-and-heart “sensitive to the suffering of others” (Mencius 2A:6, Lau trans. 1970, 82).2 According to Mencius, the “mind-and-heart” of commiseration is also a genuine 1 For a full English translation of the Sŏnghak sipto, see Kalton 1988 or Chung 1995. For Four-Seven debate letters, see Yi 1971–85, 16:8a–17:6b, V1: 402–30; Kalton, et al. 1994; Chung 1995. Chung 2016 is a full translation of the Chasŏngnok with annotation, commentary, and a comprehensive introduction. 2 The following passage also explains his basic Confucian doctrine: “All human beings have the mind-and-heart of commiseration, the mind-and-heart of shame and dislike, the mind-and-heart of respect and reverence, and the mind-and-heart of moral discernment of right and wrong. The mind-and-heart of commiseration pertains to benevolence... Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are. within us originally [in our nature].” (Mencius 6A:6, my translation; see also Lau trans. 1970, 163). Chung: Yi T’oegye on Transcending the Problem of Evil 251 moral “emotion/feeling” (K. chŏng, C. qing 情) (Mencius 6A:6)3 aroused from inside. Everyone would have the innate moral feeling of commiseration (compassion), as the beginning of the virtuous action of benevolence (human-heartedness; in/ren 仁), to immediately save “a young child on the verge of falling into a well” (Mencius 2A: 6, Lau trans. 1970, 82). When one is benevolent, one not only expresses the virtue of benevolence but also acts out of the moral feeling (mind-and-heart) of commiseration (compassion).4 In this regard, T’oegye certainly supports Mencius’ deep ontological conviction that these innate qualities are the moral feelings and actions that make human beings fundamentally good (Chung 1995). For T’oegye, the Four Beginnings of virtue—namely, the four-fold mind-and-heart (moral feelings) of commiseration, shame and dislike, courtesy and modesty, and discernment of right and wrong—pertain to the Mencian belief in “the original goodness of human nature” (K. sŏngsŏn chi sŏng, C. xingshan zhi xing 性善之性).5 The so-called child metaphor of the pure mind-and-heart (Mencius 7A:15, Lau trans. 1970, 184) therefore justifies the moral ideas of “innate knowledge [of good]” (K. yangji, C. liangzhi 良知) and “innate ability [to do good]” (K. yangnŭng, C. liangneng 良能). In other words, T’oegye concurs with this Mencian teaching that “the child-like heart” of original human goodness naturally enables everyone to love, to be filial to, one’s parents and to choose good over evil. Nonetheless, the potential problem of evil as part of “inborn human nature” is also in the Book of Mencius: Gaozi 告子 (ca. 420–ca. 350 BCE), a controversial thinker, debated Mencius, arguing that human nature is (n)either good (n)or bad because it is “like whirling water….It shows no preference for either good or evil….” (Mencius 6A: 2; see also Lau trans. 1970, 160; Chan 1963b, 52). T’oegye, like Zhu Xi and other leading Neo-Confucians, rejected Gaozi’s view by asserting that Gaozi failed to understand the inner “essence of human nature,” which includes four cardinal moral principles and virtues, such as benevolence (human-heartedness), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. Gaozi’s flaw was therefore due to his shallow and narrow interest in analyzing only physical and psychological things, such as cravings for food and sex, as the inborn aspects of human nature. About a century after Mencius, Xunzi 荀子 (c. 310–220 BCE) developed a philosophy of evil, according to which all human beings are born with their natural tendencies and inclinations for selfish profit and gain that will lead to evil if not properly regulated by institutional systems of rules and regulations (Xunzi, Hutton trans. 2014). T’oegye was aware 3 In this article, we translate the term chŏng (C. qing) as “emotion(s),” “feeling(s),” or more inclusively “emotions and feelings.” This important Confucian idea generally refers to “emotions” as well as “feelings”; we therefore use two English words “feelings” and “emotions” interchangeably. As we know, the word “emotion” refers to “a moving, stirring, agitation and perturbation,” whereas the word “feeling” means “the sense of touch in the looser acceptance of the term, in which it includes all physical sensibility not referable to the special senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell” (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 1971, s.v. “emotion.”). Overall, the term chŏng therefore means both feeling and emotion, engaging the body as well as the mind-and- heart. Emotion, as in the case of T’oegye’s moral philosophy and psychology, refers to an aroused physical or psychological state, often the result of a stimulation of the mind. 4 For including this point here, I would like to thank the second anonymous reviewer of the previous manuscript of this article.