Durham E-Theses Ethnic identity, political identity and ethnic conict: simulating the eect of congruence between the two identities on ethnic violence and conict WIGMORE-SHEPHERD, DANIEL,SEBASTIAN How to cite: WIGMORE-SHEPHERD, DANIEL,SEBASTIAN (2013) Ethnic identity, political identity and ethnic conict: simulating the eect of congruence between the two identities on ethnic violence and conict, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6971/ Use policy This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 (CC BY) Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 Ethnic identity, political identity and ethnic conflict: simulating the effect of congruence between the two identities on ethnic violence and conflict Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd Student ID 000181256 A thesis submitted for a Masters of Research in Social Anthropology The department of Anthropology Durham University 2012 “The day science begins to study non-physical phenomena, it will make more progress in one decade than in all the previous centuries of its existence.” Nikola Tesla Word count: 43,021 1 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 This thesis outlines and presents an alternative hypothetical process to the emergence of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts, rather than being dependent upon pre-existing ‘ancient hatreds’, are instead the result of a congruence between ethnic and political identity which grants individuals the ability to use ethnicity to identify and eliminate political threats. This hypothesis is formed by the examination of three case studies of ethnic conflict: Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Croatia. This hypothesis is then formalised and tested using an agent based simulation in which agent interactions are dependent upon ethnic and political identity and the congruence between the two. As predicted there was a strong positive correlation between how accurately ethnic identity reflected political identity and the level of ethnically motivated violence in the simulation, although the relationship was not linear. Furthermore the effect of a shift in congruence was found to be roughly comparable to the effect of initialising agents with a moderate level of pre-existing ethnic antagonism. 2 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 Contents 1.0 Introduction. P8. 1.1 Layout of the thesis. P9. 1.2 Thesis statement. P11. 2.0 Appropriate levels of abstraction and complexity in ABM applied to anthropology and social science. P12. 3.0 Concepts of ethnic and political identity. P19. 3.1 Development of the term ‘ethnic group’. P19. 3.2 Primordialism, instrumentalism, circumstantialism and situationalism. P19. 3.3 Identity ascription, constrained change, visibility and how ethnic identity compares to political opinion. P23. 3.4 Ethnicity, nation and the state. P26. 4.0 Ethnic Conflict: Features and Theories. P28. 4.1 Unique features of ethnic conflict. P28. 4.2 Ethnic identity in ethnic conflict. P28. 4.3 Theories on ethnic conflicts and the mechanisms governing their emergence. P29. 4.4 Primary hypothesis. P32. 5.0 The three case studies. P34. 5.1 Lebanon. P34. 5.1.1 Background to conflict. P34. 5.1.2 Anthropological analysis. P37. 5.2 Croatia. P41. 5.2.1 Background to conflict. P41. 5.2.2 Anthropological analysis. P45. 5.3 Northern Ireland. P49. 5.3.1 Background to conflict. P49. 5.3.2 Anthropological analysis. P53. 6.0 Common trends in the three cases. P58. 6.1 Externally verifiable ethnic identity.P58. 6.2 Political identity imposed on externally verifiable ethnic identity. P59. 6.3 Violence as an instigator of ethnic antagonism and further violence. P62. 7.0 The basic model. P64. 7.1 Model mechanics. P64. 7.2 Key questions. P66. 3 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 7.3 Model justification. P66. 7.4 Conceptual problems. P67. 7.5 Parameters and initial values. P67. 7.5.1 Lebanon. P68. 7.5.2 Croatia. P69. 7.5.3 Northern Ireland. P71. 7.5.4 Conclusion concerning the status of simulation inputs. P72. 8.0 Ethno-political congruence: methodology, results and discussion. P74. 8.1 Methodology. P74. 8.1.1 Procedure. P74. 8.1.2 Statistical tests. P74. 8.2 Results. P75. 8.2.1 Can ethnically based violence become dominant in the absence of initial ethnic antagonism? P75. 8.2.2 Does a higher ethno-political congruence lead to a higher proportion of ethnic attacks? P75. 8.2.3 Is there an initial congruence ratio that can prevent the escalation of ethnically motivated violence and violence in general? P78. 8.3 Discussion. P80. 9.0 Measuring the effect of different initial values of ethnic antagonism: methodology, results and discussion. P89. 9.1 Methodology. P89. 9.1.1 Procedure. P89. 9.1.2 Statistical tests. P89. 9.2 Results. P89. 9.2.1 Can a single side turn a politically motivated conflict into an ethnically motivated conflict? P89. 9.2.2 What has a larger effect: initial ethnic antagonism or ethno-political congruence? P94. 9.3 Discussion. P95. 10.0 Potential solutions explored through alterations to the basic model. P98. 10.1 Partition. P98. 10.1.1 The partition model. P98. 10.1.2 Procedure. P99. 4 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 10.1.3 Results. P99. 10.1.4 Discussion. P98. 10.2 Targeted violence and the removal of ‘communal’ guilt and blame. P105. 10.2.1 The non-collective blamemodel. P106. 10.2.2 Procedure. P106. 10.2.3 Results. P107. 10.2.4 Discussion. P110. 11.0 Are the traits of the simulation unique to ethnicity? P111. 12.0 Further developments for the model. P113. 13.0 Conclusion. P115. 14.0 References. P119. List of tables Table 1 Croat party allegiance by ethnicity. P70. Table 2 Congruence set Mann-Whitney test results. P75. Table 3 Mann-Whitney comparative tests: single and double sided initial ethnic antagonism. P94. Table 4 Mann-Whitney comparative tests: no initial antagonism, single sided antagonism, double sided antagonism. P94-95. List of figures Figure 1 Wolfram cellular autonoma. P12. Figure 2 Wolfram cellular autonoma – rule 30. P13. Figure 3 Wolfram cellular autonoma – rule 30 extended generations.P13. Figure 4 Congruence set box plot- ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P76. Figure 5 Congruence ratio 50:50 - ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks. P77. Figure 6 Congruence ratio 90:10 - ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks. P78. Figure 7 All congruence ratios - total attacks in turn. P79. Figure 8 All congruence ratios - ethnic attacks in turn. P79. 5 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 Figure 9 All congruence ratios - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P80. Figure 10 All congruence ratios - group 1 antagonism against group 2. P83. Figure 11 Congruence ratio 60:40 – intergroup antagonism. P85. Figure 12 Congruence ratio 50:50 – intergroup antagonism. P85. Figure 13 Ethnic Antagonism sets - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P90. Figure 14 Congruence ratio 70:30 – ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks. P91. Figure 15 Congruence ratio 60:40, group 1 ethnic antagonism 10 – ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks. P91. Figure 16 All sets – group 2 to group 1 ethnic antagonism. P92. Figure 17 Two sided ethnic Antagonism sets - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P93. Figure 18 Partition model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn. P99. Figure 19 Partition model all congruence ratios – total attacks in turn. P100. Figure 20 Partition model all congruence ratios – political attacks in turn. P101. Figure 21 Partition model all congruence ratios – group 1 ethnic antagonism to group 2. P103. Figure 22 Non-collective blame model all congruence ratios - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P107. Figure 23 Basic model all congruence ratios - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks. P108. Figure 24 Non-collective blame model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn. P109. Figure 25 Basic model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn.P109. On the memory stick Simulation results, simulation code, graphical versions of the simulation and licence agreement. 6 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 Statement of copyright The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. Acknowledgements I would like to thank both my supervisors, Jeremy Kendal and Stephen Lyon, for the necessary help and feedback I received throughout the year. I would like to give my particular thanks to Stephen Lyon who took a particular interest in this project and was extensively generous with his time, support and advice. I also owe my thanks to my two close personal friends Tobias Showan and St John Piano, who stimulated my interest in coding and its applications to the social sciences and without whom I would have been unable to begin the learning process. I owe particular thanks to St John Piano whose code forms the basis of the code for the agent and grid graphics of the graphical programs contained on the disc. I would also like to thank Jonathan Powell for taking the time to talk to me about the peace process in Northern Ireland and who continues to campaign and work towards peace with his group Inter Mediate. Lastly I would like to thank my parents who have given me a great deal of support and feedback this year and throughout my entire time in education. 7 Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd - 000181256 1.0 Introduction This thesis constructs a model exploring the relationship between ethnic and political identity and ethnic conflict. Originally the anthropological analysis of conflict was confined to sections of the holistic ethnographies that dominated early 20th century anthropology, such as Evans-Pritchard’s passing analysis of Nuer warfare in his monograph of the Nuer (Ferguson, 1984: 5).