State Building in Putin’s Russia Building a strong Russian state was the central goal of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This book argues that Putin’s strategy for rebuilding the state was fundamentally fl awed. Brian D. Taylor demonstrates that a disregard for the way state offi cials behave toward citizens – state quality – had a negative impact on what the state could do – state capacity. Focusing on those organizations that control state coercion, what Russians call the “power ministries,” Taylor shows that many of the weaknesses of the Russian state that existed under Boris Yeltsin persisted under Putin. Drawing on extensive fi eld research and interviews, as well as a wide range of comparative data, the book reveals the practices and norms that guide the behavior of Russian power ministry offi cials (the so-called silo- viki ), especially law enforcement personnel. By examining siloviki behav- ior from the Kremlin down to the street level, State Building in Putin’s Russia uncovers the who, where, and how of Russian state building after communism. Brian D. Taylor is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Previously, he served as Assistant Professor at the University of Oklahoma. He earned his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1998 and holds a master of science from the London School of Economics and a B.A. from the University of Iowa. He is a 2011 Fulbright Scholar to Russia and was a Carnegie Scholar from 2002 to 2003. He was also a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. He is the author of Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689– 2000 , and his work has appeared in Comparative Politics , Comparative Political Studies , Problems of Post-Communism , Europe-Asia Studies , International Studies Review , Survival , Millennium , and the Journal of Cold War Studies . “The ‘power ministries’ of the police, the security services, and the military have been central to state building efforts in post-Soviet Russia, but have been vastly under- studied. Brian Taylor’s fascinating book pries open the power ministries to explore how organizational pathologies, weak oversight, and increasingly authoritarian rule undermined efforts to build state capacity in Russia. Taylor demonstrates that in many respects, the state is hardly more effective under Putin than under Yeltsin, despite Russia’s return to economic growth and prominence on the international stage. With its keen attention to detail and impressive data collection, State Building in Putin’s Russia is an important work that should interest Russia watchers and scholars of state building alike.” – Timothy Frye, Columbia University “Brian Taylor offers a clear-eyed account of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild the power of the state in Russia in the 2000s. Taylor distinguishes between state capacity and state quality, and fi nds only modest improvements in state capacity under Putin and none in the degree to which the state actually serves the public interest. Focusing in particular on the coercive agencies of the state – the military, police, and security forces – Taylor shows that under Putin, they were largely ineffective in combating crime and terrorism but were often used for the purposes of political repression and intimidation. Taylor concludes that centralizing and consolidating power at the top is a very different enterprise from improving the quality of governance in a state.” – Thomas F. Remington, Emory University State Building in Putin’s Russia Policing and Coercion after Communism BRIAN D. TAYLOR Maxwell School, Syracuse University cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org /9780521760881 © Brian D. Taylor 2011 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2011 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Taylor, Brian D., 1964– State building in Putin’s Russia : policing and coercion after communism / Brian D. Taylor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-521-76088-1 (hardback) 1. Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 1952 – Political and social views. 2. Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich, 1931–2007 – Infl uence. 3. Russia (Federation) – Politics and government – 1991– 4. Post-communism – Russia (Federation) – History. 5. Power (Social sciences) – Russia (Federation) – History. 6. Federal government – Russia (Federation) – History. 7. Police power – Russia (Federation) – History. 8. Duress (Law) – Russia (Federation) – History. 9. State, The – History – 20th century. 10. State, The – History – 21st century. I. Title. dk510.766.p87t39 2010 947.086′2–dc22 2010037099 isbn 978-0-521-76088-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. To My Parents Contents List of Figures, Tables, and Maps page viii List of Abbreviations xi Acknowledgments xiii Note on Transliteration and Translation xvii Introduction 1 1 Bringing the Gun Back In: Coercion and the State 8 2 The Power Ministries and the Siloviki 36 3 Coercion and Capacity: Political Order and the Central State 71 4 Coercion and Capacity: Centralization and Federalism 112 5 Coercion and Quality: Power Ministry Practices and Personnel 156 6 Coercion and Quality: The State and Society 204 7 Coercion in the North Caucasus 250 8 State Capacity and Quality Reconsidered 284 Appendix A Publication Abbreviations 323 Appendix B Interview Index 325 References 331 Index 361 vii Figures, Tables, and Maps Figures 1.1 State quality and state capacity page 20 1.2 Political stability and state quality (WGI 2006) 21 2.1 Fragmentation and consolidation of the power ministries, 1986–2006 38 2.2 National defense and security and law enforcement in Russian budget, constant rubles, 1997–2007 53 2.3 Power ministry budget percentage comparison, 1999–2007 54 2.4 Tenure of FSB directors 56 2.5 Militarization of the Russian elite 58 2.6 Putin’s siloviki network, 2007 60 3.1 Political stability/no violence (WGI) 78 3.2 Deaths from terrorist attacks in Moscow, 1995–2007 85 3.3 Deaths by major terrorist attack, October 2001–June 2007 87 3.4 Government effectiveness (WGI) 90 3.5 Murders per 100,000 population, 1990–2007 92 3.6 Russian state fi scal capacity, 1993–2007 101 4.1 Regional police chief appointments, 1992–2006 136 4.2 Percentage of regional police chief appointments from outside region, 1993–2006 136 5.1 Rule of law (WGI) 159 5.2 Control of corruption (WGI) 160 5.3 Three models of policing 179 5.4 Russian law enforcement types 181 6.1 Trust in the power ministries 206 viii Figures, Tables, and Maps ix 6.2 How did the work of police and other law enforcement agencies change in the last year? 208 6.3 How did the state of citizens’ personal safety change in the last year? 210 6.4 Can the Russian authorities defend the Russian population against new terrorist attacks? 210 6.5 Annual number of pardons, 1995–2007 235 6.6 Voice and accountability (WGI) 245 7.1 Deaths from terrorism/insurgency, major attacks, North Caucasus, 2000–2007 259 7.2 Kidnappings, disappearances, and murders in Chechnya, 2002–2007 260 7.3 Deaths from terrorist incidents in Dagestan, 2002–2007 261 8.1 State capacity and per capita GNI 291 8.2 State quality and per capita GNI 292 8.3 Russia: State capacity versus state quality (WGI) 303 8.4 Weak state to police state? State building under Putin 304 8.5 Control over coercion: A typology 305 Tables 1.1 Elements of State Building 35 2.1 Main Power Ministries and Their Approximate Size, 2007 39 2.2 Police Personnel per 100,000 Inhabitants 48 3.1 Law Enforcement Capacity under Putin: Routine versus Exceptional Decisions 108 4.1 Control over Policing, Federal Political Systems 123 4.2 Legal Authority for Law Enforcement Budgetary Support, 1999 124 4.3 Polpreds by Federal District, May 2000–May 2008 131 4.4 Federal Districts and Power Ministry Personnel, 2002 and 2007 132 4.5 “Outsiders” in Regional Power Ministries, 2000–2007 138 5.1 Police Bribes “Price List,” 2002 171 5.2 Main Direction of Activity of Russian Law Enforcement Organs, Percent of Responses, 2006 180 5.3 Russian Encounters with Police Violence and Corruption 182 5.4 Turnover, Education, and Experience of MVD Investigators, 1993–2002 192 8.1 State Capacity (Dependent Variable) and Structural Factors (Wealth, Resource Dependence, Region) 296 x Figures, Tables, and Maps 8.2 State Quality (Dependent Variable) and Structural Factors (Wealth, Resource Dependence, Region) 296 8.3 Predicted Values for State Capacity and State Quality Compared to Actual Russian Scores 297 Maps 4.1 Russia’s federal districts, 2000–2009 129 7.1 North Caucasus 252 Abbreviations Cheka Extraordinary Commission CJA Center for Justice Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet