chapter v The Dutch fleet Each time international tension mounted, whether in Europe or in Asia, discus- sions flared up about the strength of the army and the Navy and their poten- tial role in repelling an invasion. At one end of the spectrum stood those who argued that the Navy would never be able to defeat an enemy fleet and that the land forces would have to be relied on for the defence of the Netherlands Indies. Carried to the extreme, the consequences of this view were that the Navy only needed one or two larger vessels to show the Dutch flag abroad and to impress the natives. No money should be expended on building large well-armoured and heavily armed ships (Boeka 1903:15). Others advocated precisely the opposite. Because the Netherlands could never fit out an army large enough to drive back an invader, not even were all the forces to be con- centrated in Java, all available means should be earmarked for the build-up of the fleet.1 Generally, whether it was in 1870, 1900, 1904 or 1914, such discus- sions tended to assume a fatalistic, pessimistic, and at times hysterical tone. The debate centred on weaknesses and not on strengths. Civilians did not put much faith in either the colonial army or the Navy. Both failed rather dismally to impress. The fleet the Dutch maintained in Netherland Indies waters was not exactly best suited to a demonstration of might. Its ships were outdated and small. Many of its sailors suffered from venereal diseases. In the Netherlands Indies about half of the crew members was affected. Nine per cent had contracted syphilis.3 Naval command tried to remedy the situation, but without avail. One of the rather naive measures taken had been to forbid shore leave in the evening. It did not work. The oppo- site was in fact observed: a significant increase. The social gap that separated the ordinary crewmen from the established society was great. A telling example of this was what happened during the visit of the warship Friesland to Padang in 1904. Unquestionably her arrival cheered up life in the city. The ‘Music, Drama and Gymnastic Society of 1 Indische Gids 1900, I:641. For a thorough analysis of colonial defense policy between 189 and 190, see Teitler 1988. 3 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:365. Kees van Dijk - 9789004260474 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 01:14:21PM via free access 9 The Netherlands Indies and the Great War the Petty Officers and Ratings’ put on a performance in the local club, De Eendracht. The audience was entertained with a comedy, ‘My lieutenant’, and comical sketches, the customary fare on such occasions in those days. The sailors made a good impression, not least because they showed a ‘decent and helpful attitude’ and had seen to it that ‘nobody, that is to say at least not the women, had to sit beside the sailors of lower rank’.4 Similar remarks can be made about the army. In 1904 De Locomotief con- cluded that it was ‘ill-trained and exhausted by the daily fight against the internal enemy, partly unshod and improperly armed’.5 Around the same time the same newspaper maintained that the army would not be able to accom- plish much against a foreign enemy.6 The army about which De Locomotief was writing consisted of European and indigenous soldiers. Neither group inspired the general public with much confidence. Many of the European sol- diers had been enticed by the bounty they received on enlisting, had signed up to try to escape poverty, or were on the run from the law. Soldiers were considered riff-raff and consequently treated as such. The European soldiers hovered on the fringes of the European colonial society. Even in the eyes of the Indonesian population, soldiers were inferior to other Europeans. As a newspaper noted around the turn of the century every Dutchman was a sir, a toean, to the natives. The exception was the soldiers, who were simply called soldadoe, soldiers.7 Indonesian soldiers, two thirds of them Javanese, did not fare much better in the public opinion of the European community. A note from the Department of the Colonies in 1906 observed that such soldiers came from the bottommost layers of society.8 Except at the times when their service was needed, all the prejudices the white European community cherished about the Indonesian population and its various ethnic groups resurfaced in full force when their performance in battle was discussed. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War De Locomotief wrote on a number of occasions that many native soldiers came from races devoid of military qualities, imbued with no or little martial spirit. The Javanese were useless in battle. They could not take on even an ‘inferior’ internal enemy on their own and when going into battle against such oppo- nents had to be accompanied by European soldiers.9 Native soldiers were dressed in European uniforms, but this did not make them good soldiers in European eyes. The fact that they went barefoot, as did the majority of the 4 De Locomotief, 22-3-1904. 5 De Locomotief, 5-1-1904, 3-1-1904. 6 De Locomotief, 7--1904. 7 De Locomotief, 8--1904. 8 Note Department C, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 13-7-1906 Q15. 9 De Locomotief, 5-1-1904, 3-1-1904. Kees van Dijk - 9789004260474 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 01:14:21PM via free access V The Dutch fleet 93 population, made them even less soldierly figures in the eyes of many white- men. Presumably shoes made the good soldier. When the matter of Dutch troops joining the expeditionary force in China had come up, it was argued that nothing was wrong with sending Indonesian troops, as long as they were Ambonese soldiers – who wore shoes – who were sent, and not others who still went barefoot.10 As late as 1913 De Locomotief wrote that the European, Ambonese and Manadonese soldiers could make good soldiers under the capable guidance of the Dutch officers. The Javanese were a different story. Most of them lacked the required physical and intellectual endowments. Even so, there was a gleam of hope. Till recently, De Locomotief continued, the Javanese had lacked the requisite physical and mental training in their youth, but times were chang- ing. In ‘our peculiar days’ the emergence of a nationalist movement had also manifested itself in an increased care of their bodies among the Javanese.11 The colonial army, it was also argued at that time in the Dutch senate, could not be expanded simply by recruiting more soldiers from among the local popula- tion; that would be detrimental to its fighting capability.1 That same year mili- tary experts had also decided that, for fighting a foreign enemy or for action in regions in the Archipelago home to warlike populations, half of the troops, no more, should consist of native soldiers, not more.13 Despite such stereotypes, hesitantly the idea dawned that Indonesian soldiers were in fact not inferior to their European brothers-in-arms. In Parliament L.F. Duymaer van Twist pointed out that there were ‘many good elements among the natives’. In the artillery corps they could hold their own with Europeans. What they lacked in physical strength, they made up by ‘thought, calmness, and caution’.14 The struggle for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region in the early twen- tieth century in which Japan, Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and Germany were the main contestants put the strengthening of the Dutch Navy high on the agenda. The danger of the threat of war was considered to loom largest in the colony, not in Europe. It had been argued as early as 1904 that the warships needed there should be more up-to-date than those in Holland itself. For the defence of the North Sea coast warships of the existing types, cast-offs so it were, would suffice.15 Ten years later the Minister of the Navy, J.J. Rambonnet, explained in Parliament that in Europe the main task of the Dutch fleet was to assist the army in guarding neutrality. The strategic location 10 De Locomotief, 0-7-1900. 11 De Locomotief, 0-10-1913, 1-11-1913. 1 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:65. 13 Rapport 1913:9. 14 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1339. 15 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1904-05:66-3. Kees van Dijk - 9789004260474 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 01:14:21PM via free access 94 The Netherlands Indies and the Great War of the homeland coupled with the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany made it unlikely that the Netherlands would become a party in a conflict in Europe. In the Netherlands Indies the threats of war were greater. In contrast to Holland, where the army formed an essential part of the defence strategy, in the Netherlands Indies it was the Navy that would have to bear the brunt of resisting foreign aggression.16 As elsewhere in the world on the eve of World War One, in the Netherlands voices pleading for a strong defence force became more vocal, especially when the Netherlands Indies was concerned. The question of whether the days of Dutch rule there without such a force were not numbered was hotly debated at home as well as in the colony. Many alarmist scenarios were presented. Fear intensified at the time of the Balkan Wars, when especially De Expres manifested what Rinkes called ‘evident nervousness’.17 Believing that the great powers were eventually to be dragged willy-nilly into the conflict, the newspaper urged ‘the comrades’ to organize and prepare for the moment that Java would have to face an aggressor.