APRIL 2013 Beyond the Last War Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM A Report of the CSIS International Security Program PROJECT PROGRAM CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS DIRECTOR DIRECTOR Stephanie Sanok Errol Laumann Sam Eaton Nathan Freier David Berteau Jacquelyn Guy Steven Nicolucci Megan Loney Curtis Buzzard J.P. Pellegrino Beyond the Last War Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM PROJECT DIRECTOR Nathan Freier PROGRAM DIRECTOR David Berteau CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS Stephanie Sanok Jacquelyn Guy Curtis Buzzard Errol Laumann Steven Nicolucci J.P. Pellegrino Sam Eaton Megan Loney A Report of the CSIS International Security Program April 2013 CHARTING our future ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2013 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data CIP information available on request. ISBN: 978-1-4422-2481-0 (pb); 978-1-4422-2482-7 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com CONTENTS Acknowledgments V Executive Summary VI I. Introduction 1 The Uncertain Promise of Prevention Alone 1 II. Study Methodology and Risk Assessment Framework 3 Five-Step Risk Assessment Process 4 III. Risk Assessment and Defense Strategy 9 Future Challenges Risk and DoD’s Risk Framework 9 Risk Biases and Behaviors 11 IV. The Policymaking Context for Ground Force Futures 13 An Era of New and Inevitable Constraints 13 A Changing Context for Future Challenges Risk Assessment 13 V. Core U.S. Interests 15 Permanent Friends and Permanent Interests 15 A Working Definition of “Core” National Interests 16 VI. Geostrategic Insights 22 Ten Critical Insights 22 VII. USCENTCOM Regional Survey 29 Key Regional Takeaways 29 Trends 31 Operational Vignettes 36 VIII. USPACOM Regional Survey 41 Key Regional Takeaways 41 Asia-Pacific Rebalance 42 Trends 44 Operational Vignettes 51 IX. Implications for Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk 56 Seven Key Implications for Ground Forces 56 X. Conclusion: Evolve, Adapt, and Innovate 72 III Appendices A. Large-Scale Operational Types 75 B. Key Tasks 92 C. USCENTCOM Operational Vignettes 108 D. USPACOM Operational Vignettes 116 E. Detailed Risk Mitigation 123 F. Acronyms 133 G. New Concepts and Terms 136 H. Bibliography 137 I. Working Group Participants 145 About the Authors and Program Director 147 IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report would not have been possible without the support of the Army G-8 and the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office. In particular, we are extremely grateful for the contributions of Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office Director Major General John Rossi and his staff. Special recognition, in this regard, goes also to Mr. Timothy Muchmore and Mr. Jim Boatner for their persistent, direct support. The CSIS team is equally grateful for the contributions of Army Staff officers, including Colonels Michael Eastman, Charles Miller, and Susan Bryant. Likewise, the CSIS team is grateful for the input and support of the Marine Corps’ Commandant’s Strategic Initiatives Group. In particular, we would like to acknowledge Colonel Michael Groen, Lieutenant Colonel Justice Chambers, and Major Steven Sutey. The report’s findings benefited greatly from the substantive contributions of staff members of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), the U.S. Army Forces Pacific Command (USARPAC), and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In USCENTCOM/ARCENT, we would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Sean Salene and Lieutenant Colonel Garrett Heath for their direct support of the project. In USPACOM/USARPAC, CSIS is eternally grateful to Captain Heedong Choi and Colonel William Florig, as well as Lieutenant Colonels Matthew Turpin, Michael Reilly, and James Frick. Finally, in USSOCOM, the CSIS team relied on the thoughtful input of Mr. Jeffrey Resko. We are also extremely grateful for the contributions of our senior review group. The senior review group included former civilian and military professionals who have dedicated a great deal of their lives to distinguished public service. Members of this group include the Honorable G. Kim Wincup, Mr. Barry Pavel, and Lieutenant Generals (Ret.) Guy Swan and James Dubik. We are further grateful to a number of professionals who were both involved decisively in working groups and took the time to review our findings in detail prior to publication. Of particular note in this regard, the CSIS team would like to thank Mr. Robert Haddick, a private consultant and former editor of Small Wars Journal; Mr. Frank Hoffman of the National Defense University; and Mr. D. Burgess Laird of the Institute for Defense Analyses. Internally, the report benefited from the insights of a number of CSIS experts. These included Dr. Jon Alterman, the CSIS Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and director, Middle East Program; Dr. Michael Green, CSIS senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair; Mr. Ernest Bower, CSIS senior adviser and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asian Studies; Dr. Maren Leed, CSIS senior adviser with the Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies; and, finally, Mr. Eric Ridge, CSIS fellow. They and their staffs were invaluable touchstones for the team and provided context for the final risk assessment. In the end, a great deal of the report’s content relied on interviews, engagements, working groups, and informal roundtable discussions with a range of subject matter experts and senior professionals. Thus, the report’s authors would like to take this opportunity to thank them for taking the time to provide us with their insights in spite of their busy schedules. Finally, this report would not have been possible without the material contributions of the CSIS staff and the capable team of military fellows. Their tireless efforts in bringing this report to fruition are a testament to their commitment to impartial analysis. The judgments advanced in this report are those of the CSIS team alone. Participation by the aforementioned does not necessarily indicate endorsement of the report’s findings. Those and any mistakes or errors are the responsibility of the authors alone. V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY You indicate your capacity and conviction to carry out your political ambitions when you have a standing army. The political exercise of power is really about control of territory.1 In September 2012, CSIS was commissioned by the United States Army to assess the future use of U.S. ground forces and future challenges risk in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) areas of responsibility (AOR). This report is a culmination of that effort. USPACOM and USCENTCOM are the geographic focus of U.S. defense strategy. This study’s risk judgments are based on ground force implications flowing from trends in and around these theaters. Both regions exemplify the intersection of core interests and fundamental strategic-level hazards. Both also feature pacing threats and challenges against which strategists and force planners might develop future capabilities. The study recognizes that no region exists in isolation. The problems of one are often the problems of others. On a practical level, then—though focused on USCENTCOM and USPACOM—this study’s findings and recommendations presumably apply across combatant commands (COCOMs). Thus, the concepts and capabilities addressed by this report may translate to contingency demands worldwide. A Classically Realist Outlook The renewed focus of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) on USCENTCOM and USPACOM appears to center on rising traditional military challenges from Iran in the Middle East and China in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond an inevitable post-9/11 emphasis on counterterrorism and homeland defense, the January 2012 defense strategic guidance reflects a traditional