Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2006-12 An analysis of counterinsurgency in Iraq: Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra from 2003-2005 Clark, Terry L.; Nielsen, Shannon E.; Broemmel, Jarett D. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2383 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ: MOSUL, RAMADI, AND SAMARRA FROM 2003-2005 by Jarett D. Broemmel Shannon E. Nielsen Terry L. Clark December 2006 Thesis Advisor: Gordon McCormick Second Reader: Kalev Sepp Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2006 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Analysis of Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Mosul, 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Ramadi, and Samarra from 2003-2005 6. AUTHOR(S) Jarett D. Broemmel, Terry L. Clark, and Shannon E. Nielsen 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed light- to-medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts. 14. SUBJECT TERMS OIF, insurgency, counterinsurgency, COIN, Iraq, Samarra, Mosul, 15. NUMBER OF Ramadi, control, trust, security, population, Diamond Model, control of the population, PAGES 145 protection of the population, intelligence, combat outposts, HUMINT, population control, consensus, coercion, expectation, behavior, influence, networks. 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ: MOSUL, RAMADI, AND SAMARRA FROM 2003-2005 Jarett D. Broemmel Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 1995 Shannon E. Nielsen Major, United States Army B.A., The Citadel, 1995 Terry L. Clark Major, United States Army B.A., University of New Mexico, 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2006 Authors: Jarett D. Broemmel Shannon E. Nielsen Terry L. Clark Approved by: Dr. Gordon McCormick Thesis Advisor Dr. Kalev Sepp Second Reader Dr. Gordon McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed light-to-medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 A. HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................... 1 B. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 1 C. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 2 D. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW.................................................................. 4 E. THE NATURE OF COIN AND THE POLITICAL SPACE .................... 5 F. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION .................... 7 G. MEASURES OF ANALYSIS .............................................................. 11 II. ANALYSIS OF MOSUL, RAMADI, AND SAMARRA................................... 17 A. 2003 ................................................................................................... 17 1. Mosul ...................................................................................... 17 a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population....... 18 b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population. .................................................................. 23 c. Direct Action................................................................ 24 2. Ramadi.................................................................................... 28 a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population....... 28 b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population ................................................................... 33 c. Direct Action................................................................ 34 3. Samarra .................................................................................. 35 a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population....... 36 b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population ................................................................... 39 c. Direct Action................................................................ 40 4. Conclusion ............................................................................. 41 B. 2004 ................................................................................................... 44 1. Mosul ...................................................................................... 44 a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population....... 44 b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population ................................................................... 49 c. Direct Action................................................................ 50 2. Ramadi.................................................................................... 54 a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population....... 54 b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population ..................................................................