University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3 May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM Fallacies and the concept of an argument Dale Turner California State Polytechnic University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Turner, Dale, "Fallacies and the concept of an argument" (1999). OSSA Conference Archive. 58. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA3/papersandcommentaries/58 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Title: Fallacies And The Concept Of An Argument Author: Dale Turner Response to this paper by: Dennis Hudecki (c)2000 Dale Turner 1. Introduction It is commonplace to hold that one’s theory of fallacious reasoning is linked to one’s view of argument in general. If Wreen (1994a) is correct, there is good reason to expect this connection. According to Wreen, to argue fallaciously is to fail in some way to provide a good argument. It follows, then, that an account of fallacious argument implies a theory of good argument. A theory of good argument, however, is functional theory. One first determines what the goal or function of an argument is and then defines a good argument as one that satisfies the function of an argument. Good arguments are successful arguments. Fallacious arguments are those that fail to be good arguments. If this account is plausible, then one might be able to glean some insights into the nature of contemporary theories of argument by examining the theories of fallacious argument they propose. If such theories are found lacking, then one likely source of the problem, given the argument above, is the theory of argument that grounds the theory of fallacious argument in question. In section (2) two important theories of fallacious argument are briefly examined: the standard treatment and the pragma-dialectical treatment. Both theories of fallacious argument have problems accounting for the way in which the concept of a fallacy is used in ordinary practical contexts. These problems are linked to the picture of argument that grounds each theory of fallacious argument. Section (3) begins with a brief discussion of two epistemic treatments of fallacious arguments. Although both treatments are ultimately implausible, they set the stage for a sketch of an alternative account of the concept of a fallacy developed in the final section of the paper. This alternative account of fallacious argument/reasoning is inspired by Wright’s (1995) picture of argument. While it is not likely to convert strong adherents of more traditional views, it does avoid some of the major problems that beset such views and does seem to account for the wide range of uses the concept of fallacy has in ordinary practical contexts. 2. Two Approaches to Understanding the Concept of a Fallacy 2a. The Standard Treatment Hamblin (1970) suggests that the standard treatment makes the following claim about the concept of a fallacy: A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Hamblin 1970: 12) Several features of this definition are worth discussing. First, a fallacy is an argument. To merely assert false statements is not to commit a fallacy unless, as Hamblin points out, "the statements constitute or express an argument."1 (Hamblin 1970: 224) An argument, according to the standard treatment, is a set of statements, one or more of these statements (the premise(s)) is offered as support for another statement (the conclusion). Second, a fallacious argument is a bad argument and a bad argument is an invalid argument. Third, a fallacious argument is not just any invalid argument, it is an invalid argument that appears valid. Finally, to claim that an argument is fallacious is to assert that the mistake is serious enough to consider the possibility that the argument has been refuted. There are good reasons to take the standard treatment seriously. Since validity and invalidity are formal notions it seems that one can talk about fallacious argument types. So, the standard treatment provides an account of fallaciousness (invalidity) that indicates what the traditional fallacy categories, the gang of eighteen as Woods (1994) calls them, have in common. The gang of eighteen are invalid argument types that appear valid. As a consequence of this first point, the standard treatment provides a vocabulary and method for criticizing arguments. However, as Hamblin and many other critics have shown2, the standard treatment is plagued with problems. The account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for fallaciousness. First, there are arguments that beg the question that are not invalid; however, at least some of these arguments are fallacious. So, the standard treatment fails to provide a necessary condition for fallaciousness. And there are countless arguments that are invalid but are not fallacious. Consider the following argument: S1: There is oil on the driveway this morning. S2: The oil was not on the driveway when I parked the car in the driveway last night. S3: The car wasn’t moved between last night and this morning. ------------------- C: The car has an oil leak. Strictly speaking, the argument is invalid: the support claims can be asserted and the conclusion denied without contradiction. In fact, this argument can be recast as an instance of affirming the consequent. However, intuitively, this argument is not fallacious. Even if there is a mistake in the argument, it is not the kind of serious mistake that would entitle one to charge that the argument is fallacious and therefore refuted. So, the standard treatment fails to provide a sufficient condition for fallaciousness. A related concern is that the standard treatment either turns all non-deductive arguments into fallacious arguments, or it makes it impossible for any non- deductive argument to be fallacious. By definition inductive arguments are invalid. It follows, then, that according to the standard treatment, all inductive arguments are fallacious. But this cannot be right. One impugns every instance of an inductive argument without ever having to examine the substantive claims the argument makes. Given how much successful reasoning is inductive, this consequence of the standard treatment indicates a serious problem with the account. A defender of the standard treatment might respond by pointing out that since inductive arguments do not even appear to be valid, the standard account leaves room for non-fallacious inductive arguments after all. There are two problems with this move. First, while there is something plausible about the claim that fallacious arguments are the ones that we are tempted by, defenders of the standard treatment have said little about what the term "appears valid" means. Second, this move makes most, if not all, inductive arguments non- fallacious by default. This is an equally problematic result since it is as implausible to hold that inductive arguments are non-fallacious in virtue of being inductive as it is to hold that inductive arguments are fallacious in virtue of being inductive. The central problem with the standard treatment, then, is that it is too narrow. An invalid argument is not necessarily a fallacious argument. Unfortunately the standard treatment gives us no way to talk about fallacious arguments except in terms of invalidity.3 What accounts for the standard treatment’s failure to provide an adequate analysis of fallaciousness? First, the failure is due to the fact that the standard treatment works backwards. Instead of looking at the variety of ways in which the term "fallacy" is used in ordinary contexts, the standard treatment works to a theory of fallaciousness from an antecedently held picture of argument. Second, the antecedently held picture of argument is itself problematic. The standard treatment is based on a deductivist picture of argument. If fallacious arguments are invalid and therefore bad arguments, then at least a necessary condition of good arguments is that they are valid. While this move is tempting4 it is not plausible. It’s not plausible primarily because good arguments rarely rest on semantic skills alone, they rest on substantive judgments of plausibility (See Wright, 1999 for a thorough exploration of this claim). But for present purposes, there is another reason the deductivist picture is not plausible. An adequate understanding of argument should provide some general insight into the way in which arguments go astray. So the failure of the standard treatment of fallacies indicts the deductivist picture at its core. 2b. The Pragma-Dialectical Treatment Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the co-developers of the pragma-dialectical treatment of fallacies, offer the following account of the concept of a fallacy: ...the term "fallacy" is reserved for speech acts which hinder in any way the resolution of a dispute in a critical discussion. Thus this term is systematically connected with the rules for critical discussions...In this conception, committing a fallacy is not tantamount to unethical conduct, but is wrong in the sense that it frustrates efforts to arrive at the resolution of a dispute. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987: 284) The concept of a fallacy, then, is part of a larger pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, an argument is a complex speech act that arises between two or more people engaged in a rational dispute over an expressed opinion of one of the disputants. The argument takes place in four stages that the disputants must pass through if rational resolution of the dispute is to occur: the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentative stage and the concluding stage.