Understanding Institutional Power Politics: Theory, Method and a case of U.S.-China Competition Hyun Seung Cho Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Hyun Seung Cho All rights reserved Abstract Understanding Institutional Power Politics: Theory, Method and a case of U.S.-China Competition Hyun Seung Cho Despite the common understanding that states compete over international institutions and jockey to define international order, our understanding of institutional power politics is underdeveloped. The dissertation sets out to answer three sets of questions relating to the specific areas that need developing – theory, methods and empirics. First, how do we think about the concepts of “power” and “international institutions”? And, how do states interact with each other in the competition over or with international institutions? Second, if institutional competition is a strategic interaction for which our current empirical knowledge is limited, how do we select cases to examine competitive processes between states? From the selected cases, what is the best way to test our theories of competitive processes while ensuring that our analysis contributes to the relatively thin empirical case knowledge? Finally, while we think the competition between U.S. and China is one of the key contemporary cases of states competing over international institutions, is the evolution of international institutions really a function of U.S.-China competition? If not, how does institutional competition work? Paper 1 deals exclusively with building a comprehensive theory of institutional power politics. From the basic concepts to the specific strategic interactions of interstate competition over international institutions, the theory of institutional power politics challenges the long-held view in IR that international institutions are solutions to power politics and signifiers of an international politics that is more cooperative. The key idea comes from applying insights from defensive realism to the context of institutional competition with the institutional power dilemma. The theory highlights how even with the most benign and cooperative intentions, states may slide into power political dynamics over international institutions. Paper 2 develops two case study methods for examining competitive processes, or more broadly, “intensive processes” – streams of processual phenomena for which the conditions and eventual outputs are ontologically distinct or of lesser analytical interest. The prototypical case selection strategy provides guidelines for selecting cases for intensive processes where the universe of cases is often difficult to know in advance. The dual process tracing (DPT) method then provides a way by which a researcher can test theories of intensive processes as well as provide substantive knowledge about the selected prototypical case. The two methods developed in this paper provide an alternative way to think about political phenomena beyond the dominant covariational and mechanismic approaches in political science research. Paper 3 is the first theoretically driven empirical examination of the “U.S.-TPP vs. China-RCEP” case of institutional competition. The paper tests the common understanding that TPP and RCEP is a product of the competition between U.S. and China. The paper finds that the competition is generated from mechanisms of misperception, uncertainty and poor signaling of intentions from both countries. The paper thus offers a powerful revision to the current understanding of the TPP-RCEP case and theoretically arrives at a defensive realist model of unintended institutional competition. The paper concludes by identifying a number of overlooked policy implications for contemporary U.S.-China relations and institution building in East Asia. Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables iii Acknowledgements iv Paper No. 1. A Theory of Institutional Power Politics: Concepts, Strategies and 1 the Institutional Power Dilemma - Three Theoretical Gaps 4 - Concepts 11 - Strategies 22 - Interactions 30 - Implications 54 - Conclusion 65 - References 67 2. Intensive Processes in IR: A Case Selection and Process Tracing Technique 72 - Covariation, Mechanisms and Intensive Processes 78 - Prototypical Case Selection 86 - Dual Process Tracing (DPT) Method 108 - Conclusion 134 - References 143 3. Unintended Institutional Competition? The Misunderstood U.S.-China 147 Strategic Rivalry in “TPP vs. RCEP” - Theory and Method 153 - Process Testing 164 - Case Reconstruction 258 - Conclusion 268 - References 271 i Appendices 275 - Appendix I 275 - Appendix II 303 - References 315 ii List of Figures and Tables Figures Figure 1-1. Self-Group Strategies 26 Figure 1-2. Other-Group Strategies 28 Figure 2. Scenario 1 - Institutional Power Competition between rival states A and B 32 Figure 3. Scenario 2 - Institutional Power Competition between rival states A and state B 33 Figure 4. Institutional Power Dilemma between non-rival states A and B 37 Figure 5. Components of Dual Process Tracing (DPT) 115 Figure 6. Application of the DPT 130 Figure 7. Timeline of TPP and RCEP and Analytical Time Frames 162 Figure 8. Percentage of TPP-related posts published per year between 2006-2016, 198 comparison between three outlets: (1) Chinese government website (gov.cn), (2) People Daily (3) Select think tank and academic journals (journals) Figure 9. China’s perception towards the TPP by year (left) and share of type of 209 perception by year (right) from www.gov.cn between 2010-2013 Figure 10. Comparing Event-History Maps for Institutional Competition Theory 259 and Revised Narrative Figure 11. Causal Graph of the Updated Theory of Unintended Institutional Competition 263 Tables Table 1: Type and objectives of proposed methods 136 Table 2 Examination of top article from Google search key words “TPP” “RCEP” 236 and “TPP RCEP” (October 2016). Grey box indicates sources that have all “Yes” Table 3. Examination of U.S. Government Sources for “U.S.-China competition 252 in TPP vs. RCEP,” 2015-2016 Boxes Box 1. Four process tests in process tracing 125 iii Acknowledgements While there are so many people I am with the bottom of my heart thankful for, I want to take the “necessary condition” approach here: listing people who without, I would not have got through the first years of Columbia, passed my comprehensive exams, do fieldwork in China, secured a post-doctoral fellowship at Stanford, and have the courage and perseverance to survive and finish the dissertation to write this note. Seven years is not a short time. And for the first half of this time at Columbia, I was told by different faculty members to leave or consider leaving the Ph.D. program on one too many occasions. I therefore do not say it lightly when I say I would not have been able to get my Ph.D. without the following people. Thank you. Andrew Nathan Robert Jervis Gerry Curtis Tonya Putnam Wang Zhengyi Liu Lening Andrew Cheon Albert Fang Bjorn Gomes Hiroaki Abe iv Anatoly Detwyler Camille Strauss-Kahn Lauren Young Kuemin Chang Sara Bjorg-Moller Susan Schwab Chris Adams Da Wei Brian Ciao Kartika Octaviana Liu Yucheng Yang Shiqi Dr. Mia Ihm Dr. Leslie Alakalay Dr. Regina Lara Dr. Allyson Nelson My mother, Heekyung Kang, my father, Myungrae Cho, my brother, Hyun Binn Cho, My wife, Nahyun Park and my son Jea Nathan Cho. Finally, my mentor and friend, Barry Buzan. v Understanding Institutional Power Politics Paper 1: A Theory of Institutional Power Politics A Theory of Institutional Power Politics: Concepts, Strategies and the Institutional Power Dilemma International institutions are primarily understood as tools to overcome collective action problems and construct social environments that embody international customs and norms. The formation and change in international institutions is therefore the result of intelligent responses by states to a variety of collective action problems and normative challenges from global financial shocks requiring states to construct international financial regulatory systems to crimes against humanity strengthening norms of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). International institutions are also understood as solutions to a variety of power political challenges from power transitions to security dilemmas. International institutions make power transparent and power asymmetries legitimate such that smaller states and rising powers are not fearful or dissatisfied with the status quo. International institutions also solve information problems by providing stable institutional channels to resolve misperception, rectify strategic mistrust and more broadly construct norms of communication. The conventional understanding is thus that more international institutions are better. International institutions signify the move away from an anarchic world where international politics is merely the interaction between self-interested states striving for survival and security to a world where states are coordinating and cooperating to produce collective goods and achieve positive conceptions of a good international life. More 1 Understanding Institutional Power Politics Paper 1: A Theory of Institutional Power Politics international institutions thus mean more cooperation and pro-norm behavior, and less competition and power politicking in international politics. The current article challenges the dominant thinking about international institutions. I argue that international