A DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY Regaining American Influence Abroad Richard Ned Lebow A Democratic Foreign Policy “In A Democratic Foreign Policy, Ned Lebow develops the tragic view framework to analyze how and why states behave. Drawing on the author’s half a century of distinguished scholarship, this book offers an original contribution to foreign policy literature. Lebow uses the idea of ‘credible commitment’ to formulate a strategy for dealing with the central challenge posed by the rise of China. In so doing Lebow effectively refutes the claim that power transitions inevitably lead to conflict. A Democratic Foreign Policy will constitute a valuable part of the debate over the next two years about what has gone wrong in twenty-first cen- tury US foreign policy and what needs to be changed.” —Fred Chernoff, Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations, Colgate University, USA “In this insightful book, Ned Lebow suggests a modification of the muscular, hegemonic approach to foreign policy followed by both Republicans and Democrats since the beginning of the Cold War. This macho approach has led to frequent military actions, which often have not been in the country’s best interest. Given today’s realities, the cure that Lebow suggests is a more thoughtful, restrained, and affordable foreign policy more in line with national needs and values, and less dependent on overwhelming economic and military power. This is a discussion well worth having.” —J.M. Houlahan, Foreign Service Officer (ret.) “Those seeking a sensible alternative to an American foreign policy suffused with triumphalism, unilateralism, and mercantilism need look no further. With his customary wit, incisiveness, command of history, and appreciation of the tragic element in politics, Ned Lebow provides a superb one.” —Rajan Menon, Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations, City University of New York, USA Richard Ned Lebow A Democratic Foreign Policy Regaining American Influence Abroad Richard Ned Lebow King’s College, London, UK Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA ISBN 978-3-030-21518-7 ISBN 978-3-030-21519-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Preto Perola / shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To my recently discovered Beck-Solomon family Preface In 2020 the American people will elect a new president, and if common sense and decency prevail it will be a Democrat. Donald Trump will become history, although the damage he has inflicted on the country will take a long time to undo. The Democratic Party has moved to the left, that is, away from the center-right position of Hilary Clinton and the party professionals. A president committed to change at home and abroad—and we hope with a majority in both houses of Congress—will have the kind of opportunities that were denied to Barack Obama. Opportunities are not enough. A new president must have a vision of what he or she wants to do and undo—a vision to which many senators, representatives, and the electorate are receptive. This is readily achievable in domestic affairs, where there is already much support for goals such as racial equality, more equitable tax structures, better urban infrastructure, more open access to citizenship, protection of national parks and monu- ments, and serious efforts to address pollution and climate change. It is a more difficult project in foreign affairs. With any luck, the Alt Right, nativist nationalism, and mercantilist approaches to international trade will return to the shadow world they inhabited before 2014. This will leave the approach to foreign policy represented by what I call the national security establishment free of any serious competitors. This establishment reflects a near-consensus among the majority of people involved in foreign policy in and out of government (the media, think vii viii Preface tanks, and the academy) that America is a hegemonic power, has a global responsibility for preserving the world’s territorial and economic order, and that others welcome its dominant role. They also believe that power confers hegemony and demands not only a dominant economy but mili- tary spending at a level that guarantees American superiority and, with it, the ability to intervene anywhere in the world. These beliefs are biparti- san and have shaped the foreign and defense policies of Democratic and Republican administrations since the early days of the Cold War and the presidency of Harry S. Truman. To be sure there are policy differences among those who subscribe to this view of the world when it comes to specific policies. Most recently they are divided on questions such as troop levels in Afghanistan, inter- vention in Syria—favored by Hilary Clinton and opposed by Obama— intervention by proxy in Yemen, and how closely the US should be asso- ciated with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of its leader-authorized assas- sination of a dissident in their embassy in Istanbul. These are differences in degree, not of kind, and are largely tactical. Nobody in the establish- ment is suggesting that we consider deep cuts in the military budget, undertake a total withdrawal from Afghanistan, or a fundamental reori- entation of our long-standing and deep commitment to Saudi Arabia. There are alternative foundations for foreign policy: Marxism and libertarian-­isolationism. They have no mainstream traction. Each has some valid insights. Marxism errs in its unquestioning belief in the eco- nomic determinants of policy of all kinds, but it is useful in highlighting some of the connections between business and foreign policy. Libertarian-­ isolationism is single-minded in its focus on terminating foreign commit- ments, but properly maintains that military interventions have not generally been in the country’s interest. In this book I propose an alternative vision of foreign policy, one based on a tragic understanding of life and politics. It is rooted in an under- standing that the world is opaque, that we have at best limited ability to control and manipulate it, and that our efforts to do so often backfire. It further recognizes that conflict is inevitable because of clashing value sys- tems and interests, but that too firm a commitment to these values and interests and unwillingness to compromise and exercise restraint can only intensify conflict. Tragedy also foregrounds the hubris of powerful actors and how overreaching and overconfidence in family life, domestic poli- Preface ix tics, and the international arena can lead to catastrophe. It teaches us that great powers are their own worst enemies. They act in ways to enhance their power but undermine it. A tragic understanding of life and politics provides an intellectual, emotional, and psychological framework for thinking about politics. It offers no insights into the day-to-day formulation of foreign policy. For this we need some understanding of the national interest, and much of my book is about how we can think intelligently about our interests. I am clear at the outset that there is no such thing as the national interest. There are multiple conceptions of the national interest because it or they are reflections of our values and the projects to which we are committed. These are all subjective in nature and often a matter of difference or con- troversy within society. The national interest is political in nature just as the struggle among competing formulation of the national interest for audiences and primacy is a political process. I use tragedy as a vantage point to critique the dominant understand- ing of security and the means by which it is secured: emphasis on power and especially military might, deterrence and compellence, American control of international institutions, the search for special privileges, and a reputation for being tough. I show just how questionable these mecha- nisms are and how they are often counterproductive to American secu- rity. I then step back and consider the national interest. What matters to most Americans? What values do they cherish? To what projects do they give rise or support? How can foreign policy best be made responsive to them? I describe values widely shared by Americans but certainly claim no right or authority to identify these values or how they should be real- ized. I do believe that a careful elaboration of values and how they relate to interests is a useful exercise and has the potential to stimulate mean- ingful debate in lieu of the kinds of sound bites and point scoring that now dominates political discussion.