American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Theses and Dissertations 2-1-2013 The potential rise of an Islamist youth within 25 January revolts: a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood youth Dina Hosni Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds Recommended Citation APA Citation Hosni, D. (2013).The potential rise of an Islamist youth within 25 January revolts: a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood youth [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1065 MLA Citation Hosni, Dina. The potential rise of an Islamist youth within 25 January revolts: a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood youth. 2013. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1065 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. 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The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences THE POTENTIAL RISE OF AN ISLAMIST YOUTH WITHIN 25 JANUARY REVOLTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD YOUTH A Thesis Submitted to Political Science Department in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Dina Hosni July/2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………….. vii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW…………... 1 Background…………………………………………………………………... 1 Significance of the Study…………………………………………………...... 3 Literature Review…………………………………………………………..... 4 Subcultures and Hegemony………………………………………………... 4 Social Movements……………………………………………………….….8 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt………………………………………....10 Research Problem………………………………………………….……….... 14 Research Hypothesis……………………………………………………….... 17 Conceptual Framework…………………………………………………..…. 18 Gramscian Theory of Hegemony and Counter-hegemony………………… 18 Mannheim's Generational Model…………………………………………... 20 Generational Divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood…………………... 21 Muslim Brotherhood's Hegemonic Project within Egyptian Society……..... 23 Youth Activism toward 25 January…………….……………………….….. 25 MB Youth Counter-Hegemony on the Organizational Level……….……… 27 Delimitations of the Study………………………..……………………...…… 31 Methodology………………………………………………….…………….…. 32 Structure of the Study…………………………………………………….….. 34 CHAPTER TWO: CULTURE AND SUBCULTURE: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ITS YOUTH…………………………………………….. 36 The Notion of Culture and Subculture……………………………………… 36 iii The Muslim Brotherhood Worldview………………………………….…… 39 Reality……………………………………………………………………… 39 Society……………………………………………………………………... 40 The Islamic Umma…………………………………………………………. 43 Morals and Resolution……………………………………………………… 44 Non-Muslims……………………………………………………………….. 48 MB Worldview from Theory to Practice…………………………………… 50 The MB Youth Subcultural Worldview…………………………………….. 51 The Islamic Project…………………………………………………………. 52 Umma versus Nation State…………………………………………………. 54 Organizational Unity……………………………………………………….. 57 Impact of MB Tarbiyya (Education)……………………………………….. 60 Same Universals but More Open to Western Ideology……………….……. 60 Non-Muslims……………………………………………………………….. 62 Democracy………………………………………………………………….. 63 Worldviews of MB Youth versus MB Leadership………………………….. 65 CHAPTER THREE: THE MB NOT IN POWER: BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS………………… 67 Background………………………………………………………………….... 67 Social Media…………………………………………………………………… 68 Collective Action with More Liberal Youth………………………………….72 The MB Youth Participates in the Revolution……………………………… 74 The MB Leadership Participates in the Revolution………………………… 76 Internal Wrangling between the MB Leadership and its Youth and the Establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)……………………. 77 Internal Disparity within the MB Youth and the Establishment of the al- Tayyar al-Misriy (Egyptian Current) (Under Establishment) Party…….... 84 iv Further Resignations within the MB and the Establishment of Other Breakaway Parties…………………………………………………………... 87 MB Leadership and the Youth under SCAF's Rule………………………. 90 Millionyyas (Million Man March)………………………………………….. 93 Parliamentary Elections 2011……………………………………………….. 97 CHAPTER FOUR: THE MB IN POWER: FROM PARLIAMENT TO PRESIDENCY UNTIL BEFORE JUNE 30………… 100 Background………………………………………………………………....... 100 Presidential Elections………………………………………………………... 102 MB Youth Attitudes toward Aboul Fotouh’s Candidacy…………….………. 102 MB Youth Stance toward Fielding Khayrat al-Shater as Presidential Candidate………………………………………………………… 104 MB Youth Stance toward Fielding Muhammad Morsi as a Backup Presidential Candidate……………………………………………………..… 107 Cleavages among Youth under Morsi's Rule……………………………… 111 a) Supportive MB Youth………………………………………………… 113 Supportive MB youth stance toward a Party……………………….. 113 Supportive MB Youth Stance toward the MB…………………………..116 b) Ex-Current MB Youth…………………………………………………. 119 Critical Ex-Current MB Youth Stance toward Parties……………….. 119 Critical Ex-Current MB Youth Stances toward the MB……………… 122 Al-Itihadiyya and Muqattam as Two Marked Locational Events………… 124 Relationship among MB Youth Groups…………………………………... 129 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION…………………………………………….. 132 The MB's Hegemonizing Project and Youth Recruitment………………… 132 2005 MB Parliamentary Victory within the MB Hegemonizing Project….. 133 First Traces of the Rise of a Youth Subculture within the Parliamentary Victory……………………………………………………………………... 135 Framing of Collective Action by MB Youth……………………………… 136 v MB Youth War of Position/War of Movement within 25 January……….. 138 Categorization of MB Youth within 25 January…………………………... 140 Earlier Forms of MB Youth Dissent………………………………………. 145 Generations within this MB Youth Generation……………………………. 147 MB Youth War of Movement Prospects…………………………………... 149 Current MB Youth Cohort as a Subculture?..................................................154 Concluding Remarks………………………………………………………. 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………….……….163 vi ABSTRACT The thesis endeavors to offer a fresh perspective on the potential rise of Islamist youth, focusing on the pro-change ex-current MB youth as a potential subculture within 25 January and the assumption of the Egyptian MB to power. To validate this hypothesis, Gramsci's theory on hegemony and counter-hegemony has been deployed to study the rise of pro-change MB youth against Mubarak's authoritarian regime on the state level in tandem with counter-hegemony against the strict al-samc w-al-ṭāca principle (i.e. blind obedience) on the organizational level. Elements of social movement theory have been used to substantiate the relevance of counter-hegemony, namely, Gamson's three components of collective action frames; injustice, agency and identity. Mannheim's generational model has also been employed in the study as a unit of analysis to distinguish between pro-change ex-current MB youth representing the focus of the study and supportive MB youth. With concern to analytical orientation, the study has deployed mostly qualitative research methods based on primary sources in the form of 30 semi-structured interviews, in addition to content analysis of scholarly articles and books, web logs, in addition to journalistic material, drawing on the concepts of counter-hegemony and collective action frames. The analysis has demonstrated that the 2005 MB parliamentary victory which has heralded the success of the MB hegemonizing project, has generated the first traces of the rise of a youth subculture which has grown to pinnacle with the 25 January Revolution and its after effects. Based on the analysis, the cohort of MB youth could be categorized into two groups: those supportive of the MB, and those critical of the MB performance. The latter group which is the focus of the present study could be further branched into two orientations: those who still believe in reform from within vii keeping a vigilant eye on the Organization's performance, and those who could no longer tolerate MB's performance and thus have drifted away from the organization in order to establish or join other parties or groups, or have possibly remained independent. Content analysis has also shown that the pro-change ex-current MB youth have developed their own worldview as differing from that of the parent culture where they have opted accordingly for their own sphere of activity regardless of the Organization while staying committed to the general ideas of al-Banna. In line with Gamson’s three collective action frames, those youth have experienced feelings of ‘injustice’ directed toward the MB Organization which has excluded them from the decision-making process. Within the ‘agency’ frame, a number of those youth have sought the Cyber sphere as a type of liberating educational experience. Through their interaction with other youths whether in the cyber or public sphere, they have found common grounds with other Egyptian youths as could be translated in Revolution Youth Coalition (I’tilaf Shabāb al-Thawra), al-Tayyar al-Misriy (The Egyptian Current) Party under construction and Misr al-Qawiyya (Strong Egypt) established by splintering MB youth groups. The ‘identity’ frame within Gamson’s classification has emerged within the 25 January revolution and within its after effects as a form of resistance to the MB's excessive restrictions on the organizational level conspicuously in the dismissal of Aboul Fotouh and the establishment of the FJP to be the only