Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1991-09 U.S./NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear deterrence: paradox or pitfall? Stanton, Lowell S. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26832 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS U.S. /NATO SEA-BASED NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: PARADOX OR PITFALL? by Lowell S. Stanton September, 1991 Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 7?c:Q7l-z iCURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No 0704-0188 a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School (If applicable) Code 38 Naval Postgraduate School ic. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS {City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93940-5000 la. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicable) fe. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO 1 TITLE (Include Security Classification) U.S. /NATO SEA-BASED NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: PARADOX OR PITFALL? 2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Stanton, Lowell S, 3a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNT Master's Thesis FROM TO September 1991 106 e ""ifOrc^tXpRg&ED IN THIS THESIS ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL P0UCY OR POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR THE OS. 60VERNMENt COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP 9 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The present study examines the evolution of nuclear strategy with particular emphasis on the capacity of US/NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces. The current trend in NATO towards a certain denuclearization of the Central European states might well place an increased reliance on sea-based theater nuclear weapons to counter Soviet theater nuclear forces in the Western Soviet Union. The present work analyzes the policy background of the NATO nuclear strategy from a European perspective in light of recent problems as a necessary precondition to an understanding of the more concrete issues of hardware. Although the US Navy's nuclear-capable Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) remains a potent and flexible nuclear strike asset, it is best suited for heav- ily defended high-value fixed targets. Emphasis on offensive mobility in a future conflict will make carrier-based aircraft a more decisive platform from which to pros- ecute and destroy high-value mobile targets. However, an analysis of the US Navy's non- 20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION O UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT DTIC USERS Unclassified !2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL Donald Abenheim (408) 646-2228 38 ID Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE strategic nuclear forces reveals substantial deficiencies when compared with those of the Soviet Union. A declining US Navy nuclear stockpile of air-deliverable strike weapons in combination with the lack ofa long-range nuclear-capable strike aircraft weakens the credibility of the aircraft carrier battle group as a nuclear deterrent force. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGI DD Form 1473. JUN 86 (Reverse) 11 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. U.S./NATO SEA-BASED NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: PARADOX OR PITFALL? by Lowell S. Stanton Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1981 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September, 1991 IWI ABSTRACT The present study examines the evolution of nuclear strategy with particular emphasis on the capacity of U.S. /NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces. The current trend in NATO towards a certain denuclearization of the Central European states might well place an increased reliance on sea-based theater nuclear weapons to counter Soviet theater nuclear forces in the Western Soviet Union. The present work analyzes he policy background of the NATO nuclear strategy from a European perspective in light of recent problems as a necessary precondition to an understanding of the more concrete issues of hardware. Although the U.S. Navy's nuclear-capable Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) remains a potent and flexible nuclear strike asset, it is best suited for heavily defended high value fixed targets. Emphasis on offensive mobility in a future conflict will make carrier-based aircraft a more decisive platform from which to prosecute and destroy high value mobile targets. However, an analysis of the U.S. Navy's non-strategic nuclear forces reveals substantial deficiencies when compared with those of the Soviet Union. A declining U.S. Navy nuclear stockpile of air-deliverable strike weapons in combination with the lack of a long-range nuclear-capable stealth aircraft weakens the credibility of the aircraft carrier battle group as a nuclear deterrent force. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS I . INTRODUCTION vi II. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE 4 A. THE ORIGINS OF WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR POLICY ... 8 B. THE "EUROSTRATEGIC" NUCLEAR BALANCE 2 6 III. REFORMULATING NATO STRATEGY 4 4 A. BACKGROUND: "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" 44 1. Hierarchy of Potential Levels of Deterrence 45 B. THE DETERRENCE DEBATE WITHIN NATO 47 C. MAJOR POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES 51 1. Arms Control 52 2 . Coupling 54 3. Credibility 55 4. Threshold 56 IV. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CORRELATION OF FORCES ... 60 A. ATLANTIC TO THE URALS NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE 62 B. SEA-BASED NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS 7 3 V. CONCLUSIONS 91 LIST OF REFERENCES 93 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 99 VI I . INTRODUCTION Dramatic events in late 1989 have transformed the strategic landscape in Central Europe. The most basic objectives of the Atlantic Alliance having been achieved, a unified German state within NATO joins in a far reaching review of the basic purposes, strategies, and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A review of the size and tasks of the Alliance's nuclear forces looks forward to a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in strategy and substantial reductions of nuclear forces, while at the same time acknowledging the essential role they fulfill in a strategy designed to preserve peace. The new alliance strategy that will succeed flexible response and forward defense is only now emerging, yet it appears clear that the principles of flexible response -- to deter aggression and defend alliance territory, should deterrence fail remain capable to respond in kind at every level along the continuum of deterrence -- shall endure. Yet, the elimination of ground-based intermediate nuclear forces (INF) , in addition to the imminent withdrawal of short-range nuclear forces (SNF) will make it more difficult for NATO to maintain credible and flexible response options. The U.S. Navy is more than likely to be called upon to provide the solution, thereby increasing NATO's reliance on U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces. This creates a profound dilemma for the U.S. Navy. While the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union has been greatly reduced, the Soviet Union remains the principle U.S. nuclear threat. Significantly, the trend toward a certain denuclearization in Central Europe will strengthen Soviet comparative advantages in geographic and mobilization factors and leave political military outcomes to turn more decisively on the nonnuclear correlation of forces. While recent arms control successes will substantially reduce the size of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, they will nevertheless remain the largest military force in Europe. It is widely recognized that Soviet sea-based nuclear forces are far more robust than those of the U.S. Navy. Consequently, it is generally agreed that it is in our best interest to avoid nuclear war-at-sea vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. To accomplish this goal we have relied heavily on the threat of retaliation against the Soviet Russian homeland as a deterrent against Soviet naval "first-use" of nuclear weapons at sea. Meanwhile, NATO's strategic concepts specifically leave open the option of "first-use" of nuclear weapons, albeit as a "last resort," to prevent a looming conventional defeat in defense of NATO territory. The inherent contradiction between these two policies would make NATO's reliance on sea-based nuclear weapons seem incredible. It has been a long standing goal of Soviet foreign and military policy to prevent NATO from employing nuclear weapons. And many would argue that it has been the credible threat to use these weapons that has kept the peace in Europe over the past four decades. Although nuclear weapons may serve largely as political instruments, properly formulated military options are essential for enhancing the political credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee. This thesis examines the increased role of U.S. sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces in support of NATO's emerging strategic concepts. It begins with an attempt to better understand the reasons behind the developing trend toward denuclearization in Central Europe which appear to stem largely from a "delegitimization" of nuclear deterrence policies in Germany. The doctrine of flexible response is reviewed as well as the military-political issues that will shape future strategy. The non-strategic nuclear balance in Europe will be examined with special emphasis on the capabilities of U.S.