
TEAMSTERS' MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND POLITICS 1 Teamsters’ Management Policies and Politics That Influence the Union Today Doreen E. Johnson University Community R. Richard Sabo Management and Human Resources Over the last ten years American business has downsized, limited annual wage increases for its workers, and decreased workers’ health and welfare benefits, while the salaries of its management including their bonuses have continually increased. As a result, strikes by workers for their rights to jobs and benefits are on the rise with sympathy coming from the American public, many of whom are in the same position but without the support of a union. To compete successfully in today's global marketplace an organization needs to have the support of a motivated, productive, and well-paid workforce. To accomplish this, labor needs a strong union that can provide such a workforce by negotiating return of respect for its members by employers. The management of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the largest private union in the United States, can do this because they did it before. Their management’s policies and politics brought about employers’ approval and respect of its members during the first half of the 20th century. This historical study shows how these policies and politics contributed to the organization that is present today and the opportunity it has to prove that unions are the cornerstones of a democratic society. Introduction In August 1997 the Teamsters led the United Parcel Services’ fifteen-day strike to a successful resolution for its members of the Los Angeles locals, affecting its worldwide operations. In 1998 the United Auto Workers waged a successful strike against General Motors Corporation to save auto workers’ jobs from going overseas and plants from being shut down. In 1995 Boeing Company also found its workers out on strike for almost three months to save their jobs from going overseas. In each of these strikes the labor unions pointedly showed concern for their members’ well being. Is history repeating itself by forcing labor unions to fight employers for their rights just as was done in the 1930s and 1940s? Can the unions avoid another fight and take their place in the American business community alongside management and work together toward success in today’s global market place? The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the largest union in the United States with so much power and strength that it could almost shut down the nation’s economy if it so desired seemed to be the union to research for answers to these questions. Its management had been the center of violence, corruption, and racketeering for more than fifty years. How could such a powerful union come under the influence and direction of gangsters, yet have its members seemingly content with it? How did its management correct the perception of a gangster-influenced union so that during the 1997 UPS strike, the public became very sympathetic to their Teamsters union demands for its part-time members? This research is a study of management policies and politics of the IBT, tracing the roots of the Teamsters’ organization through the time of James R. Hoffa, the policies and politics that follow Hoffa, and how the Teamsters union functions today. The study was limited to policies and the politics of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters’ presidents (the term “president” is used throughout this article in place of the 2 JOHNSON, SABO Fall 1999 Teamsters official title of general president). It does not attempt to evaluate the ethical nature of the individual presidents’ policies and politics nor will it evaluate those of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters today. This article makes the following assumptions: • There are dissimilar influences and, hence, individual contributions among the management of the IBT throughout its past; • The identified policies and politics of the individual presidents of the IBT can be analyzed and interpreted; • The identified policies and politics of the individual presidents of the IBT can be related to each other; • The management of the IBT did influence the policies and politics of the present day union. Based on the above assumptions, the article shows that: • Each change of management of the Teamsters resulted in individualized influence(s) and/or contribution(s) to the union; • The policies and politics of the individual Teamster management can be determined; • The policies and politics of the Teamsters’ management, particularly through the time of Jimmy Hoffa, can be related to each other; and • These identified policies and politics of management, following the time of Jimmy Hoffa, do relate to the Teamsters’ present day union. Teamsters’ Presidents Early History 1899-1952 In 1899 John Callahan chartered the first Team Drivers International Union (TDIU) through the AFL and became its first president. The TDIU organized groups of drivers in Chicago who quickly became craftsmen of a sort and established some closed shops. Jasper Clark became the second president in 1901. The principles of wage unionism, including weekly and hourly pay, were established. Strikes were successfully used to achieve goals and increase wages. By 1902 the Teamster membership had almost doubled (Leiter, 1957). Chicago Teamster locals had numerous criminal associations, with corruption, racketeering, and collusion being common practices. Cornelius Shea, president from 1903-1907, allowed the collusion of labor with manage- ment, resulting in substantial wage increases for union members and large profits for employers. Negotiations resulted in shorter hours and time-and-one-half pay from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Contacts with racketeers continued with Shea’s approval until he was indicted in 1905 for collusion with employers. This resulted in a number of locals seceding, a considerable decline in membership, and a dwindling Teamster treasury (Leiter, 1957). TEAMSTERS' MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND POLITICS 3 At the 1907 convention of the IBT, Daniel J. Tobin became president, winning by just 12 votes. To assure a lasting presidency, Tobin in 1915 changed the presidential election to once every five years (Leiter, 1957). This worked very well for him for he held office until 1952. He was very hostile toward Communists, actually having a clause barring Communists from membership inserted in the Teamster Constitution (James and James, 1965). Tobin’s avoidance of sympathy strikes and boycotts as well as careful expenditures of union funds accounted for his success in rebuilding the Teamsters. After almost twenty years of requests, he finally obtained an increase in the per capita tax and strike fund in 1920 and again in 1952 (Leiter, 1957). Tobin had no influence to rid the union of racketeers, so he turned his head “the other way,” leaving them to their own devices. He became very influential in the labor movement, particularly in the AFL where he rose to third vice president (Leiter, 1957). Tobin turned down an increase in salary in 1947, but accepted perks that totaled much more. Tobin’s politics favored the Democrats, especially President Roosevelt. The IBT’s main objectives during Tobin’s reign were economic, not political. To achieve his goals within the union Tobin asked others to follow through, knowing he would not need to be advised of how they reached their goals (Sloan, 1991). In the early 1940s, the pressures within the union for major changes in the administrative machinery began to mount as a result of the rise of a new generation of local leaders more dynamic and aggressive than the older men who were still holding power. Also, changes in industrial processes and organization began to affect the IBT. Tobin made Dave Beck his executive vice president in 1948, as a result of his successful organizing practices in the West. Leadership and Corruption, 1952-1967 In 1952 Beck became the fifth president of the IBT. He immediately moved Teamster headquarters to Washington D.C. and built a $5 million headquarters. Under Beck’s leadership and through his techniques of organizing from above, Teamsters’ national membership increased from 890,000 in 1948 to 1,120,000 by 1952 (Romer, 1962). The IBT became an industrial union, organizing workers from industries such as trucking, warehousing and food processing. To deal with the new industrial organization, Beck reorganized the union’s structure, creating the conferences and trade divisions. His ability to find new methods of organizing was extraordinary. He influenced the union to support Republican candidates for president in 1948 and again 1952 (Romer, 1962). Beck’s biggest problem was his innate interest in power and his desire to win the esteem of Teamster employers. As a Teamster leader, Beck set out to establish a kind of partnership with employers with the intention of stabilizing the industry, raising profits, and thus raising wages for some of the Teamster members. Teamsters became the “friendly” union that the employers “could live with.” Beck and other Teamster officials came to identify with the employers and their problems, to share the employers’ concerns, to adopt their lifestyles, and ultimately to become businessmen themselves, forgetting the rank-and-file Teamsters in many cases (LaBotz, 1990). Beck’s power and reputation vanished completely when he fled to Europe on “urgent business” as soon as the McClellan committee began looking into his affairs. On his return he took the Fifth Amendment when called to testify (Romer, 1962). Beck was indited on tax evasion and withdrew his presidential candidacy in 1957, leaving it to Jimmy Hoffa. James R. Hoffa, president from 1957-1967, sought influence and power in everything he did. He centralized collective bargaining of wages into a National Master Freight Contract. He earned the respect of all employers with whom he negotiated, frequently knowing more about their companies than their negotiators did. Since Hoffa had a wonderful memory for thousands of details, he preferred to be in complete charge and was (Clay, 1965).
Details
-
File Typepdf
-
Upload Time-
-
Content LanguagesEnglish
-
Upload UserAnonymous/Not logged-in
-
File Pages10 Page
-
File Size-