Kyoto University Becoming Stateless: Historical Experience and Its Refl ection on the Concept of State among the Lahu in Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asian Massif Kataoka Tatsuki* This paper aims to contribute to James Scott’s discussion of statelessness in “Zomia” by examining the realities of political autonomy and the concepts of state and king- ship of the Lahu. During the nineteenth century, “kings” appeared among the Lahu in parts of southwest Yunnan. Indeed, the Lahu enjoyed political autonomy under their own kings before these were eliminated in the process of modern state forma- tion and border demarcation in China and Burma. Messianic movements emerged among the Lahu after they became stateless. These movements stressed the need to redeem the lost states and kings throughout the course of the Lahu’s modern history. In this respect, statelessness is not a timeless, quintessential attribute of the Lahu. Rather, they only became conscious of statelessness during the modern period. What this demonstrates is that the Lahu have never been conscious anar- chists who chose to avoid kings and states. They possess their own original con- cepts of state and kingship, even though these differ from our conventional under- standing, and the main theme of their historical experience and mythical accounts centers around their search for their own state and king. Keywords: statelessness, Yunnan-Southeast Asian borderlands, Lahu, kingship, millenarianism I Introduction James Scott’s recent work The Art of Not Being Governed (J. C. Scott 2009) is an excellent contribution to studies on the massif of mainland Southeast Asia and southwest China (“Zomia” in his terminology). Scott upholds that every aspect of social life of highlanders in this area can be seen as a conscious strategy to maintain distance from state power. He argues that their first priority was to avoid control from lowland states and that their * 片岡 樹, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi- cho, Yoshida Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan e-mail: [email protected] Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 2013, pp. 69–94 69 ©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University NII-Electronic Library Service Kyoto University 70 KATAOKAA T. social organization, shifting cultivation, illiteracy, and origin myths were designed to justify statelessness in order to meet their ultimate goal of anarchy. His argument is a part of the recent trend in this field to present a non-state-centered perspective. Studies of this sort have appeared as opportunities for fieldwork have increased since China, Vietnam, and Laos (partly) opened their doors to foreign scholars.1) Such studies have led to a re-evaluation of certain social dynamics that hitherto remained hidden from the modern state perspective. James Scott’s book has made advances in this respect. The Lahu, a Tibeto-Burman speaking group, are distributed over a wide area that covers Upper Burma, northern Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as their original land Yunnan. According to James Scott, they are one of the typically stateless peoples of “Zomia.” Indeed, their consciousness of being stateless is both an important motif in their origin myth and a main driving force behind a series of messianic movements. However, whether statelessness reflects their consciousness is questionable. In this paper, I will present an alternative interpretation of their historical consciousness. I first discuss the Lahu’s political autonomy in southwest Yunnan during the nineteenth century (Section II) and follow up by discussing arguments concerning the elimination of political autonomy in the course of China’s building of a modern nation-state (Section III). Next I examine indigenous concepts of state and king, the origin myth that justifies stateless, as well as the messianic movements that search for “the lost book” of the Lahu (Section IV). Finally, in the concluding section, I present possibilities for viewing “Zomia” from an alternative perspective, which may open up ways of discussing the realities of states run by highlanders and their original concept of statehood. II The “Lahu Age” Emergence of the Lahu Autonomous Polities After a long period of “missing links” in their ethno-history,2) the Lahu (then known as Luohei 猓黒 or Kucong 苦葱 in Chinese documents) emerged in Chinese official records of the Yongzheng 雍正 period.3) Qing officials promoted an image of the Luohei or Kucong as “unruly rebels,” and the “Luohei rebels” appeared again in the Jiaqing 嘉慶 period 1) For example, see Giersch (2006) and Horstmann and Wadley (2006). 2) For the history of the Lahu before Qing, see “Lahuzu Jianshi” Bianxiezu (1986), Wang and He (1999), Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui (2003). 3) Dianyun Linianchuan, Vol. 12, 621–624. See also Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao Zouzhe, Vol. 7, 453–454, Vol. 20, 98 for details of the activities of the Luohei and Kucong. NII-Electronic Library Service Kyoto University Becoming Stateless 71 when they were accused of disobedience to the lowland Tay (Shan) cawfaa or military native officials (tusi 土司) owing allegiance to the Qing emperor. Demographic, economic, and religious factors contributed to the appearance of the “rebels.”4) The first factor to consider is the expansion of the Han migrant population in southwest Yunnan and Upper Burma during the eighteenth century. According to the Draft Comprehensive Gazetteer of Yunnan, the population of Yongchang 永昌府 and Shunning 順寧府 Prefectures, where the majority of the Lahu resided, increased from 166,962 in 1736 to 660,452 in 18305) due to the huge influx of Han migrants. Highlanders were thus exposed to Han cultural influence. The spread of Mahayana Buddhism over the Lahu hills is a typical example (discussed below). Rapid opening of mines in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands also attracted Han migrants. Reid (2004, 24) summarizes the migration of Han Chinese miners: [M]iners migrated in large numbers into Yunnan, where there were reported to be 500,000 miners by 1800. The desire for further mining sites was not halted by any notional boundary of Chinese imperial control. The hills in the north of what are today Burma, Laos, and Vietnam held similar resources of copper, lead, iron, and silver as those of Yunnan. Chinese miners became far more numerous on all these frontiers in the eighteenth century, making deals as necessary with local or state power-holders. Han mine owners maintained private armies and actively participated in local poli- tics. The most prominent figures were Wu Shangxian 呉尚賢 of Maolong 茂隆 silver mine and Gong Li-yan 宮里雁 of Bolong (Bawdwin) 波龍 silver mine. The “Mian Kao 緬考” included in the Dian Xi of 1808 comments that these two mine owners were “most feared by surrounding barbarians” along the Yunnan-Burma borderlands during the eight- eenth century. Another silver mine, Munai 募乃, was located in the center of the Lahu hills in today’s Lancang County 瀾滄縣, and was also managed by Han Chinese.6) At the same time, the Qing dynasty introduced gaitu guiliu 改土歸流 policies, direct administration by imperial officials to replace indirect rule by military native officials (tusi) in the eighteenth century. This was actively implemented on the east bank of the Mekong (Lancang) river during the Yongzheng period under the initiative of Ertai 鄂爾泰, the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou. The abolition of Tay native military officials in Weiyuan 威遠 (present-day Jinggu 景谷) and Zhenyuan 鎭沅 during the 1720s was 4) See Ma (2004; 2007) and Takeuchi (2010) for details of Han immigrants to the Lahu hills, their impact on the local economy, and the transformation of ethnic relations, which eventually led to the creation of the Lahu semi-independent polities led by Han monks. 5) See Yunnan Tongzhi Gao, Vol. 56. 6) For details of the Chinese miners’ role in ethnic relations in the eighteenth-century Yunnan-Burma borderlands (including Munai), see Giersch (2006, 127–135). NII-Electronic Library Service Kyoto University 72 KATAOKAA T. followed by a series of uprisings by displaced Tay former aristocrats in coalition with other highlanders including the Lahu. The influx of Han Chinese migrants and the grow- ing pressure of Qing’s direct administration by the Qing created a “middle ground” (Giersch 2006), or a field of competition over political power and economic resources among the Han immigrants, lowland Tay, and surrounding highlanders in southwest Yunnan. The second factor behind the emergence of the “Lahu rebels” was political unrest in Yunnan-upper mainland Southeast Asia during the eighteenth century. Mine owners, Han migrants, as well as local Tay cawfaa (Sën.Wii, Keng Tung, Mäng: Lëm 孟連, Sipsong Panna, Chiang Mai, etc.) actively participated in local politics along the Yunnan-Burma frontiers at the time of dynasty change in Burma and Siam. The new Siamese dynasty, Thongburi-Bangkok, ousted Burmese troops from Chiang Mai and made a vassal state of it. The newly appointed Chiang Mai king, Kawila, mounted military expeditions to Keng Tung and Sipsong Panna to bring back war captives to repopulate the Chiang Mai valley. The recently founded Burmese Konbaung dynasty also quickly reverted to an expansionist policy that targeted the Tay Shan polities in the northeast. It led to a trian- gular struggle among Burmese troops, Tay polities, and the leaders of the Han Chinese immigrants. All of this occurred in the aftermath of the 1766–69 Qing-Konbaung War. The Tay polities were the main battlefields in all of these conflicts. In the course of such political turmoil, Tay cawfaa sometimes fought each other and sometimes banded together in accordance with complex marriage alliances. The Tay polities split into small factions and their political prestige in the region was severely damaged (ibid., 97–124). Highlanders served at the frontline as spies, guides, or (un)reliable support forces for lowland cawfaa in inter-valley-state warfare.