Cannons Light for Flight. “...paracrate packing make[s] necessary the occasional disassembly of various parts of the how- Cannons itzer and carriage.” Technical Manual 9-319 75-mm Pack Howitzer M1A1 and Carriage M8, 19432 American airborne Field Artillery units in World War II primarily employed Under Canopy the M1A1 75-mm pack howitzer on an M8 carriage. Initially designed in the American Parachute Field Artillery 1920s as a weapon for disassembly into loads carried by mules, it delivered a 14-pound shell to a maximum range of in Operation Market-Garden 9,610 yards.3 The artillery community by Major Scott T. Glass, QM later developed the M8 carriage specifi- cally for airdrop operations. The gun weighed 1,339 pounds, and The mission of parachute Field Artillery is to render fire in during the opening phases of airborne close support of airborne infantry...in the tactical operations operations, the gun crews wheeled it by hand without a prime mover as standard after dropping.” practice.4 Indeed, the doctrinal manual Employment of Airborne Field Artillery, 19431 for airborne Field Artillery at the time recognized crew muscle as the prime means of moving guns on the airborne he United States Army currently battlefield.5 maintains four battalions and two Third Place The 75-mm howitzer’s relatively small Tbatteries of cannon artillery on size and weight allowed disassembly airborne status. Parachuted guns played into nine paracrate or parapack loads roles in several World War II opera- containing gun components and ammu- tions, Korea and, most recently, Panama nition. (See Figure 1.) Gun crews packed in 1989. However, the airborne artillery loads One through Five and Nine and has placed a battalion-plus under canopy attached them to fuselage and wing racks successfully into combat only once— of C-47 transport aircraft. The jump- more than 55 years ago in September master released the bundles over the 1944 during Operation Market-Garden. drop zone (DZ) by toggling a series of In this operation, the 376th Parachute switches. As he did so, gunners pushed Field Artillery Battalion (PFAB) and B out a bundle from the troop door con- Battery, 377th PFAB dropped into Hol- taining 75-mm howitzer loads Six, land near Nijmegen and Eindhoven, Seven and Eight roped together and respectively. then followed the bundle out. A daisy- The Market phase of Market-Garden chain harness connected the loads jetti- saw the largest wartime parachute in- Artillery arriving on a battlefield by soned from outside the aircraft and en- sertion of Field Artillery by any com- parachute will continue as a viable com- sured they arrived on the DZ close to- batant in World War II. It remains the bat option. Cannoneers in the airborne gether.6 The M1A1 had few peers at the largest and most successful to this day. artillery community can prepare their time as an airborne indirect fire weapon, Given the Chief of Staff of the Army’s units for success by examining the ex- and the British airborne forces used it recent initiatives for light forces that periences of the FA parachuted into instead of attempting to develop a simi- stress quick combat deployment, Field Holland. lar weapon.7 18 July-August 2000 Field Artillery Challenges Not Conquered…Yet. “Parachute artillery didn’t fare too well in Sicily and Normandy.” Major Gen- eral James M. Gavin, Former Com- mander of the 82d Airborne Division8 Airborne guns figured to play a promi- nent role during the assault onto the island of Sicily on 10 June 1943 when elements of two artillery battalions were to participate in a night drop. However, unusually high winds coupled with poor navigation by aircraft crews and friendly anti-aircraft fires scattered guns and gunners far from the DZs.9 This disper- sion prevented the airborne artillery The 75-mm howitzer’s relatively small size and weight allowed disassembly into nine from making a battlefield contribution paracrate or parapack loads containing gun components and ammunition. The version proportionate to its potential. shown here is the M1A1 on the M1 (M116) carriage (TM 9-3305 Principles of Artillery The parachute drops scheduled for the Weapons, Page 2-9). night of 5 and 6 June 1944 preceding the Normandy invasion also promised two howitzers accompanying his first its potential. At worst, the artillery ab- roles for the parachute Field Artillery. drops. The 101st Airborne Division sorbed valuable airframes with little or Perhaps influenced by his experiences envisaged a battalion mission for its no return on the investment. Batteries in Sicily, Brigadier General Gavin, lim- 377th PFAB and planned to drop all 12 landed widely dispersed during hours ited the 82d Division’s 456th PFAB to of its howitzers.10 of darkness across the wrong DZs. Ef- But once again, the airborne cannon forts failed to concentrate the guns, 1. Front Trail Section and Drawbar crews entered combat under extremely crews and ammunition necessary to 2. Axle, Rear Trail Section and adverse conditions that rendered them mass fires shortly after landing. Even Toolbox unable to provide immediate fires to so, several key airborne leaders still 3. Sleigh and Gun Cradle supported units. Aircraft scattered guns recognized the value of artillery during 4. Top Gun Cradle and crews over wide areas in the dark- an airborne operation. Brigadier Gen- ness. Very few howitzers could be re- eral Gavin was in this group and, al- 5. Cannon Tube covered from the mostly marshy ter- though he dropped only two guns in 6. Breechblock and Sights rain, and those that could, in many cases, Normandy, his influence played a large 7. Carriage Wheels experienced irreparable drop damage. role in crafting the most successful air- 8. 10 Ready Rounds of Ammunition Of the 12 howitzers it dropped into borne artillery drop of World War II. 9. Paracaisson Handcart of Eight Normandy, the 377th PFAB recovered Concept for Success. “...it looked as Additional Rounds and placed into action only one gun in though artillery would come in very the critical days after the drop.11 The handy in the first 24 hours, so the deci- Figure 1: The 75-mm Pack Howitzer Disas- drop scattered and damaged guns so sion was made to take it in by para- sembled into Paracrates or Parapack thoroughly that the battalion was nearly chute.” Major General Gavin13 Loads. (Information taken from The Ameri- useless as an indirect fire force for the In late August and early September can Arsenal edited by Ian V. Hogg and initial two weeks after the landing.12 1944, Allied mechanized forces broke published by Stackpole Books, Mecha- At best, the performance of the air- away from the Normandy beaches and nicsville, Pennsylvania, 1996, Pages borne artillery during the Sicily and chased retreating German units across 144-145.) Normandy operations didn’t live up to northern France. Planners in the re- cently created 1st Allied Airborne Army proposed a series of operations to trap major German maneuver formations. Allied ground troops overran the pro- posed DZs before the operations could be launched, but these events only in- creased enthusiasm for another mass parachute assault. After the first week of September, a plan evolved to insert three divisions by parachute and glider to support a thrust across the Rhine River in Holland. By successfully vaulting the Rhine, Allied planners hoped to turn a major portion of the Siegfried Line defenses, threaten German industrial areas and remove the Airborne gunners prepare parapacks next to their C-47 transport. Note the paratroopers last great river obstacle to Germany’s are preparing the 75-mm howitzer bundles themselves. interior. Field Artillery July-August 2000 19 The final plan called for the 101st the Rhine River. It was an operation wooded forest astride the Dutch-Ger- Airborne Division to drop into St. tailor-made for airborne troops. man border.17 (See Figure 3.) Oedenrode north of Eindhoven to se- Major General Maxwell Taylor, Com- Gavin and his planners knew that a cure multiple canal crossings. (See the mander of the 101st Airborne Division, parachute artillery battalion would pro- map in Figure 2.) The British 6th Air- devoted almost all his first lifts to infan- vide the firepower necessary for ac- borne Division would drop into Arnhem try. Because his division would jump complishing these tasks. An added bo- to seize the bridge over the Lower Rhine closest to the advancing XXX Corps, he nus was that a PFAB required 48 C-47 River. The 82d Airborne Division reasoned that his infantry could quickly aircraft versus 95 to deploy a glider formed the vital link between the 101st capture their assigned objectives with- Field Artillery battalion. These 48 air- and British 6th airborne divisions by out needing the firepower options pro- craft needed four minutes of airspace; grabbing bridges and canal crossings vided by parachute Field Artillery. B the 95 towing gliders required 15 min- around Nijmegen over the Maas and Battery of the 377th PFAB would jump utes. Waal Rivers.14 The three divisions’ land- on D+3 with the majority of the division Key to the airborne artillery’s perfor- ing sites were connected by what be- artillery arriving by glider before the mance was the decision to execute the came known as “Hell’s Highway.” battery.16 parachute drop in daylight. This elimi- Simultaneous with the three divisions Brigadier General Gavin took a much nated the requirement of a time-con- landing by parachute and glider, the different perspective because his mis- suming and confusing rehearsal of a British XXX Corps would advance sion specified capture of the Groesbeek night drop immediately before the ac- along a narrow corridor through the two Heights.