Presence and Influence in Lobbying: Evidence from Dodd-Frank Pamela Ban∗ Hye Young Youy Abstract Interest groups face many choices when lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group lobbying across two stages of reg- ulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehen- sive lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of lobbying activities ei- ther during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bu- reaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence. ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA. Email: [email protected] yAssistant Professor, Wil Family Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY. Email: [email protected] 1 \The bill, completed early Friday and expected to come up for a final vote this week, is basically a 2,000-page missive to federal agencies, instructing regulators to address subjects ranging from derivatives trading to document retention. But it is notably short on specifics, giving regulators significant power to determine its impact { and giving partisans on both sides a second chance to influence the outcome..." { Binyamin Appelbaum, The New York Times on Dodd-Frank, 2010 1 Introduction Lobbying is a business with no deadline. Interest groups lobby to influ- ence agenda setting and voting in Congress, and continue to lobby well after Congress passes legislation (Hall and Miler 2008; You 2017). In this endless game, interest groups participate in different stages of policymaking and use multiple tools in their attempts to achieve influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth and Godwin 2013). They appear in committee hearings and testimonies, hire commercial lobbying firms and former government offi- cials to contact members of Congress and bureaucrats, meet with regulators, and submit comments during rulemaking process. Different interest groups and different lobbying activities are observed at different stages of policymak- ing. Despite the prevalence of lobbying throughout multiple stages of poli- cymaking, there is relatively little research that documents the choices and effectiveness of different lobbying methods across different stages of policy- making. Scholars have spent copious amounts of time to understand the effects of lobbying on policy outcomes. This endeavor has been challenging because lob- bying is inherently a strategic decision. This is particularly true when scholars attempt to estimate the effect of lobbying on votes by members of Congress. First, unlike campaign contributions, it is difficult to measure lobbying con- tacts at the congressional member level because the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which regulates the domestic lobbying process, only requires lobbyists to disclose the identity of the chamber of Congress or federal agency 2 contacted, not the name of the lawmaker or the bill or topic they were lobbying on. Second, it is well-known that interest groups tend to lobby their allies in Congress, who may already share similar preferences with the interest groups; therefore it is challenging to disentangle the effect of lobbying from inherent, already existing preferences (Hall and Wayman 1990; Kollman 1997; Hall and Deadorff 2006). Furthermore, the bulk of the literature on the effects of lobbying is focused on lobbying Congress; fewer studies have concentrated on lobbying during the subsequent rulemaking stage, despite rulemaking's importance in imple- menting legislation. The previous studies who do focus on the rulemaking stage have identified the kinds of participants who are most and least active in comments submissions, and correlate participation with rule changes (Golden, 1998; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Haeder and Yackee, 2015). Other questions in the lobbying literature, such as the impact of the \revolving door," have received attention by scholars in the congressional context (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen, 2012; Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014), but have not yet been investigated for outcomes in the rulemaking stage. This paper advances the literature by studying the lobbying activities of in- terest groups across two stages of regulatory policymaking { the congressional bill stage and the federal agency rulemaking stage { and by examining whose voices get acknowledged at the end of the process. We track the combina- tions of lobbying activities used and identify which groups are acknowledged in the final rule. Notably, we consider the \revolving door" in the rulemaking process and investigate whether organizations with former SEC employees are more likely to be acknowledged. Our advantage is a newly collected dataset, explained in detail below, that allows us to directly track references made in an agency rule to specific interest groups who had lobbied on that rule. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank, hereafter), passed in July 2010 with around 330 provisions for rule- making, presents a fitting case study to analyze lobbying in federal agency rulemaking.1 We specifically focus on rulemaking activities by the Security 1Unlike the number of rulemaking provisions, the number of rules is uncertain ex-ante 3 and Exchange Commission (SEC), who was responsible for making rules for up to 97 provisions to implement Dodd-Frank. Numerous groups, from cor- porations to local governments, were involved in lobbying at various stages of the policymaking process. First, we provide a comprehensive description of the lobbying activities of interest groups across both the congressional bill stage and the rulemaking stage by analyzing which organizations are involved and what types of lob- bying strategies { e.g. submitting lobbying reports for lobbying contacts in Congress or the federal bureaucracy, submitting comments to agencies, meet- ing with federal regulators, hiring former SEC regulators { each organization used to lobby on Dodd-Frank from 2009{2014. This enables us to understand how different organizations allocate their resources in different stages of poli- cymaking in their attempt to influence regulatory policymaking. Next, following studies that have explored interest groups' activities in the rulemaking process (Carpenter 2002; Yackee and Yackee 2006; McKay and Yackee 2007; Kerwin and Furlong 2008; Boehmke, Gailmard and Patty 2013; Haeder and Yackee 2015), we examine how lobbying in the rulemaking stage influences final rules. Previous studies observe which organizations submitted comments and whether the final rule had changes, but do not isolate which specific organizations' opinions, if any, were taken into account. We take a new approach that explicitly connects parts of the final rules to specific interest groups by using citations in the final rules { our newly collected dataset { which reference comments and meetings between organizations and the SEC. In the final version of their rules, the SEC includes citations that name the opinions of a selected group of organizations and the medium in which those opinions were transmitted. This allows us to directly connect any considerations the SEC took into account in between the proposed and final version of rules to the specific comments or meetings of specific interest groups. While a citation of an organization in the final rule does not necessarily suggest because some rulemaking provisions are discretionary, one rule can satisfy multiple rule- making provisions, multiple rules can satisfy a single provision, non-rulemaking provisions may result in rules, etc. 4 that an organization's exact preferences are reflected in the final rule, it does indicate acknowledgement of the organization's opinion by federal regulators in the rulemaking process. Thus, our study and our newly collected dataset can identify whether or not the SEC took into account an organization's submitted comment or meeting, allowing us to advance the literature by drawing more specific conclusions on the effectiveness of organizations' lobbying efforts. For Dodd-Frank, we find that 2,961 organizations participated in the lobby- ing process either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Corporations and trade associations were the most active, but local governments and members of Congress were also actively involved. While corporations and trade associations lobbied throughout both stages, we find that local governments, not-for-profit organizations, and even individual members of Congress mostly participated in the rulemaking stage exclusively. We find that the number of lobbying report submissions and the number of meetings with the SEC are strongly associated with the citation of the organi- zation in the SEC's final rule. When we compare comment submissions across various types of organizations, comments submitted by trade associations and members