TIME, TRUTH AND REALISM An Essay on the Semantics and Metaphysics of Tense Joshua M. Mozersky A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Phi losophy University of Toronto O Copyright by Joshua M. Mozersky 1999 National tibrary Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Sue& 395. rue Wellington OttawaON KtAW OttawaOIY K1A ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive Licence dowing the exclusive permettaat à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seli reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfichelfilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantîal extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imphés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Tirne, Trrtth and Realism: An Essay on the Semantics and Metaphysics of Tense Joshua M. Mozersky Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto Ph.D. Thesis, 1999 ABSTWCT Different beliefs conceming the metaphysical stais of tense divide philosophers into two camps. Those who embrace a tensed theory of time (often called the 'A-series') argue that past, presenr andfuture correspond to genuine ontologicai distinctions. Those who deny the reality of such distinctions espouse a tenseless theory of time (known as the 'B- series'). In this essay I defend a tenseless account. I begin with an examination of the most prominent ontological conceptions of tense, finding them to be incoherent at worst, highly implausible at best. I then turn my attention to Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, arguing that, properly understood, it demonstrates that tenses could not be physically reaiized. The upshot is that tense is not a philosophically viable notion. If time is real, it must be tenseless. Therefore, the choice is between tenseless time and some sort of temporal idealism. Defending the former alternative, 1 focus my efforts, in the second part of the essay, on responding to the most important objections to a tense-free ontology. 1 argue that tenseless time: (1) can explain the semantics of tensed sentences; (2) does not entai1 fatalisrn or determinism of any kind; and (3) is consistent with our mental experience. These results indicate that tense is a feature of perception, not a property of time itself. In the third part of the essay 1 argue that theories that constrain truth epistemicaily are poorly motivated and implausible. Therefore, in considering the status of tense, ontological considerations can rightly take precedence over epistemic concerns. This defuses objections to tenseless time that are based on the obvious fact that the pst, present and future differ with respect to their episternic accessibility. It is, therefore, consistent to hold that time is epistemically asymmetric but ontologically syrnmetric. A dissertation, like any major writing project, is a collaborative affair. 1 have many people to thank for rnaking this essay far better than it otherwise would have ken. First and foremost, 1 am grateful to have had the chance to work under the co- supervision of Jim Brown and Bernard Katz, whose seemingly boundless knowledge, generosity and support combined to provide encouragement while saving me from errors too numerous to recall. Every paragraph of this essay has been improved as a result of their insightful input. What's good in what follows owes as much to them as to me. Calvin Nomore went well beyond his official duties as a dissertation advisor. Despite the many claims on his time, he would, when 1 needed it, put some aside in which to heIp me sort out my ideas. 1 am fortunate to have had the opportunity to benefit from his sage advice. Cheryl Misak graciously took the time to read a draft of chapter 6 and provided me with excellent feedback. Despite the differences in Our philosophical outlook, 1 find our exchanges to be extremely enriching. Thanks to Thomas Baldwin for an enlightening correspondence on the nature of temporal facts, and to Huw Pice for stimulating conversations on tense, directionality and realism. 1 have benefited frorn many discussions with student-friends in the Department of PhiIosophy at the University of Toronto. In particular, 1 would like to thank Anthony Speca for hundreds of hours of debate on al1 things philosophical, including time, and Krister Bykvist, Glen Hoffman and Patrick Moran for probing questions and clear- sighted comrnents. iii A few chapters were presented in early forms at conferences. Stom McCall and Ali Kazmi provided helpful comrnents on versions of chapter 3, David Martens' insight greatly improved chapter 4, and Justin Holt helped put me on the right track in chapter 6. Thanks also to audiences at the 1997 and 1998 CPA congresses, the 1997 OPS conference, the 1997 WCPA meeting, and the University of Toronto Philosophy Department's Forum. My most profound debt of gratitude is to Carole-Anne, who put up with an often obsessed philosopher-in-training with compassion, understanding and good humour. I dedicate this essay to her. Acknowledgments iii Introduction 2 1. Tense and Alternative Conceptions of The 6 1. introduction 6 2. Tenses as Properties: McTaggart's Argument 6 3. hfinite Reflexive Properties 13 4. The 'Empty Future' View 16 5. The Tree Model' of Reality 19 6. Event Identity and Presentism 22 7. Are the Facts Tenseless? 30 8. McTaggart on Change 33 9. Conclusion 35 2. Time and the Special Theory of Relativity 36 1. Introduction 36 2. Einstein and the Special Theory of Relativity 36 3. Minkowski and the Four-Dimensional World 40 4. Some Lessons for the Philosophy of Time 43 5. Time and Physical Geometry 53 6. The B-Series and Relative Time * 58 7. Conclusion 60 3. Tense and Temporal Semantics 62 1. Introduction 62 2. The New Tenseless Theory of Time and Truth Conditions 62 3. Tense, Truth Conditions and Translation 64 4. Tensed Entailment Relations 68 5. Tenseless Entailment Relations 69 6. Truth Conditions, Meanings and Propositions 76 7. The Referential-Attributive Distinction and the Present tense Copula 80 8. Conclusion 87 4. Time, Tense and Freedom 88 1. Introduction 88 2. The Incompatibility Thesis 89 3. Hard and Soft Facts 90 4. Eliminating Possibilities 93 5. Detection vs. Projection 94 6. Divine Foreknowledge and Causation 96 7. Causation and Explanation 98 8. Omniscience, Causation and Counterfactuals 102 9. Some Objections IO5 10. Facts and Events 107 1 1. Tense, Logical Fatalism and Detenninism 109 12. Conclusion 11 1 5. The Cognitive Signüïcance of Tense 112 1. Introduction 112 2. Tensed Beliefs, Rational Action and the Passage of Time 112 3. Indexicality, Belief and Perception 116 4. Beliefs and Facts 119 5. Tense and Temporal Perspective 120 6. Temporal Perspective and the Tmth Value Links 125 7. ReaIism and the Perception of Succession: Entropy 127 8, Realism and the Perception of Succession: Causation 132 9. Realism and the Perception of Succession: The Non-Reductive Strategy 135 IO. Conclusion 139 6. Truth and Ontology 140 1. Introduction 140 2. The Conflict 140 3. Motivations for Epistemic Tmth 143 4. Epistemic Truth and Bivalence 144 5. Predicate Specification 146 6. Underdetemination: The Topology of Time 147 7. Vagueness 150 8. The Liar Paradox 152 9. Non-Epistemic Truth and Accessibility 153 IO. Truth, Ontology and Explanation 156 1 1. Ontological Realism and Explanation 160 12. Conclusion 161 Appendix: Realism, Bivalence and Quantum Mechanics 162 Conclusion 169 Bibliography 171 1 think that we cm, however imperfectly, mirror the world, like Leibniz's monads; and 1 think it is the duty of the philosopher to make himself as undistorting a rnirror as he can. But it is also his duty to recognise such distortions as are inevitable from our very nature. Of these, the most fundamental is that we view the world from the point of view of the here and now, not with that large impartiality which theists attribute to the Deity. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development. Introduction Different beliefs conceming the metaphysical status of tense divide philosophers into two camps. Those who ernbrace a rensed theory of time (often called the 'A-series') argue that pasl. present andfuture correspond to genuine ontological distinctions. Those who deny the reality of such distinctions espouse a tenseless theory of time (known as the 'B- series'). In this essay I defend a tenseless account. The current philosophical debate over the status of tense took shape in 1908 with the publication of McTaggart's famous article, The Unreality of Time'. There, McTaggart distinguished tensed from tenseless ways of thinking about time and argued that tense was both incoherent and the essence of time. He concluded that time is not reai. Tenseless theorists tend to accept McTaggart's incoherence claim but reject his essence daim; vice versa for tense theorists. The tenseless cause has been advocated by such luminaries as Russell, Quine, Griinbaum, Smart, Horwich and Mellor. Tensed theones have been defended by notables such as Broad, Whitehead, Pnor, Sellars, Tooley, McCall and, most recently, Quentin Smith. Debates that continue, decade after decade, to win adherents to either side are looked upon with suspicion and even distress by some phiIosophers who subsequently look to dissolve the issue by arguing that it is merely a pseudo-problem.