DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION IN AFGHANISTAN 30 September 2003 ICG Asia Report N°65 Kabul/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES ........................................................................ 2 III. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ................................................................................. 5 A. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY............................................................................................5 B. POLICE FORCES.....................................................................................................................5 C. DEFENCE MINISTRY REFORM AND THE ANBP......................................................................6 D. THE SECURITY COMMISSION FOR THE NORTH.......................................................................8 IV. THE NORTHEAST: KUNDUZ AND TAKHAR........................................................ 9 A. POST-TALIBAN ARMS COLLECTION ......................................................................................9 B. ETHNIC AND FACTIONAL TENSIONS ....................................................................................11 C. REINTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES........................................................................................12 V. THE SOUTHEAST: KHOST AND PAKTIA............................................................ 14 A. BACKGROUND.....................................................................................................................14 B. AMF DIVISIONS .................................................................................................................15 C. POLICE FORCES...................................................................................................................17 D. REINTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES........................................................................................18 VI. KANDAHAR................................................................................................................. 19 A. AMF AND UNOFFICIAL FORCES ..........................................................................................20 B. POLICE................................................................................................................................21 C. REINTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES........................................................................................22 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN.......................................................................................................24 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................25 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................26 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................33 ICG Asia Report N°65 30 September 2003 DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION IN AFGHANISTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The domination of Afghanistan’s political Tajik commanders from the Panjshir Valley – has landscape by armed parties and individual emerged as a key player in the DR process. Teams commanders is still the principal obstacle to of 70 officers and soldiers assigned and trained by implementation of the political process that was the ministry will be responsible for compiling data agreed at the Bonn conference in late 2001. on the militia units and personnel in each district to Without a credible process of disarmament, be covered by the DR program. Regional demobilisation and reintegration of former Verification Committees (RVCs), consisting of five commanders and fighters into society (DR), it is independent individuals for each region, plus two inconceivable that any of the key elements of that additional individuals from each province, will then political process – including the adoption of a new review that data. constitution, judicial reform, and elections – can be meaningfully implemented. More international While the ANBP is based on a sound understanding engagement across the country – in the form of of Afghan militia structures, the heavy ministerial both security contributions and economic assistance footprint on the process creates a high risk of co- – remains the essential ingredient. option. The spontaneous demobilisation of many former combatants that has already taken place as a In late October 2003, the United Nations plans to result of low and irregular pay means that relatively initiate the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program few troops who retain links to commanders are (ANBP), a U.S.$41 million DR fund, with a pilot likely to be found at the bases of the Afghan project that will target 1,000 soldiers in the Military Forces (AMF). The task of identifying northeastern town of Kunduz. This will be followed militia personnel, particularly the low-level by similar pilot projects in Gardez and Bamiyan commanders who are the key agents of troop and then rolled out on a larger scale over the rest of mobilisation, requires independent data collection the country, with priority to the faction-ridden city at the village level – a task for which UN or ANBP of Mazar-i Sharif in the north and Parwan province, staff would be better suited. Without a more robust which is home to many of the troops now stationed verification mechanism than the RVCs to cross- in Kabul. The process is intended to remove the check the data, especially where UN profiling is support structure beneath senior commanders by unavailable, there is a serious risk that the process disengaging lower-level commanders and troops will be misused by powerful figures either to through individualised counselling, vocational strengthen patronage networks or to demobilise training, and jobs creation and placement. only their opponents. The ANBP, however, has been negotiated in the Recent attempts at disarmament and security sector absence of either an international or a non-factional reform in Afghanistan offer valuable lessons for Afghan force that can project its authority implementation of the ANBP. In the north, since throughout the country. As a result, the ministry of May 2002, the inter-party Security Commission has defence – still dominated despite recent reforms by mediated factional disputes at a local level and Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan ICG Asia Report N°65, 30 September 2003 Page ii carried out regional disarmament agreements. The There is also an important economic prerequisite. failure to address larger factional rivalries in the The international community needs to support the region, however, has limited its effectiveness. In DR process by creating sustainable employment the northeast, arms collection under the authority of opportunities for demobilising troops. This should the ministry of defence has put significant be part of a larger development strategy for the quantities of light and heavy weapons into different regions, targeting in particular the provincial and district depots, but the growing rehabilitation of industrial facilities and the revival estrangement of local Uzbek commanders from the of long-dormant agricultural projects such as cotton Panjshiri Tajik-dominated Shura-yi Nazar has production in Kunduz and forestry in Khost. With reduced the prospect of their being transferred to a careful planning and focused investment, structured central authority. environments can be created that minimise the risk of recidivism among former combatants and In the southeastern provinces of Khost and Paktia, provide viable alternatives to poppy cultivation. by contrast, the presence of the U.S., British and French-trained Afghan National Army (ANA) as well as Coalition troops has allowed some RECOMMENDATIONS meaningful security sector reforms to take place, both by exerting pressure on recalcitrant To the Afghan Transitional Administration: commanders to leave office when directed to by the Kabul government and by helping fill the security 1. Establish and implement criteria for vacuum while new provincial security institutions appointment to senior posts within the ministry are assembled. Equally meaningful has been the of defence that emphasise higher education, appointment, by the central government and graduation from the military academy or other centrally-appointed governors, of professional formal military training. officers to take over the provincial police and 2. Create at both the central and provincial levels military divisions. However, circumstances and a non-partisan, multiethnic committee to context must be carefully examined in order to review and refer candidates for recruitment assess the real significance of personnel changes. into the Afghan National Army that is independent of the AMF structure and includes In Kandahar, for example, the reassignment of the an appeals procedure for rejected candidates. provincial governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, has improved somewhat the prospects for an overhaul of To the UN Security Council: the security sector but rather than creating non-tribal governance and security institutions, the measures 3. Authorise NATO to expand the international that have been taken are likely