SITARAMAN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2016 12:04 PM Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History Ganesh Sitaraman* In the last four decades, the American middle class has been hollowed out, and fears are growing that economic inequality is leading to political inequality. These trends raise a troubling question: Can our constitutional system survive the collapse of the middle class? This question might seem tangential—if not unrelated—to contemporary constitutional theory. But for most of the history of political thought, one of the central problems of constitutional design was the relationship between the distribution of wealth in society and the structure of government. Two traditions emerged from thinking about this relationship. The first tradition assumed that society would be divided into rich and poor, and it designed class-warfare constitutions that incorporated economic classes directly into the structure of government. The second tradition was based on the assumption that society was relatively equal economically; as a result, it was not necessary to incorporate economic class into these middle-class constitutions. This Essay identifies these two traditions and traces their intellectual history from Aristotle through the eighteenth century. It then shows that the intellectual tradition of the middle-class constitution was alive and flourishing during the time of the American founding—suggesting that the collapse of the American middle class today has consequences of constitutional significance. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1302 I. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY .................................................................. 1304 A. Class-Warfare Constitutions ................................................. 1306 B. The Middle-Class Constitution ............................................. 1311 II. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION .................................................................................. 1319 A. Power, Property, and Republican Government ..................... 1320 B. America’s Economic Exceptionalism ................................... 1323 C. Preserving the Middle-Class Constitution ............................ 1325 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1327 * Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Portions of this Essay are drawn from my forthcoming book, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUTION (under contract with Alfred A. Knopf). SITARAMAN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2016 12:04 PM 1302 Texas Law Review [Vol. 94:1301 Introduction In the last four decades, the American middle class has been hollowed out.1 Economists have documented widening inequality and the increasing share of wealth going to the top 1% and 0.1% of Americans.2 At the same time, fears are growing that economic inequality is leading to political inequality. In a variety of studies over the last decade, political scientists have shown that economic elites dominate all aspects of the American political system.3 In fact, they have even demonstrated that the views of middle-class Americans have effectively no impact on policy outcomes, while the views of economic elites are strong predictors.4 These findings operate across all areas of policy, and they provide systematic empirical evidence that American politics is skewed in favor of the wealthiest. Some scholars have even begun to study oligarchies throughout history as a way to better understand contemporary America.5 These trends raise a troubling question: Can our constitutional system survive the collapse of the middle class? What does the middle class have to do with preserving our constitutional system? The answer is hardly obvious. In the last few decades, constitutional theory has focused surprisingly little on the collapse of the middle class.6 Work on economic and political inequality has primarily been in specific domains such as campaign finance reform and the rights of the poor.7 With a few notable exceptions, constitutional theorists 1. See generally DAVID MADLAND, HOLLOWED OUT: WHY THE ECONOMY DOESN’T WORK WITHOUT A STRONG MIDDLE CLASS (2015) (documenting the decline of the American middle class, and arguing that a strong middle class is necessary to America’s economic growth). 2. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 3. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 1–3 (2008) (discussing the ramifications that economic inequality has on democratic politics); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 112 (2012) (documenting “enormous inequalities in the responsiveness of policy makers to the preferences of more- and less-well-off Americans”); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 117 (2012) (connecting economic inequality with political inequality). 4. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 & fig.1 (2014). 5. See JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 211–20 (2011) (placing the United States within a greater discussion of various forms of oligarchies). 6. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (noting and examining the lack of constitutional discourse surrounding growing economic inequality). 7. The literature is voluminous. For a few recent entries in the campaign finance literature, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). On the rights of the poor, the classic statements are Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional SITARAMAN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2016 12:04 PM 2016] Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure 1303 rarely discuss the distribution of wealth in society in ways that implicate the basic structure of the Constitution.8 This is surprising. For most of the history of political thought, one of the central problems of constitutional design was the relationship between the distribution of wealth in society and the structure of government. From the ancient Greeks onward, political philosophers were preoccupied with the problem of economic inequality and the structure of government. Unless a society had a strong middle class, the wealthy elites would clash with everyone else—the rich oppressing the poor, the poor seeking to confiscate and redistribute the wealth of the rich. Economic inequality led inevitably to political inequality, and as a result, to instability, class warfare, and revolution. A vital task of constitutional theory was to design governments that would not fall prey to the tumults that accompanied economic inequality. In this Essay, I make two arguments. The first argument is that many constitutional thinkers throughout history not only saw a relationship between the economic structure of society and the structure of government, but also recognized that the distribution of wealth in society constrained the type of government that could operate. To show this, I present a brief intellectual history of two different traditions that address the relationship between the economic structure of society and the structure of government. The first tradition assumed that society would be divided into the rich and poor. It held that the best way to prevent instability was to incorporate economic class directly into the structure of government. I call these systems class-warfare constitutions. The second tradition was based on the alternate assumption: society was not defined by economic inequality, but rather by relative equality and a large middle class. In a society with relative economic homogeneity, the constitution need not incorporate class into its structure. I call this kind of system a middle-class constitution. Importantly, political thinkers recognized that as the distribution of wealth changed in society, so too would the distribution of political power. These two traditions are the subject of Part I. Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 962 (1973); and Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659. See also Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). For an intellectual history of the evolution of constitutional welfare rights, see William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001). For a response, see Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001). A more recent entry is Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 (2008). 8. The exceptions include Kate Andrias, Separation of Wealth: Inequalities and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L.