The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands BY ANDREW LEITH he purpose of this article is not to provide a critical analysis of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) or a robust platform for lessons learned. Rather, T it offers a general introduction to the country and an overview of a stabilization and recon- struction operation with a different framework than many of the operations that the United States has participated in during the post–Cold War period. RAMSI is an Australian-led intervention that deployed to the Solomon Islands in July 2003 to establish peace and security. Unlike the Australian- led Peace Monitoring Group, which deployed to Bougainville from May 1998 to June 2003,1 and the ongoing commitment to East Timor,2 RAMSI is led by a diplomat. It emphasizes policing and a “light” military presence. One could argue that the lessons learned from recent interventions in fragile and conflict- affected countries such as the Solomon Islands are more relevant to future U.S. commitments than the plethora of lessons learned templates and volumes of doctrine that are being pieced together from the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences. The Solomon Islands is the third largest archipelago in the South Pacific consisting of a scat- tered double chain of 992 islands extending 1,000 miles southeast from Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. With a population of approximately 560,000, the country has a diverse cultural mix across Dr. Andrew Leith currently resides in the Solomon Islands where he is researching on behalf of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence. He is also a Faculty Member in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University. PRISM 2, no. 3 FROM THE FIELD | 155 LEITH the nine provinces: Choiseul, Malaita, Western, Malaitans; violence escalated, causing several Temotu, Central, Rennell and Bellona, Makira- hundred deaths. In October 2000, mediations Ulawa, Isabel, and Guadalcanal, where the by Australia and New Zealand resulted in the capital city Honiara, governed separately as a Townsville Peace Agreement signing with a capital territory, is located. Melanesians make general amnesty and disarmament of both fac- up over 90 percent of the population, but tions agreed upon. By this stage, general law- there are substantial numbers of Polynesians, lessness and violence had spread to other prov- Micronesians, Chinese, and Europeans. Within inces, resulting in the collapse of an already the Melanesian group, there is an array of lan- fragile government and economy. Regionally, guages, clans, and tribal affiliations, which are there was a general fear that the Solomon made even more complex by the wantok system Islands could become a failed state, which for of obligation based on the same language group. Australia was a strategic nightmare, given that It is a country renown for its remoteness, beauti- within the “arch of instability” to its north- ful coral islands, and Melanesian hospitality, but east, the events in East Timor were still unfold- apart from Honiara and the provincial centers, ing and the Peace Monitoring Group was in the archipelago has not changed much since the the midst of concluding ceasefire-monitoring 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal in activities in Bougainville. August 1942. At the request of the government of the Solomon Islands, RAMSI was deployed in July 2003 to assist in the establishment of the ability to bridge organizational peace and security through support for law stovepipes is due in part to the fact that and justice, democratic governance, and eco- Australia had already developed a wealth nomic growth. Unlike the commitments to of experience in the practical integration Bougainville and East Timor, RAMSI was led by of development and security agencies a diplomat sourced from within the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. From the onset, there was a strong emphasis on policing with However, the history of the Solomon a light military footprint provided mainly by Islands post-independence in July 1978 has the Australian Defence Force,3 which soon been short and troubled. The violence that restored law and order. There were 15 contrib- erupted in early 1998 was fueled by tensions uting countries involved, including personnel in Guadalcanal where traditional landown- from the Australian Agency for International ers resented the immigrants from Malaita Development (AusAID), Department of who had begun to settle lands as part of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Federal an urban drift toward better employment Police, Customs and Border Services, Finance, opportunities in Honiara. The Guadalcanal Treasury, and the Australian Defence Force. Revolutionary Army began to terrorize and One of the key lessons learned from the initial kill rural Malaitans who were then forced RAMSI deployment is that it functioned effec- to flee to Honiara or back to their home tively without the usual hurdles that normally island. The Malaita Eagle Force was subse- plague the multiagency process and the first quently formed to protect the interests of the months of any operation. 156 | FROM THE FIELD PRISM 2, no. 3 AssisTANCE MISSION TO THE SOLOMON ISLANDS Access to clean water reduces poverty and is a fundamental requirement for economic development Rob Maccoll / AusAID The ability to bridge what could have external communications undertaken as a become the usual flight to the budgetary and multiagency product, and coherent and cohe- regulatory security of organizational stovepipes sive support provided at the departmental and is due in part to the fact that Australia had cabinet levels back in Canberra. already developed a wealth of experience in Since its establishment, RAMSI has the practical integration of development and made considerable efforts to work with security agencies. The caliber of personnel the government of the Solomon Islands to selected to deploy, individual relationships, improve the country’s rule of law, machin- and interagency networks established in ery of government, and problem of urban Bougainville and East Timor certainly contrib- drift driven by a youth bulge seeking better uted to the initial successes, but much can be employment opportunities that eventually attributed to the 6 weeks prior to deployment leads to the breakdown of infrastructure and where all key stakeholders discussed, work- traditional and community values. AusAID shopped, developed strategies, and defined and the New Zealand Aid Programme have roles structured around three phases: restoring also worked hard to improve the fragile security, restoring governance, and capacity- education and health care sectors—no dif- building.4 This was followed up on the ground ferent from the kaleidoscope of cultural, by the establishment of a single internal economic, and infrastructure problems that reporting system, twice-daily coordination confronts most fragile and postconflict coun- meetings for senior agency representatives, tries. Arguably, one of the reasons RAMSI PRISM 2, no. 3 FROM THE FIELD | 157 LEITH was able to function effectively from the had been able to gain power as the prime min- onset was that the British colonial system ster through funding provided by the Chinese left behind a Westminster-style bureaucracy, business community. Despite the presence of a judicial system based on English Common RAMSI’s security forces, the appointment of Law, and links to the Commonwealth. Thus, Rini resulted in 2 days of anarchy and rioting, unlike many other recent interventions— with Chinatown and the Pacific Casino Hotel where there has been a terra nullis approach burned to the ground. Australia’s response was and an egregious assumption that all things to reinforce RAMSI, which quickly stabilized having to do with governance must be rec- the security situation. Moreover, a no-confi- reated in the image of “our own democratic dence vote resulted in the resignation of Rini. institutions”—in the Solomon Islands, the The subsequent appointment of Manasseh majority of RAMSI staff who are sourced from Sogavare as prime minister brought calm to Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific were the capital and enabled RAMSI to continue able to commence work within a framework with its mission. that they and their counterparts accepted as Since April 2006, there have been a number of no-confidence votes and a general election in August 2010, and although ten- with the drawdown of the RAMSI sions do occasionally bubble to the surface, commitment, it is not too difficult to most stakeholders appear committed to recon- envisage a country once again crippled ciling and maintaining peace across the archi- by corruption and nepotism—with pelago. However, there are also a number of the inevitable outcome being a return unresolved political, economic, and social to chaos issues that need to be addressed by the gov- ernment of the Solomon Islands. Particularly with the drawdown of the RAMSI commit- functional. Another legacy of the country’s ment scheduled to commence in mid-2012, colonial past is that English is the official lan- it is not too difficult to envisage a country guage, which makes it much easier to conduct once again crippled by corruption and nepo- business both regionally and internationally tism—with the inevitable outcome being a and for those tasked with capacity-building return to chaos. to interface with their counterparts. While Despite these concerns, the RAMSI mis- many less educated Solomon Islanders are not sion has