$12 SPRING 2011 VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 John Eibner The Afghanistan Turkey’s Top Catholic Bishop Slain Conflict Steven Rosen Abbas vs. Obama David Schenker Amitai Etzioni Damascus on Trial An Exit Strategy Ben-Dror Yemini NGOs vs. Israel Alexander Joffe David Katz Egypt’s Museums Plundered Winning the War Ali Alfoneh Ahmadinejad’s Patronage System Hilal Khashan Harsh Pant Lebanon’s Islamist Stronghold India’s Dilemmas Plus . • Reviews by Cohen, Hollander, Meir-Levi, Nisan, Phelps, Plaut, and Solomon • Operationally: The Forum exerts an active in- fluence through its projects, including Campus Watch, Islamist Watch, the Legal Project, and the Forum Washington Project. www.MEForum.org • Philanthropically: The Forum distributes nearly $2 million annually through its Education Fund, The Middle East Forum works to define and promote helping researchers, writers, investigators, and ac- American interests in the Middle East and to protect the tivists around the world. 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Wachs Harley Lippman Robert Guzzardi Carroll A. Weinberg Judith Friedman Rosen Lawrence Gould Chairman Ele Wood Scott S. Rosenblum Chairman Edwin Seave Joseph S. Zuritsky Henry Rosenfeld David Shifrin Vice Chairman Josiah Rotenberg Vice Chairman Marilyn Stern Melvin Salberg Joseph Shafran Vice Chairman New York Lawrence Shelley Program Chairman Orna Shulman Philip Baskin Steven Levy Jonathan Torop Secretary Jack R. Bershad Chairman Margo Marbut Train Howard M. Casper Nina Rosenwald Patrick Clawson Vice Chairman Yehuda Baskin Birtan Aka Collier Boston Dennis Seaman David E. Edman Michael A. Weiss Richard J. Fox Ziad K. Abdelnour Joshua Katzen Stephen Weiss Stanley D. Ginsburg Nira Abramowitz Chairman Edward M. Glickman Wilma G. Aeder Richard Calmas Lawrence B. Hollin Norman S. Benzaquen Vice Chairman Ira M. Ingerman Patricia D. Cayne Arthur Karafin Brian T. Decker Robert Abrams Daniel Pipes Samuel M. Lehrer David Eisenberg Howard Bleich Director Murray S. Levin Roger A. Gerber Susan Gardos Bleich Myrna Linsenberg Donald G. Ginsberg Benjamin Gordon Amy Shargel Seymour G. Mandell Eugene M. Grant Brian Grodman Managing Director Michael Mooreville N. Richard Greenfield Lawrence K. Grodman Jeremy T. Rosenblum Martin Gross Irene Pipes Milton S. Schneider Leon Korngold Mark H. Rubin William Seltzer David J. Kudish George A. Violin Murray H. Shusterman Joshua Landes Harry C. Wechsler Edward M. Snider Donald M. Landis David Wolf Ronni Gordon Stillman Robert J. Levine Maxine Wolf SPRING 2011 VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT 03 Amitai Etzioni, Mission Creep and Its Discontents Washington must abandon unrealistic nation-building and democratization goals 17 David Katz, Reforming the Village War Separating the Pashtun tribes from the Taliban is key to victory 31 Harsh V. Pant, India’s Changing Role Washington should pay closer attention to India’s concerns 41 John Eibner, Turkey’s Christians under Siege A bishop’s murder is emblematic of Turkey’s endemic Christophobia 53 Steven J. Rosen, Abbas vs. Obama A U.N. declaration of Palestinian statehood could put Washington on the spot 59 David Schenker, Damascus on Trial A U.S. court judgment imposes a high price on Assad’s recklessness 67 Ben-Dror Yemini, NGOs vs. Israel The Knesset probes foreign funding of the delegitimization campaign DATELINE 73 Alexander H. Joffe, Egypt’s Antiquities Caught in the Revolution The country’s relics have always been a tool to shape Egyptian identity 79 Ali Alfoneh, All Ahmadinejad’s Men Can the Iranian president’s patronage system thwart the supreme leader? 85 Hilal Khashan, Lebanon’s Islamist Stronghold The city’s hopelessly fragmented Salafi movement is primarily non-combative REVIEWS 91 Brief Reviews Israel’s Arab media ... The Goldstone report ... India’s Israel policy ... Lebanese identity / 1 Editor Publisher and Review Editor Efraim Karsh Daniel Pipes Senior Editors Deputy Publisher Patrick Clawson Raymond Ibrahim Denis MacEoin Michael Rubin Assistant Editor Hillel Zaremba Managing Editor Judy Goodrobb Editorial Assistant William Aquilino Board of Editors Fouad Ajami James R. Russell Johns Hopkins University Harvard University David Cook Franck Salameh Rice University Boston College Martin Kramer Philip Carl Salzman The Shalem Center McGill University Timur Kuran Saliba Sarsar Duke University Monmouth University Habib C. Malik Robert B. Satloff Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights The Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Lebanon Sabri Sayarø James Phillips Sabancø University The Heritage Foundation Kemal Silay Steven Plaut Indiana University University of Haifa Lee Smith Dennis Ross Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Steven L. Spiegel Barry Rubin University of California, Los Angeles Global Research in International Affairs Center Kenneth W. Stein Emory University 2 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY SPRING 2011 The Afghanistan Conflict Mission Creep and Its Discontents by Amitai Etzioni ashington’s persistent difficulties in Afghanistan are due to the Obama administration’s mission creep. Within a matter of months, U.S. operations Wexpanded from counterterrorism measures designed “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future”1 to a counterinsurgency strategy viewing nation-building and de- mocratization as prerequisites to military success—a highly unrealistic goal in a country that is as poor, illiterate, corrupt, and conflicted as Afghanistan. The mission creep and confusion in Afghanistan has greatly hindered U.S. efforts to find a way to complete its campaign and to disengage. As the target keeps changing and enlarging, public support for the intervention both in the United States and in other nations is declining while the human and economic costs of the war are mounting. A return to the original goal and to some version of the “Biden approach”—advocating reliance on drones, Special Forces, and the CIA to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a haven for terrorists after the U.S. departure—may provide an answer. mission to be carried out by military forces and COUNTERTERRORISM TO the CIA. However, over the following year, the COUNTERINSURGENCY president endorsed Gen. David Petraeus’s change of strategy from counterterrorism to Having made the Afghan war the edifice of counterinsurgency, which holds that in order to his struggle against violent extremism, President accomplish the security goal of eliminating ter- Obama has been struggling to shape a coherent rorists and their havens, a considerable measure strategy. His first strategic review of the situa- of nation-building must take place. tion in Afghanistan, completed in March 2009, In discussions of counterinsurgency, the was basically framed as a counterterrorism term “nation-building” is typically avoided, but the precept that to win the United States must build an “effective and legitimate government” Amitai Etzioni is a university professor and pro- and that counterinsurgency means not just de- fessor of international relations at George Wash- stroying the enemy but also holding the territo- ington University, director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, and the author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral For- 1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strat- eign Policy (Yale University Press, 2008). egy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Mar. 27, 2009. Etzioni: Afghan War Strategy / 3 ries and building the new polity, in effect amounts tion-building was progressing rather poorly, mis- to nation-building. Moreover, the scope of na- sion creep turned into mission confusion. At tion-building has been steadily extended. Thus, several points, the U.S. government opposed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated that negotiations with the Taliban. At others, it en- “we share an interest in helping build an Af- dorsed and facilitated these talks.4 A more mod- ghanistan that is stable and secure; that can pro- erate goal was mentioned much more frequently: vide prosperity and progress and peace for its Weaken the Taliban to the point that they be- citizens.”2 Obama added the following day that come truly interested in a peaceful settlement or he had “reaffirmed the commitment of the United in avoiding a civil war among the various ethnic States to an Afghanistan that is stable, strong, groups after U.S. troops leave. and prosperous.” He re- Most recently, a geopolitical goal has been iterated the 2009 goal to added—namely to ensure that after the U.S. with- Police, judges, “disrupt, dismantle, and drawal, the Afghan government will not tilt to- jailors, customs defeat