C O R P O R A T I O N Improving the Understanding of Special Operations A Case History Analysis Linda Robinson, Austin Long, Kimberly Jackson, Rebeca Orrie For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2026 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9839-9 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The U.S. Army Special Operations Command asked the RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center at the RAND Corporation, to examine how successful change has occurred in Army and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) policy regarding special operations forces. The purpose of the project is to inform the command’s development of options for policymakers and its articula- tion of how the varied Army special operations forces (SOF) capabili- ties can help to meet U.S. national security objectives. The command requested that the Arroyo Center review the history of key decisions on Army SOF development; analyze the principal factors in decisions and outcomes; develop an opportunity recognition framework; and derive recommendations for Army SOF and Army initiative planning and execution. We conducted in-depth historical and contemporaneous case studies to examine the formal and informal governmental pro- cesses by which capabilities were explained, proposals were advanced, and decisions reached concerning the formation, development, and employment of special operations capabilities at critical junctures. The research in this report was conducted from January to June 2016 and represents the state of affairs and our analysis at that time.1 This report contains the study results. The findings and recom- mendations should be of interest to the special operations community, congressional committees charged with oversight of the U.S. military, 1 Since the writing of this report, Section 1208 has been codified into law as a permanent authority under United States Code, Title 10, Section 127e, which now enables the Secretary of Defense to expend up to $100 million for its authorized activities. iii iv Improving the Understanding of Special Ops: A Case History Analysis officials in DoD, and other departments and agencies with responsi- bilities in national security or international affairs. The study should also be of interest to a wider audience that includes officials, academ- ics, or members of the public concerned with the interagency process for the development and promulgation of policy initiatives concerning the U.S. military. The research conclusions reached do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Special Operations Com- mand, the Department of the Army, DoD, or the U.S. government. RAND research publications are peer reviewed and meet the quality- assurance standards established by the RAND Corporation to ensure that studies are objective, independent, and balanced. The standards are summarized and described in detail at www.rand.org/standards/ summary. This research was received and approved by the RAND Insti- tutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee). RAND operates under a Federalwide Assurance for the Protection of Human Subjects (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as the Common Rule. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strat- egy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. The RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is RAN167272. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Tables .............................................................................xiii Summary ..........................................................................xv Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxxi Abbreviations ................................................................. xxxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Purpose of Study ................................................................... 1 Background ......................................................................... 2 Research Approach ................................................................. 2 Case Selection Criteria .......................................................... 3 Analytic Framework ............................................................. 5 Method of Assessing Outcomes and Deriving Lessons ..................... 7 Organization of This Report ...................................................... 8 CHAPTER TWO Special Operations Capabilities: Creation of 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit ........................................................ 9 Overview ............................................................................ 9 Catalyst .............................................................................. 9 Stakeholder Analysis ..............................................................10 Proposal Formation and Key Junctures ........................................11 Establishing the Alamo Forces ................................................11 Decision and Outcome Analysis ................................................14 Key Lesson .........................................................................15 v vi Improving the Understanding of Special Ops: A Case History Analysis CHAPTER THREE Creation of the Office of Strategic Services: SOF-CIA Precursor ......17 Overview ...........................................................................17 Catalyst and Stakeholder Analysis ..............................................17 Donovan at War and in Politics, 1905–1940 ................................17 Proposal Formation and Key Junctures ........................................18 Coordinator of Information, 1941 ............................................18 Decision and Outcome Analysis ............................................... 20 Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945 ..................................... 20 Summary of Lessons ..............................................................21 CHAPTER FOUR Special Operations Capabilities: Creation of U.S. Army Special Forces ................................................. 23 Overview .......................................................................... 23 Catalyst ............................................................................ 23 Psychological Operations ........................................................ 24 Stakeholder Analysis: Advocates ............................................. 24 Stakeholder Analysis: Detractors ............................................. 26 Key Junctures ................................................................... 26 Unconventional Warfare ........................................................ 30 Stakeholder Analysis ........................................................... 30 Key Junctures ....................................................................31 Decision, Outcome Analysis, and Lessons .................................... 34 CHAPTER FIVE Special Operations Capabilities: Special Forces Expansion Under President Kennedy and Contraction Through the Vietnam War ................................37 Overview ...........................................................................37 Catalyst .............................................................................37 Proposal Formation .............................................................. 38 Key Policy Initiatives ............................................................ 40 Stakeholder Analysis ............................................................. 42 Decision and Outcome Analysis ............................................... 44 Military Drawdown ........................................................... 44 Contents vii Poor Relations ...................................................................45 Conventionalizing the Vietnam War ........................................ 48 Summary of Lessons