A BRIEF HISTORY OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLING PRESENTED BY YOUR 2008 FAC REUNION COMMITTEE Contributing Authors: Charlie Pocock, Jim Gordon, Jerry Allen, and Charlie Heidel The History of Forward Air Controlling *****Before WWII…..by Charlie Pocock It is difficult to identify who first came up with the idea of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs), but in the U.S. military some credit must certainly go to Professor Thaddeus P. Lowe. In 1862 President Lincoln appointed Professor Lowe as the first Chief of the Air Service of the Union Army. Professor Lowe may better be remembered for his invention of refrigeration, but as part of the Union Army he pioneered four aviation concepts that remain valid today: 1) Airborne visual reconnaissance. 2) Airborne photographic reconnaissance. 3) Airborne artillery adjustment. 4) Communications relay. As much as the new art and science of photography aided Professor Lowe and his balloon corps, the invention of the telegraph also made it possible for the pilot of a tethered balloon to communicate his observations to people on the ground and in the most sophisticated cases talk directly to an artillery telegrapher. The best-documented engagement demonstrating the effectiveness of the use of balloons in the U.S. Civil War was during the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. Both the Union and Confederate armies employed balloons and numerous aerial photos survive, depicting the positions of the opposing armies. In fact, any aerial photos of Civil War battlefields were taken from Union or Confederate Army Balloons. To say that being a balloon pilot was hazardous duty would be a gross understatement. Balloons also saw limited service in the Spanish American War and the 1st Aero Squadron, equipped with JN-4 aircraft, was deployed to New Mexico during the Mexican Incursion. Both balloons and aircraft were used in various roles in WW I. Several other missions, such as air-to-air combat and tactical bombing were developed during the war, but visual and photographic reconnaissance, artillery adjustment and communications relay remained the cornerstone missions for the air corps of both sides. *****World War II…..by Jim Gordon During World War II significant strides were made in defining the role of airpower in close support of ground forces. Forward air control concepts were tried with limited success by the South African Air Force as part of the Royal Air Force in the African campaigns but it wasn‟t until the war in Italy that the concepts of ground and airborne forward air controlling were well defined. The Rover system was developed by the British and adopted by the Americans. A Rover unit consisted of an RAF controller, and an Army Air Liaison Officer, and VHF radio for aircraft communications. Their function was to apply air power to targets, often fleeting, close to the front line. A fundamental feature of the system was use of waves of strike aircraft, with pre- briefed assigned targets but they were required to orbit near the line of battle for 2 20 minutes, subject to Rover preemption and use against fleeting targets of higher priority or urgency. If the Rovers did not direct the fighter-bombers, the latter attacked their pre-briefed targets. U.S. commanders, impressed by the British at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system. One important aspect of the Rover system was the willingness to use large numbers of tactical attack aircraft, which were only available after air supremacy had been achieved in the area. The Rover system was complimented by the use of airborne Forward Air Controllers flying light aircraft (British Lysanders and USAAF L-5 Sentinels). These FACs used the collective call sign Horsefly. Success of the Horsefly operations was tempered by inadequate communications equipment and extreme vulnerability to hostile air-to-air action and Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA). For the Normandy invasion each beachhead was assigned an LST with a combined Army and Air Force control element to coordinate Army requirements for close air support. Rover parties went ashore with all the ground forces. However, it wasn‟t until the fall of 1944 that Horsefly-type FACing became common. Increased resources and the full use of the expanded air-ground liaison teams produced a functional system of airborne FACs. There are many stories of individual heroism by Forward Air Controllers in WW II but perhaps none is more impressive than the story about Captain James E. Parker. Captain Parker was in charge of the air support party that had been rushed to Bastogne on 18 December 1944. It was his job to integrate Close Air Support (CAS) into the fight throughout the siege. Captain Parker, a veteran fighter-bomber pilot with considerable experience in both the Pacific and European theaters, was also an experienced Forward Air Controller. Parker talked to flight leaders en route to Bastogne, gave them approach instructions, and helped them identify intended targets. P-47s came in low and fast, catching the Germans by surprise. On more than one occasion, ground troops received CAS within fifteen minutes of requesting an air strike. Enemy flak was heavy and elusive, with German batteries apparently moving from position to position around the Bastogne perimeter. On 28-29 December, Captain Parker coordinated a series of combined arms air-artillery attacks that finally silenced the threat and enabled the American Army to break the siege. At the conclusion of WWII the US seems to have forgotten many of the hard lessons of WWII and in their haste to demobilize disbanded the airborne Forward Air Controller concept and relegated it to a ground based system using radio equipped jeeps. This is where the system was at the beginning of the Korean War. ***** The War in Korea…..by Jerry Allen The Mosquitos were the airborne and ground controllers of Close Air Support during the Korean War. They were the pilots and observers who flew unarmed T-6 trainers over the front lines, seeking out enemy positions and 3 guiding fighter-bombers in CAS strikes. They were the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) who lived on the front lines and teamed with the T-6s in the CAS mission. They were the support people who surmounted the hardships of equipment shortages and primitive facilities, keeping the T-6s in the air and the TACPs on the front lines. The Mosquitos were born when U.S. and South Korean army units retreated before an enemy vastly superior in numbers and armament. They began as a small Air Force squadron, but grew into a multi-service and multi- national group as men from the U.S. Army and United Nations armies worldwide joined their ranks to fly as observers in the T-6s. The organization was infused throughout with an unsurpassed esprit de corps and camaraderie as men fulfilled their often hazardous and always critical duties. T-T6D-6D "Mosquito" “Mosquito” and and TACP TACP Jeep. jeep. USAF USAF Museum Museum Photo Photo Prophets of doom received a credible hearing with their predictions that full scale military and political disaster was at hand: A communist aggressor would push the U.S. Army into the sea and swallow South Korea whole. This disaster scenario did not play out, due largely to the success of air power with interdiction and Close Air Support. When the Korean War began, military doctrine regarded Close Air Support as an important element in the firepower available to ground forces. Units in contact with the enemy could call on fighter-bombers to neutralize enemy strong points, destroy vehicles and eliminate troop concentrations. However to assure effective use of ordnance and prevent accidental striking of friendly forces, a controller had to be in sight of the target area, in radio contact with the fighter-bombers and had to continuously monitor and direct this firepower. This responsibility was assigned to an Air Force unit call a Tactical Air Control Party. A TACP consisted of a pilot who was given the title of Forward Air Controller, an airman radio operator and an airman radio mechanic. Their equipment consisted of a VRC-1 jeep, which had radio equipment compatible with the radios in the fighter-bombers. Eight TACPs were available in Japan at 4 the outbreak of the war. These were deployed rapidly in support of South Korean ground units, thus giving them the distinction of being the first U.S. and UN combat units to enter the war. In theory a TACP seemed an ideal arrangement; an Air Force team on the ground directing air strikes by fighter-bombers. However, the Korean battle situation soon revealed serious flaws. Since the FAC had to be able to see the target area to control the strike, many targets were not engaged because the primitive Korean roads made rapid movement between sectors of the front impossible. When roads existed at all they rarely reached good observation points. TACPs that persevered and gained good observation position frequently became targets themselves because their radio jeep could be seen by the enemy. Remote control equipment, which would have allowed the TACP to conceal their radio jeep a safer distance away from their observation point, was not available until later in the war. Further, some TACPs, moving between sectors, were ambushed or cutoff by the rapidly moving enemy and were forced to destroy their equipment and regain friendly lines on foot. Some were killed, reported missing or taken prisoner. The need to augment the existing system was apparent and so was the solution: a controller who could move rapidly over the battlefield was an airborne controller. The Air Force began looking for aircraft and methods to implement this approach.