------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case. No. 1:17-cv-02511 (RJL) Plaintiff, v. AT&T INC., DIRECTV GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC, and TIME WARNER INC., Defendants. REBUTTAL REPORT OF CARL SHAPIRO 26 February 2018 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Table of Contents 1. Assignment.......................................................................................................... 1 2. Summary of Opinions ........................................................................................ 1 3. Overall Approach to Vertical Mergers ............................................................ 2 The Need for a Detailed, Fact-Intensive Inquiry ............................................................... 3 Use of the Consumer Welfare Standard ............................................................................ 4 4. Using a Bargaining Model to Analyze Competitive Effects........................... 4 5. Turner Fee Increases and Downstream Competition .................................... 6 Turner Fees Comprise a Small Fraction of MVPD Subscription Fees ............................. 6 Pass-Through of Higher Turner Fees to Final Consumers ............................................... 8 6. The Commercial Significance of the Turner Content .................................... 8 Turner’s Share of Viewership .......................................................................................... 10 The Value of Turner Content Has Been Rising over Time .............................................. 13 Evidence from Virtual MVPDs ........................................................................................ 16 Suddenlink/Viacom Episode ............................................................................................ 22 Cable One/Viacom Episode ............................................................................................. 26 Turner Content Is More Valuable to MVPDs than Viacom Content ............................... 28 7. Impact of Industry Changes on Key Bargaining Model Inputs ..................32 Subscriber Loss Rates ...................................................................................................... 33 Diversion Ratios .............................................................................................................. 34 DTV Margins ................................................................................................................... 36 Combined Effect of the Changes in Key Inputs ............................................................... 38 8. What We Can Learn from Prior Vertical Transactions ..............................39 9. HBO ...................................................................................................................41 10. Coordination Between AT&T and Comcast .............................................43 Turner and NBCU Content Are Highly Valuable to Virtual MVPDs ............................ 43 The MVPD Industry Is Vulnerable to Coordination...................................................... 45 11. Efficiencies ....................................................................................................48 12. Turner’s Arbitration Offer .........................................................................51 13. Updating the Turner Bargaining Model ...................................................53 Appendix A. Testimony of Carl Shapiro During the Past Four Years .............58 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Appendix B. Materials Relied Upon ....................................................................60 Appendix C. Professor Carlton’s Viewership Metrics and the Importance of Turner Sports Content ..........................................................................................66 Appendix D. Change in Suddenlink Subscribership Trend After Loss of Viacom Content ......................................................................................................69 Appendix E. Turner and Viacom’s Per-Subscriber Per-Month Fees ..............70 Appendix F. Turner PSPM Fee Growth, SNL Kagan .......................................71 Appendix G. Updated Turner Bargaining Model Merger Effect Estimates ...73 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Table of Figures Figure 1. Growth in Turner Programming Fees vs. Growth of the Consumer Price Index: 2009–2016............................................................................................................................. 14 Figure 2. Replication of Carlton Report Figure 11: Percentage Change in Affiliate Fee Between 2010 and 2017 for DIRECTV ............................................................................. 15 Figure 3. Year-Over-Year Change in Affiliate Fee Between 2010 and 2017 for DIRECTV (excluding ESPN) ................................................................................................................ 16 Figure 4. Professor Carlton’s Table 7, With Subscribership Data ........................................ 18 Figure 5. Suddenlink-Viacom Subscriber Loss Rate Estimates ............................................. 24 Figure 6. Suddenlink’s Continuing Subscriber Loss Due to Loss of Viacom Content and the Period Professor Carlton Focused On (Figure 10 in Shapiro Report) ................... 25 Figure 7. Continuing Subscriber Loss at Cable One Due to Loss of Viacom Content ......... 27 Figure 8. PSPM Fees Earned by Turner and Viacom, 2013–2016 ......................................... 30 Figure 9. Predicted Turner Monthly Fee Increases for Rival MVPDs in 2017.................... 55 Figure 10. Predicted Net Change in MVPD Monthly Costs for Turner Content Due to the Merger .................................................................................................................................. 56 Figure 11. Predicted Impact of Merger on Consumers in 2017 Using Merger Simulation Model .................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 12. Extending Professor Carlton's Suddenlink Analysis in Fig. 9.............................. 69 Figure 13. Per-Subscriber Per-Month Fees Paid to Turner and Viacom, 2006 – 2017 ....... 70 Figure 14 Replication of Carlton Report Figure 11: Percentage Change in Affiliate Fee Between 2010 and 2017 per SNL Kagan ........................................................................... 71 Figure 15. Year-Over-Year Change in Affiliate Fee Between 2010 and 2017 per SNL Kagan (Excluding ESPN) ................................................................................................... 72 Figure 16. Predicted Turner Monthly Fee Increases for Rival MVPDs (Diverted Subscribers Choose Only DTV’s Video Offering) ........................................................... 73 Figure 17. Predicted Increase in Annual Costs to Consumers in Major DMAs Using Merger Simulation Model .................................................................................................. 74 Figure 18. Merger Effects by Local Footprint Overlap Zone ................................................. 75 Figure 19. Merger Effects by Local Footprint Overlap Zone and Number of Competing MVPDs ................................................................................................................................. 76 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Figure 20. Cost Increases to Rival MVPDs and Net Consumer Effect in Each Zone ......... 77 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 1. Assignment In this report, I respond to the expert reports submitted by AT&T and Time Warner, especially the report submitted by Professor Dennis Carlton (“Carlton Report”). I also update my analysis based on newly available information. Appendix A contains an updated list of the matters in which I have testified during the past four years. Appendix B contains a list of the materials upon which I have relied in preparing this rebuttal report. 2. Summary of Opinions The primary conclusions that I reach in this rebuttal report, above and beyond those presented in my initial report (“Shapiro Report”), are as follows: While I agree with Professor Carlton that vertical mergers in general can generate pro- competitive efficiencies, each vertical merger must be evaluated on its own terms. I have applied the consumer welfare standard to the proposed merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and I have concluded that it is likely to harm consumers and diminish competition among video content distributors. I find that the merger is likely to cause substantial aggregate harm to consumers, even though these harms are a small fraction of what consumers pay for their MVPD subscriptions. See Sections 3 and 5 below. Professor Carlton states that the bargaining theory upon which I rely for my analysis of the effects of the proposed merger on the Turner affiliate fees is fragile and inconsistent with marketplace evidence. I explain why the use of bargaining theory in this case is well supported and consistent with the evidence. See Section 4 below. Professor Carlton offers various metrics to support his assertions that the Turner Content is not especially important to video content distributors and that