FICTION AND ITS OBJECTS Ashley Everett Watkins A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2020 Full metadata for this thesis is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this thesis: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/19537 This item is protected by original copyright This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 Fiction and Its Objects Ashley Everett Watkins This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University of St Andrews September 2019 Abstract This thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional practice and maximally preserves the meanings of our fictional utterances. I begin by asking two questions: How can it be true of a fictional object such as Dune's Paul Atreides that he was born on the planet Caladan to the Lady Jessica (an intrafictional claim), that he was created on Earth by Frank Herbert (an extrafictional claim), and that he does not exist (a nonexistence claim)? If one or more of these is not true, then what is the nature of our assent to these three types of propositions about fictional objects? I argue that fiction's social nature and its basis in imaginative acts provides us with a dualist account of fictional objects: 'Paul Atreides' in the intrafictional and nonexistence claims refers to merely possible people while 'Paul Atreides' in extrafictional claims refers to an actual abstract artifact. I defend imagination's central role in fiction and argue that it's a norm of imagination that it models possibilities. I then define fiction as a social practice necessarily consisting in 1) acts of social imagining, 2) agreement maintained by implicit principles, 3) an aesthetic function or aim, and 4) the creation of abstract artifacts through which it achieves that aim. The result is that intrafictional claims are not assertions about the actual world, but expressions of imaginings that have as their intentional objects possible objects and states of affairs. Extrafictional claims are assertions about the actual abstract artifacts created by fictional practice that bear a picking out relation to the possibilia of fictive imaginings. Finally, nonexistence claims are assertions about the possibilia of our fictive imaginings - assertions that they are not actual. I defend the compatibility of these artifactualist and possibilist accounts and show how their union under the umbrella of a full theory of fiction both explains their intuitive appeal and solves the major issues they encounter individually. Acknowledgements I’d like first of all to express my huge gratitude to the St Andrews and Stirling Graduate programme in Philosophy, and the faculty and fellow students who create such a cooperative and invigorating environment in which to study. I’m very grateful to the university for the funding I’ve received for my philosophical development and research, including the Philosophical Quarterly Bursary during my MLitt and the Sheana and Pierre Rollin Scholarship during my PhD. Of course, I could not have completed this work without the unwavering support of my supervisors. Thanks to Berys Gaut for seeing my potential, making me a better writer and a better thinker, hammering at my bad habits until they finally broke, and for teaching me the meaning of scholarship. Thanks to Aaron Cotnoir for feedback that was both encouraging and incisive, guidance on all matters metaphysical, and particularly for all the long meetings and many words read in the final months of my writing-up. Thanks to the community of philosophy PhD students, who are responsible for so much of the joy and excitement of the past four years. To the St Andrews MAP chapter for striving to make philosophy open to all. To the members of the Aesthetics Reading Group, Clo Torregrossa, James Ursell, and Eric Studt, for many hours of challenging conversation, support, and friendship. Special thanks to Clo, who not only helped run our reading group and MAP chapter, but is also my co-organizer for the Scottish Aesthetics Forum. She has been a voice of reason, a recommender of readings, and a reliable source of camaraderie and non-philosophical conversation since our days on the MLitt. I could not have made it this far without the support of my family back in Nevada. Thanks to my mom Vicki Dolan for the weekly emails, for always taking an interest and believing in me when I couldn’t believe in myself. Thanks to my dad John Watkins, who taught me how to argue before I knew what philosophy was, and for the many hours spent debating morality, religion, and science with a 12-year-old. I don’t know how he had the patience. Thanks to my older brother Kyle, my uncles Steve and Jim, and my aunt Dorothy for always welcoming me back home when I visit. And special thanks to my grandparents, John and Doris Watkins, who were so proud when I told them I was going to St Andrews. Though I lost them on the way, I know they would have loved to see me graduate. I’m grateful to all those at California State University in Northridge who sparked my interest in and encouraged me to pursue philosophy. I owe so much to the incredible education I received from a faculty that poured time and energy into their undergraduates. Thanks to Abel Franco for always having time for coffee and ideas, and never lowering expectations. Thanks to Julie Yoo for enthusiasm and engagement, for reading recommendations and for having patience with me when I didn’t know what I wanted. And thanks to Takashi Yagisawa for showing me the power of possible worlds and Star Trek thought experiments. Finally, I give my warmest thanks to my partner Nick Bibby. Thanks for keeping me sane, fed, grounded, and safe. Thanks for listening to me talk endlessly about fictional objects. Thank you for seeing me through anxieties, panics, and low points, and for being there to celebrate all my victories. Thanks for becoming my home in Scotland. Candidate's declaration I, Ashley Everett Watkins, do hereby certify that this thesis, submitted for the degree of PhD, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. I was admitted as a research student at the University of St Andrews in September 2015. I received funding from an organisation or institution and have acknowledged the funder(s) in the full text of my thesis. Date Signature of candidate Supervisor's declaration I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date Signature of supervisor Permission for publication In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand, unless exempt by an award of an embargo as requested below, that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that this thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use and that the library has the right to migrate this thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I, Ashley Everett Watkins, confirm that my thesis does not contain any third-party material that requires copyright clearance. The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis: Printed copy No embargo on print copy. Electronic copy No embargo on electronic copy. Date Signature of candidate Date Signature of supervisor Underpinning Research Data or Digital Outputs Candidate's declaration I, Ashley Everett Watkins, hereby certify that no requirements to deposit original research data or digital outputs apply to this thesis and that, where appropriate, secondary data used have been referenced in the full text of my thesis. Date Signature of candidate 1 Table of Contents Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 4 Chapter 1 – The two branches of the philosophy of fiction .......................................................... 7 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7 1. Ontology-focused views .............................................................................................................. 9 1.1 Irrealist ontology ................................................................................................................ 10 1.2 Creationist ontology ........................................................................................................... 14 1.3 Possibilist ontology ............................................................................................................. 18 2. ‘Action theories’ ......................................................................................................................