Thomist or Relativist? Macintyre's Interpretation of adaequatio intellectus et rei W. Matthews Grant A central concern ofAlasdair Macintyre's on-going philosophical project has been to show the compatibility between the following two claims. The first claim has to do with the nature of reason, both theoretical and practical. The claim is that, although observance of the law of non-contradiction and other such formal principles is a necessary condition of rationality, sufficient resources for rational adjudication between competing ethical positions are to be found only by reference to the substantive commitments and presuppo­ sitions of some particular tradition. Macintyre, therefore, urges us to abandon what he characterizes as the Enlightenment belief in universal, ahistorical, tradition-transcendent canons of reason, canons available to and undeniable by any rational person, regardless of place and time. To the contrary, Macintyre maintains that there is no such thing as rationality as such. Since the canons of rational justification are always immanent to a particular tradition, there are as many rationalities as there are traditions. 1 Macintyre's second thesis, which he hopes to show compatible with the first, is the claim that, despite the tradition-:constituted nature of rationality, it is possible for one tradition to show itself rationally superior to another. 2 In short, Macintyre wants to argue that his first claim does not entail the rela­ tivism it might seem to imply. And it is not difficult to understand why it might so seem. For if each tradition carries with it its own standards of ratio­ nality, it is hard to imagine how one tradition could show itself rationally superior to another. Won't the contradictory claims of two traditions, A and B, always be vindicated each by the peculiar standards of its own tradition? 1Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), chap. I. 2Ibid., pp. 365-66. 102 THOMIST OR RELATIVIST 103 Yet won't these same claims appear to lack justification when seen from the standpoint of its rival? Macintyre's response to these questions involves developing accounts of intra and inter-traditional rational justification given his views on the tra­ dition-constituted nature of rationality outlined above. According to Macintyre, a tradition is comprised not only of a set of substantive commit­ ments by reference to which particular moral claims are justified, but also by a set of problems and disputed questions, which fonn the basis of an on­ going program of research and enquiry within that tradition. Such problems can emerge for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the teachings of the acknowl­ edged authorities of a tradition contain or imply seeming inconsistencies. Or maybe certain experiences of the community raise new questions that chal­ lenge traditional assumptions. Whatever the case may be, it is important to note that it is by virtue of its own standards that a tradition recognizes its problems. According to Macintyre, rational progress occurs within such a tradition when, whether through conceptual innovation or the reinterpreta­ tion of authoritative teaching, solutions to such problems can be found without abandoning the fundamental claims and authorities which make the tradition what it is. The theoretical products of such innovation and reinterpretation are justified, and constitute a measure of rational progress, precisely because of their ability to resolve disputed questions while retaining the tradition's basic commitments. 3 But it may happen that solutions to such problems are not forthcoming, that intra-traditional rational progress does not occur. It is only at this point, according to Macintyre, that inter-traditional rational progress becomes a possibility. A tradi­ tion has reached what Macintyre calls an "epistemological crisis" when it is able to recognize by its own standards that it has problems, but is repeatedly unable to solve those problems. According to Macintyre, it is possible for a tradition that has reached this crisis stage to find in some other tradition the resources needed both to diagnose its problems and to solve them. For this discovery to occur, the proponents of the crisis tradition will have to learn the other tradition from the inside out-so that they are able not only to understand that tradition as it understands itself, but also, so that they can see their own tradition from the perspective of the other. Under these circumstances, the proponents of the crisis tradition will discover the rational superiority of its rival if the following conditions are met. First, the rival tradition must afford them resources for seeing why their own tradition is limited in such a way as to generate the problems which it could not resolve given its own beliefs, categories and methods. Second, the rival tradition must be able to over- %id., chap. 18. 104 W. MATTHEWS GRANT come those problems either by virtue of its superior conceptual resources, or by dispensing with the flawed assumptions which generated the problems in the frrst place. Finally, the rival tradition must not be plagued by an epistemological crisis ofits own. When such conditions have been met, the proponents ofthe crisis tradi­ tion are justified in abandoning that tradition in favor of its rival. Notice that the rational conversion from one tradition to the other does not require a set of neutral standards, independent of both traditions; for it is by the standards of the former tradition that its problems were recognized, and it is by the standards of the latter that those problems were explained and overcome.4 My purpose in this paper is not to evaluate Macintyre's success in over­ coming relativism given his commitment to the tradition-constituted nature of rationalif¥. I will simply assume for the sake of argument that Macintyre suc­ ceeds,5 and focus, instead, on his understanding oftruth. In particular, I want to ask whether Macintyre holds a Thomistic conception oftruth and, if so, how he might defend that conception. The first question is of interest, not only because Macintyre increasingly identifies himself as a Thomist-Aristotelian, but also because he does so while defending an ostensibly un-Thomistic,6 historicist account of rationality. The latter question is of interest, because, insofar as Macintyre does want to defend a conception oftruth as an adequacy or confor­ mity or correspondence between mind and thing, he will immediately be confronted by two sorts of objections, one from the anti-realist, and one from the realist. The anti-realist will regard as unwarranted any attempt to claim truth as a relationship between the mind and a reality independent of the mind. The realist, on the other hand, will embrace the Thomistic conception of truth, but will deny that that conception is compatible with Macintyre's understand­ ing of rationality as constituted by traditions. In what follows, I consider how Macintyre responds to the first objection and suggest how he might respond to the second. I argue that the Thomistic conception of truth can be defended against the standard anti-realist objection, and that it can be defended even if Macintyre is right about the tradition-constituted nature of rationality. %id. 51 find Macintyre's efforts in this regard to be promising, although some have argued otherwise. See Alicia Juarrero Roque, "Language Competence and Tradition-constituted Rationality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:3 (September 1991 ), pp. 611- 17. For criticisms of Macintyre from a Thomistic perspective see Robert George, "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions," The Review o.f'Metaphysics 42 (March 1989), pp. 593-605; and John Haldane, "Macintyre's Thomist Revival: What Next?," in A./fer Macintyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 91-107. 6 See especially "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions," pp. 599-600. See also Janet Coleman, "Macintyre and Aquinas," in After Mac!n~vre, pp. 65-90. THOMIST OR RELATIVIST 105 How Thomistic is Macintyre's Conception of Truth? At the very end of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, after four hundred pages devoted to an examination of the rationality of traditions, and after having declared the person allied to no tradition to be in a state of moral and intellectual destitution, Macintyre finally proclaims his own allegiance to the tradition ofAquinas. 7 Already, in chapter ten of the same book, Macintyre speaks favorably of Aquinas's conception oftruth.8 And though he doesn't offer an explicit exegesis of the texts in which Aquinas defines truth as "adaequatio intellectus et rei," he does use some form of the English cog­ nate "adequate" over twenty-five times in chapter eighteen, when discussing the notion of truth which accompanies his account of rationality. Hence, even before he reveals his allegiance at the end of the book, the reader can't help but feel that Macintyre sees himself as giving what is in substance a Thomistic account of truth, freed of scholastic jargon, and ready for consideration by contemporary philosophers. I suspect most Thomists would heartily welcome the following sorts of passages: What is it precisely that corresponds or fails to correspond to what? Assertions in speech or writing, certainly, but these as secondary expressions of intelligent thought which is or is not adequate in its dealings with its objects, the realities of the social and rational world. 9 The concept of truth is timeless. To claim that some thesis is true is not only to claim that for all possible times and places that it cannot be shown to fail to correspond to reality ... but also that the mind which expresses its thought in that thesis is in fact adequate to its object. 10 One of the great originating insights of tradition constituted enquiries is that false beliefs and false judgments represent a failure of the mind, and not of its objects.