International Law Studies—Volume 50 THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA Robert W. Tucker (Author) The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE There are a number of means available to belligerents for inducing com­ pliance with the rules governing war's conduct. 1 In the event of unlawful behavior on the part of an enemy remedial action may take the form of direct protest and demand for compensation as vvell as for the punishment of individual offenders. Assuming, however, that the unlawful behavior in question has either been directly instigated by order of the enemy govern­ ment, or at least performed with its sufferance, other measures will generally prove necessary. 2 The injured belligerent may direct an appeal to neutral states, requesting the latter to intervene for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon the delinquent party.3 And although neutral states have no duty to protest against the commission of illegitimate acts of warfare it has been frequently asserted that they have a right to do so. 4 Finally, the in­ jured belligerent may resort to repressive measures-sanctions-in reaction to unlawful behavior on the part of an enemy, measures which take the form of reprisals or of punishing captured offenders as war criminals. It is to these two latter categories of measures that attention will be directed in the following pages. 1 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 300, for an enumeration of the types of remedial action an injured belligerent may resort to in the event of unlawful behavior on the part of an enemy. 2 It may be, of course, that the primary purpose of protesting the unlawful behavior is to influence world opinion against the offending belligerent. Protests may be communicated direct to the enemy state, through a protecting power, a humanitarian organization acting in the capacity of a protecting power, or any state not participating in the conflict. 3 Neutral states may provide their good offices to the belligerents with a view to settling the con ttoversy. 4 "There can be no doubt that neutral States ... may, either singly, or jointly and collec­ tively, exercise intervention whenever illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare are committed (1) by belligerent Governments, or (2.) by members of belligerent forces, if the Governments concerned do not punish the offenders and compensate the sufferers. But although neutral States have without doubt a right to intervene, they have no duty to do so." Oppenheim­ Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 559-6o.-Experience has shown that it is particularly in warfare at sea that neutral states have been vigilant to protest against unla:wful belligerent behavior, even though such behavior may only directly concern for the moment the other belligerent. The reason for this is the intimate relationship between observance of belligerent rights a11d observance of neutral rights, violations of the former being either concomitant with or leading to violations of the latter. Needless to say, the effect of such neutral intervention will be directly proportional to the strength of the neutral states and the vigor with which protests are pressed. 150 A. REPRISALS As between belligerents reprisals are acts, otherwise unlawful, which are exceptionally permitted to one belligerent as a reaction against illegal acts of warfare committed by an enemy.5 It is generally acknowledged that 5 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 3Ioa. In a recent survey of the problem of war reprisals the latter are defined as "otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare which under certain conditions may legally be used by a belligerent against the enemy in order to deter the enemy from a repetition of his prior illegal acts and thus to enforce compliance with the generally recognized rules of war." A. R. Albrecht, "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conventions of I949," A. ]. I. L., 49 (I953), p. 59o.-It is preferable that a distinction be drawn between 'reprisals', in the strict sense of the term, and other 'collective measures' a belligerent may take, particularly against the population of an occupied territory. Whereas both types of measures involve the principle of collective responsibility, the basis for and consequences of these two types of measures differ. The legal basis for a reprisal-in the strict sense-must be an unlawful act ordered or authorized by the enemy government, or at least an unlawful act performed by the armed forces of an enemy which-though performed without higher authorization-is not met with measures of repression and (possibly) of compensation. Illegitimate acts of warfare may be performed by individuals-particularly by the enemy population in occupied territory-which cannot be attributed either directly or indirectly to the enemy state. As against these latter acts a belligerent appears to be permitted by customary law to take collective measures of repression, so-called "colkctive sanctions." In the war crimes trials held after World War II there does not appear to have been a case involving reprisals in the strict sense. Instead, the trials involving so-called "reprisals" dealt in reality with the measures of repression taken by Germany against civilian populations in occupied territories for allegedly illegitimate acts of warfare performed by individual members of the population. In two trials a distinction was drawn between reprisals-in the strict sense-and other collec­ tive measures of repression. In the Trial of Hans Rauter the Netherlands Special Court of Cassa­ tion declared that: "In the proper sense one can speak of reprisals only when a State resorts, by means of its organs, to measures at variance with International Law, on account of the fact that its opponent-in this case the State with which it is at war-had begun ... to commit acts contrary to International Law .. "Law Reports . •. I4 (I949), p. I32.· In the second trial an Italian Military Tribunal at Rome stated that "the right to take reprisals arises only in consequence of an illegal act which can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to a State. On the other hand, if civilian citizens of the occupied State commit criminal acts within the occu­ pied territory which harm the occupying state, and if the search for the culprits proves to be a matter of considerable difficulty, partly owing to the solidarity of the population, it is permis­ sible to impose collective sanctions." In re Kappler, [I948], Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, (I948), Case No. Ip, p. 472.. At the same time, most tribunals­ particularly the American and British-insisted upon referring to the collective measures taken against civilian populations in occupied territories as "reprisals," thereby obscuring the fact that there are important differences between these measures and the measures belligerents may take against illegitimate acts of warfare performed by the armed forces of a state under the command or authorization of the government. There is no intention here of undertaking an analysis of these trials. It is sufficient only to state that despite a lack of uniformity in certain respects over the restrictions imposed upon a belligerent occupant in taking hostages and so­ called "reprisal prisoners" (and even of executing them in the event of absolute necessity), there was a general consensus that such collective measures were-in principle-permitted, but that Article 50 of the I907 Hague Regulations (IV) demanded, at the very least, that a clear connection be established between the victims of collective measures and the illegal actions which gave rise to these measures. See, for example, the Hostages Trial (Trial of Wil­ helm List and Others) Trials of War Criminals, II (I95o), pp. I2.4_9-53 and the Einsatzgruppen 151 since the purpose of reprisals is to induce compliance with the laws of war reprisals should not be resorted to merely for revenge but only as a last resort in order to compel an enemy to desist from unlawful behavior. For this reason the injured belligerent should attempt, whenever possible, to obtain cessation of the illegal acts (and appropriate redress) through means other than reprisals. It is always preferable that if measures of reprisal are finally resorted to the order to employ them should emanate from the highest authority. However, in circumstances of urgent necessity it is conceded that subordinate military commanders may, on their own initia­ tive, order appropriate reprisals. In all cases, reprisals must be terminated once they have achieved their objective, which is to induce a belligerent to desist from unlawful conduct and to comply with the rules regulating the conduct of war. 6 According to customary law measures of reprisal may be directed gener­ ally against the persons and property of an enemy. There need be no con­ nection between the individuals performing the unlawful acts which give rise to the right of reprisal and the individuals made the objects of retalia­ tory measures. In a word, the essential principle characterizing measures of reprisal is that of collective responsibility. However, as between the parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the individuals (and their property) who may be made the objects of reprisals have been substantially restricted. For these Conventions prohibit the taking of reprisals against any of the several categories of individuals afforded the protection of the Conventions. 7 But apart from the prohibitions contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions Trial (U. S. v. Otto Ohlendorf et al.), Trials of W ar Criminals, 4 (r95o), pp. 460 ff. It is, in fact, precisely this latter requirement that clearly illustrates the difference in the legal consequences attached to illegitimate acts of warfare which may be attributed directly or indirectly to the state, and the legal consequences attached to similar acts which cannot be so attributed.