Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Book Title Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy Copyright Year 2010 Copyright Holder Springer-Verlag Chapter Title Substance, Accident, and Modes Author Family Name Klima Particle Given Name Gyula Suffix Division Department of Philosophy Organization Fordham University Address New York, NY, 10458, USA Email Comp. by: SChandrakala Stage: Proof Chapter ID: 336 Title Name: MedPhilosophy Page Number: 1 Date:27/4/10 Time:07:07:20 S Some Problems with the Ontological Square Substance, Accident, and Modes The problems generated by the Aristotelian Ontological Square can be grouped into extensional ones on the one GYULA KLIMA hand (dealing with the extent of these divisions), and Department of Philosophy intensional ones (dealing with their interpretation), on Fordham University the other. The extensional problems concern the sufficiency New York, NY 10458 and necessity of the division of entities provided by the USA Square. The intensional problems are related to the inter- pretation of the extent (what counts as an existent in what sense) and criteria (what does it mean for something to be Abstract in/said of or not to be in/said of a subject) of the fourfold This article presents the Aristotelian distinction between division. substance and accident, and the interpretational problems The problem of the sufficiency of the division is it generated for medieval philosophers and theologians. whether it really comprehends all entities, or perhaps A survey of the extensional and intensional problems of there are others that cannot be placed in any of the four the distinction and some of the solutions proposed for domains of the Square. The problem of the necessity of the them will lead to an analysis of the theoretical need to division is whether it contains perhaps more than what is introduce the new ontological category of modes in late- needed for classifying all entities, that is to say, whether it medieval philosophy, paving the way to the abandonment contains some nonentities. of substance–accident metaphysics in early modern The first, naturally emerging Aristotelian suspicion philosophy. concerning the Square should be that about its necessity. After all, the division is supposed to contain universals, Aristotle’s Ontological Square whereas Aristotle denies the existence of universal entities. The medieval distinction between substance and accident If, therefore, the Square contains universals, and universals goes back to Aristotle’s remarks in his Categories, describ- are not entities, then it seems that the Square has to ing what is often referred to as his ontological square contain some nonentities, i.e., it contains more than is (Angelelli 1991). The basis of the fourfold distinction is necessary for the classification of all entities, for all entities provided in terms of two pairs of criteria, namely, being in/ are either particular substances or particular accidents, but not being in and being said of/not being said of a subject, there are no universal substances or accidents among real yielding what is meant to be an exhaustive and mutually existents. exclusive division of the realm of all existents. The The problem of sufficiency, however, is generated by resulting division was usually taken to provide the division considerations concerning entities that somehow would of all entities into particular and universal substances, and not seem to fit into Aristotle’s fourfold division. A case in particular and universal accidents (Table 1). point is provided by the significata of propositions, This is the most fundamental division of the Aristote- described most poignantly by the anonymous author of lian ontology of actual entities. Accordingly, slight differ- the twelfth-century tract Ars Burana as being ‘‘extra- ences in its interpretation led to vastly different solutions predicamental,’’ i.e., as not belonging to any of the ten to several problems it generated, both in metaphysics and Aristotelian categories, namely, the category of substance, in theology. The following discussion provides a sampling and the nine categories of accidents (De Rijk of these problems, relating them to these interpretational 1967:357–359). Earlier on, Abelard’s dicta were also differences. assigned by him a peculiar place, apparently outside the Aristotelian Square. And later authors, continuing in the tradition of assigning propositions their significata as H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010 Comp. by: SChandrakala Stage: Proof Chapter ID: 336 Title Name: MedPhilosophy Page Number: 1 Date:27/4/10 Time:07:07:21 2 S Substance, Accident, and Modes distinct from the significata or supposita of their This is, in fact, the basis of Aquinas’ understanding of categorematic terms, would also place them outside the the Aristotelian idea of inherence, that is, an accident’s divisions of the Square: thus enuntiabilia as conceived by being-in a subject. For an accident to be is nothing but thirteenth-century authors, or the real propositions of for its subject to be informed by it, or, conversely, for it to Walter Burley, or the complexe significabilia of Adam be in its subject: accidentis esse est inesse [‘‘for an accident Wodeham or Gregory of Rimini, not being identifiable to be is for it to be in (a subject)’’]. This is precisely why on with either substances or accidents, were placed in their Aquinas’s conception an accident cannot be said to be own, separate category (Nuchelmans 1973, 1980). in the same sense as a substance. When we say that an The problem with all these additions is that since accident, say, the whiteness of a sheet of paper, exists, the Aristotle’s division was provided in terms of contradictory act of being signified by the predicate of this predication is criteria it was supposed to be an exhaustive and mutually not the act of being of this sheet of paper without qualifica- exclusive division of everything there is. tion (for that would be the substantial act of being of this This way of putting the problem, however, directly sheet), but the act of being of the sheet with respect to its leads us to the intensional problems of the Square. whiteness; it is not the being of the sheet absolutely, rather, it Aristotle’s opening words in the relevant passage indicate is the sheet’s being white. So, the act of being of the whiteness that his division is supposed to cover all existents.How- of this sheet is nothing but an act of being of the sheet, ever, depending on the interpretation of what we take to be although, of course, it is just an accidental act of being of existent and in what sense, different items will be taken to the sheet: the sheet may continue in its own existence even fall within the realm of existents to be divided by the if its whiteness perishes, say, when the sheet is dipped in Square. black ink. Taking his cue from Boethius’ remarks concerning the subject matter of Aristotle’s Categories, almost Aristotle vs. the Theology of the Eucharist a millennium later Thomas de Vio Cajetan characterized However, this interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of the entities to be considered here in the following way: the inherence of an accident in its subject seems to be in direct conflict with the theological doctrine of the miracle " if one is to ask whether it is words or things which are of the Eucharist, which would require at least the logical principally treated of here, we have to say that it is things, possibility of the existence of the accidents of transubstan- though not absolutely, but insofar as they are conceived in tiated bread and wine without inhering in any substance. an incomplex manner, and, by consequent necessity, inso- For if for an accident to exist is for its subject to be far as signified by words. (Cajetan 1939:5) informed by it, then it seems to involve a direct contra- Cajetan’s interpretation of the subject matter of the Cate- diction to claim that an accident exists and yet it does not gories provides an elegant solution to both problems with inform any subject. the Square posed above. Since the entities to be considered The theological requirement of the separability of here are not only mind-independent real beings, but any accidents in continued existence from their subject, there- objects of our simple concepts, universals fit into the fore, introduced a number of complications into the inter- Square, even if there are no mind-independent entities pretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of accidental being. existing in a universal manner, insofar as universals are The fundamental question is whether the Aristotelian beings of reason, having some foundation in reality. For the doctrine is absolutely incompatible with the theological same reason, however, enuntiabilia are ruled out, insofar doctrine of the Eucharist, or whether there is some as they are the objects not of simple, but of complex authentic interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine that concepts, namely, of complex thoughts formed by the would allow the separate existence of accidents to be at judgment-forming intellect. least supernaturally possible, i.e., free from contradiction. Clearly, Cajetan’s solution is able to accommodate A striking exposition of the ‘‘incompatibilist position’’ beings of reason, because it presupposes the Thomistic is provided in the fourteenth century by John Buridan, interpretation of what and how being is divided in the who argues that since Aristotle’s position is incompatible Aristotelian Square, namely, the extension of an analogical with Christian faith, Christians actually have to have notion into the extensions of its analogata. According to a radically different concept of accidental being from this doctrine, the extent of the Aristotelian Square should that of Aristotle (Bakker 2001:247–257).