[IEA] REPORT 2/2020 Liberal democracies and protection of self-government How to protect territorial minorities from the decisions of the majority Liberal democracies and protection of self-government How to protect territorial minorities from the decisions of the majority Report prepared by: Ferran Requejo (dir.) Jordi Garcia Mireia Grau Gerard Martín Helena Mora Marc Sanjaume-Calvet Barcelona, Decembre 2020 © Generalitat de Catalunya. Government of Catalonia Institute of Self-Government Studies (https://presidencia.gencat.cat/iea-en) Cover image: Istock Design and layout: Autonomous Entity of the Official Gazette and the Publications Dept. DL B 12562-2021 Contents List of illustrations ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 1. Introduction: Protection of self-government and the tyranny of the majority ............ 7 2. Consociationalism. Power-Sharing Executives .................................................................................................. 15 3. The exclusive powers of the territorial entities ..................................................................................................... 26 4. Federal/regional asymmetries .................................................................................................................................................... 48 5. Opting in/opting out procedures .......................................................................................................................................... 59 6. Bicameralism ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 70 7. Judiciary .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 77 8. Constitutional review ............................................................................................................................................................................... 91 9. Constitutional reform .............................................................................................................................................................................100 10. Secession clauses .....................................................................................................................................................................................106 11. Summary of conclusions. Effectiveness of institutional procedures for the protection of self-government .............................................................................................................................. 115 3 List of illustrations Figure 1 Comparative politics (institutional federalisation, decentralisation, plurinationality and asymmetries) ...................................................................................................................... 12 Table 1 Cases of post-World War I consociational agreements for executive powers .................................................................................................................. 18 Table 2 Examples of consociational democracies with shared executive power .................................................................................................................................. 19 Table 3 Germany: main characteristics of the distribution of powers ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 32 Table 4 Belgium: main characteristics of the distribution of powers ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 36 Table 5 Canada: main characteristics of the distribution of powers ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 42 Table 6 Protection of the powers of self-government of territorial entities .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 43 Table 7 Some examples of asymmetries in single-nation/plurinational federal states .............................................................................................................................................................................. 50 Table 8 Examples of opting-out procedures in the EU............................................................................... 60 Table 9 Constitutional asymmetries and opting out in Canada ...................................................... 64 Table 10 Types of veto in upper houses ............................................................................................................................. 71 Table 11 Upper houses in comparative politics ........................................................................................................ 72 Table 12 Constitutional review .......................................................................................................................................................... 94 Table 13 Procedures for constitutional reform in federations (+ Spain) ....................................103 Table 14 Constitutional secession clauses .....................................................................................................................109 Table 15 Constitutions containing this type of clause ...................................................................................... 110 Table 16 Effectiveness of institutional procedures for the protection of self-government (federal and regional states with political decentralisation) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 115 4 Liberal democracies and protection of self-government Foreword Is the self-government of territorial entities protected in democratic regional states and federations in a way that is both effective and stable? Which collective deci- sion-making institutions and procedures are most efficient in achieving this protec- tion? How are they evolving? Do they allow for the strengthening of self-government or do they represent a growing deterioration? Does the fact of whether democracies are single-nation or plurinational play a role in the protection and development of self-government? To what extent? What are the most appropriate institutional pro- cedures for protecting self-government in plurinational democracies? This report seeks to answer such questions, which can be summarised in terms of the general question posed in the subtitle of the report: how to protect territorial minorities from the decisions of the majority. The analytical perspective adopted to answer this general question is twofold, based on: 1) current analyses of the theories of democracy and federalism, and 2) the comparative practical experiences shown by modern-day federal and regional democracies (single-nation and plurinational). On the basis of these two dimensions, the specific case of Catalonia is analysed. As we will see, the institutions and decision-making procedures of today’s democ- racies do not have the same degree of effectiveness (efficacy and efficiency) for the protection and development of self-government. Furthermore, the comparative perspective shows that the same institution and procedures do not produce the same degree of effectiveness. In this report, we focus on analysing the institutional protections (or guarantees) of self-government in democracies that are character- ised by its compounded territorial structure (federations and regional states with political decentralisation). This document is structured into ten analytical chapters and a conclusions section. Apart from the introduction, each chapter aims to analyse the impact of a specific institutional arrangement on the protection of self-government. Ten different insti- tutional arrangements are analysed: consociationalism, exclusive powers, asym- 5 [IEA] REPORT 2/2020 metries, opting in and opting out procedures, bicameralism, the judiciary, constitu- tional review, constitutional reform and secession clauses.1 Each chapter is divided into the same four sections: a) General characteristics b) Comparative perspective c) The case of Spain d) Effectiveness for the protection of self-government The choice of cases in the comparative perspective section depends on each insti- tutional procedure. The selection of cases responds to three criteria: a) the inclusion of both single-nation and plurinational states; b) to inclusion of a minimum num- ber of cases in all chapters; and c) the combination of a more detailed analyses of the most