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The Bountiful Mind: Memory, Cognition and Knowledge Acquisition in Plato’s Meno Selina Beaugrand PhD Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2016 1 Abstract The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology."1 In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.”2 This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct 1 Christopher Shields, Ancient Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed., (New York: 2 Ibid, p. 64. 2 challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one 3 whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated. 4 Declaration I declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author. The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material submitted for a degree. Signature: Date: 1st September 2016 5 For A. 6 Contents Acknowledgements 8 Introduction 9 1. Paradox and Recollection in the Meno 12 1.1. Virtue, Paradox and Recollection 12 1.2. The Traditional Reading 22 1.3. Plato’s Problem 24 1.4. The Problem of Interpretation 29 2. The Standard Epistemological Reading 34 2.1. The Standard Epistemological Reading: A Summary 35 2.2. Recollection and Paradox 45 2.3. The Standard Reading and the Problem of Interpretation 47 3. The Hybrid Epistemological Reading 65 3.1. Knowledge as Explanatory Understanding in the Meno 65 3.2. Meno’s Challenge and the Eristic Dilemma 67 3.3. The Hybrid Reading and the Problem of Interpretation 78 4. Reality & Cognition I: The World as Change 91 4.1. Heraclitean Flux 93 4.2. What Price Change? 95 4.3. Radical Flux and The Impossibility of Intelligible Speech 107 4.4. Objections and Responses 113 5. Reality & Cognition II: The Bountiful Mind 123 5.1. Forms and Flux 123 5.2. Forms and Particulars 127 5.3. The Priority of Forms 130 5.4. Innatism, Empiricism and the Objection From Hybrid Sources of Cognition 142 6. Memory in the Meno 156 6.1. ‘Memory’ in the Meno 158 6.2. Learning and ‘Remembering’ 163 6.3. What’s Wrong With The Eristic Argument? 170 6.4. The Paradox in Context 180 Conclusion 186 Bibliography 190 7 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to all those who made this thesis possible. My utmost gratitude goes first and foremost to my principal supervisor, Professor Dory Scaltsas, for his guidance, trust, constant encouragement, patience, the long discussions, insightful and helpful comments and for his continuous support throughout the course of the project. My deepest thanks and appreciation also go to my second supervisor, Professor Duncan Pritchard, for his time, constant encouragement and patience, and without whose support this thesis wouldn’t have been possible. I am indebted to the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences at the University of Edinburgh for their generous funding of this project through the Career Development Studentship scheme, which removed financial concerns from my decision to embark on this journey. I would also like to thank members of the postgraduate community and members of faculty at the Department of Philosophy, the University of Edinburgh, for the interesting philosophical discussions we have had, and for creating a supportive and intellectually stimulating environment for me to work in. Many thanks to Katie Keltie, from the PPLS Postgraduate Office, for her assistance with the administrative aspects of my degree. I am grateful to the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, its committee – past and present – and its members, for welcoming me into the postgraduate philosophy community, for their friendship and practical guidance, and for providing me with opportunities for collaborations. I would also like to thank my parents and my family for their support and encouragement. Last, but not least, my special thanks and gratitude go to my husband, François-Xavier Beaugrand, for his unfailing support, continuous encouragement and endless patience, and to my son, Daniel, for providing me with the inspiration required to complete this project. 8 Introduction In the Meno, Plato introduces the famous paradox of enquiry, which argues that if you already know x, then there is no need to enquire further into x; and if you don’t already know x, then you don’t know what you’re looking for. Hence either way, whether x is known or not unknown, enquiry into x is impossible.