Ending the Korean War Ending the Korean War Elizabeth A. Stanley The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace Throughout history, shifts in governing coalitions have critically affected war termination. For ex- ample, the execution of the Athenian democratic ruler Cleophon and the as- cendancy of the pro-Spartan oligarchs in b.c. 404 led to Athens’ surrender to Sparta and ended the twenty-seven-year Second Peloponnesian War. Similarly, the death of Russian Empress Elizabeth in January 1762 led her Prussophile successor, Peter III, to immediately recall Russian armies that were occupying Berlin and conclude the Treaty of Saint Petersburg by May—ending the ªghting between Russia and Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. During World War I, riots in Germany ushered in a new government that then negotiated the ªnal war armistice, as Kaiser Wilhelm II ºed to Holland. Likewise, during World War II, France and Italy surrendered shortly after changes in their gov- erning coalitions, in 1940 and 1943, respectively. Most recently, on his ªrst full day in ofªce, U.S. President Barack Obama summoned senior ofªcials to the White House to begin fulªlling his campaign promise to pull combat forces out of the war in Iraq.1 Scholars working on issues related to war termination have noted this phe- nomenon, albeit anecdotally. For example, H.A. Calahan observes that “it seems fair to conclude that a change of regime for the vanquished comes close Elizabeth A. Stanley is Assistant Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Depart- ment of Government at Georgetown University. This article is drawn from her book Paths to Peace: Do- mestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). The author thanks Nora Bensahel, Risa Brooks, Michael Brown, Benjamin Fordham, Page Fortna, Hein Goemans, Kristin Goss, Kristen Gunness, Lise Morjé Howard, Rebecca Johnson, Iain Johnston, Brad Lee, Brent Mitchell, David Post, Jennifer Lind Press, Dan Reiter, Stephen Rosen, John Sawyer, John Schaldach, Tammy Schultz, Theda Skocpol, Jack Snyder, Allan Stam, Stephen Walt, Kathryn Weathersby, the anonymous reviewers, and participants at seminars at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and Georgetown University’s Government Depart- ment, and at annual conferences of the International Studies Association and the American Politi- cal Science Association. 1. This phenomenon extends to noninterstate wars as well. For example, the leader of the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, Jonas Savimbi, was killed in an am- bush by government troops in February 2002; six weeks later, a cease-ªre was signed, ending the twenty-seven-year-long Angolan civil war. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, both sides reached a settle- ment after Foday Sankoh, the leader of the rebel group Revolutionary United Front, was arrested. Comparable patterns can be observed in extrasystemic wars, such as Charles de Gaulle and Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in France and the Soviet Union and ending their wars in Al- geria and Afghanistan, respectively. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 42–82 © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 42 Ending the Korean War 43 to being a condition precedent to the making of peace.”2 Robert Rothstein con- cludes that “because it is unlikely that the ofªcials currently in charge can make the necessary changes in policies with which they have become identiªed, new personnel seem imperative.”3 Michael Handel suggests that “the termination of a long and stalemated war is frequently preceded by a drastic political change in leadership in the country of one of the bellig- erents.”4 Finally, in the landmark study of this phenomenon, Fred Iklé classiªes elites in each belligerent state as “hawks” and “doves” and asserts that the hawks may need to leave the government before the state can settle.5 In short, the empirical record includes numerous examples of domestic governing coalition shifts leading to war termination, and many scholars from different theoretical perspectives have noted this tendency. Few scholars, how- ever, have attempted to explain the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon in a rigorous and generalizable manner.6 In this article, I introduce a new theory about shifts in domestic governing coalitions, a state’s elite foreign policy decisionmaking group, and explain their role in the war termination process. I outline three obstacles to peace, as well as coalitional dynamics, that can lead incumbent governing coalitions to be unable to end the war—even when such a change is necessary or desirable. As a result, ending the war may only be possible by replacing some or all of the coalition’s members. As bargaining models of war suggest, wars can only end once all belliger- ents develop similar expectations about the war. Whereas most bargaining models assume that this change in expectation occurs with an attitude change among incumbent leaders, my theory suggests that it may result from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. Thus, my argument reªnes the 2. H.A. Calahan, What Makes a War End? (New York: Vanguard, 1944), p. 209. 3. Robert Rothstein, “Domestic Politics and Peacemaking: Reconciling Incompatible Imperatives,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 392, No. 1 (November 1970), p. 74. 4. Michael I. Handel, War Termination—A Critical Survey (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusa- lem, 1978), p. 26. 5. Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 6. One recent exception is Sarah Elizabeth Croco, who tests the argument that culpable leaders will feel more pressure to stay in the war than nonculpable leaders. Her argument, however, only applies to heads of state and not to governing coalitions. See Croco, “Peace at What Price? Domes- tic Politics, Settlement Costs, and War Termination,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2008. Similarly, in a parallel study of interstate rivalry termination from 1816 to 1992, D. Scott Bennett found that a change in the leadership or political system of one of the rivals led to a de- crease in the duration of the rivalry. See Bennett, “Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termi- nation,” International Interactions, Vol. 22, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 369–397; and D. Scott Bennett, “Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Termination,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 1200–1231. International Security 34:1 44 domestic-level mechanisms that lead to the international bargains that end war. As such, this analysis builds on a much wider literature within interna- tional relations about “two-level games,” one level being domestic and the other international.7 I assess this theory in a plausibility probe of the Korean War, a quintessential example of stalemated war. Unlike most other empirical studies of interstate war duration and termination, which focus only on wars that ended with a clear-cut victor,8 my model theorizes explicitly about stalemates. The irony of the Korean War is that the ªnal armistice terms accepted in July 1953 were little different from those proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951. Given that the battleªeld situation remained relatively constant throughout those two years, yet casualties continued to mount,9 why did the belligerents wait so long? From a strategic viewpoint, continuing the war made no sense— but from a domestic viewpoint, it did. As my analysis makes clear, the end of the war was preceded by shifts in the domestic governing coalitions of the three major belligerents, which permitted the war to end. The rest of this article is divided into four sections and a conclusion. The ªrst section brieºy reviews the existing war termination literature and shows how previous approaches are incomplete. The second section outlines my theory about domestic coalition shifts in war termination. The third section examines 7. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” Interna- tional Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460; George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Ra- tional Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Po- litical Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577–592; Alastair Smith, “International Crises and Domestic Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623–638; and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 829–844. 8. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 239–257; H.E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcom- ing). Important exceptions include D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, “The Declining Advan- tages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1998), pp. 344–366; and Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 813–829. 9. U.S. statistics show that 45 percent of U.S. casualties—22,000 killed and 63,200 wounded— occurred while negotiations were in progress. See Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Poli- tics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p.