Contingent Reliance on the Affect Heuristic as a Function of Regulatory Focus Michel Tuan Pham Tamar Avnet Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision-making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevent ion focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different type s of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope- insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se. Although decision research has historically focused affective responses to make judgments and decisions, on the cognitive processes underlying decision making, to begin with? a growing body of research from multiple disciplines The purpose of this research is to test the suggests that affective processes play an important role hypothesis that an important determinant of the as well. In particular, there is strong evidence that reliance on affect as a heuristic for evaluations and decisions are often based on subjective affective decisions is the self-regulatory orientation of the responses to the options, which appear to be seen as decision-maker. Building on recent findings by Pham indicative of the options’ values (Bechara, Damasio, and Avnet (2004), we propose that the reliance on Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, affect as an evaluation heuristic is more pronounced & Welch, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). among decision-makers with a self-regulatory This process is known as the “affect heuristic” in orientation known as a promotion focus than among behavioral decision research (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, those with a self-regulatory orientation known as a & MacGregor, 2002), the “How-do-I-feel-about-it?” prevention focus. This hypothesis was tested in four heuristic in social psychology (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) studies across four different judgment contexts— and consumer research (Pham, 1998), and the “somatic people impression formations, consumer product marker hypothesis” in some neuroscience circles evaluations, social recommendations, and contingent (Damasio, 1994). valuations of public goods—and using three different Behavioral decision research on the affect heuristic operationalizations of the affect heuristic. has mostly focused on the judgmental implications of relying on subjective affective responses as opposed to Affect and Regulatory Focus in Judgments and cognitive reasoning processes in judgments and Decisions decisions (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Ratner & Herbst, Affect as an Evaluation Heuristic 2005; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). For example, affective valuations of risks have Numerous studies have shown that, even when been found to be less sensitive to probability objective information about the target is held constant, information compared to cognitive valuations of the targets are evaluated more favorably and chosen more same risks (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). Affective frequently when they are perceived to elicit pleasant evaluations have also been found to be more sensitive feelings than when they are perceived to elicit to social comparisons than cognitive evaluations (Hsee, unpleasant feelings. This phenomenon has been Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2004; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). observed both with feelings that are genuine integral While research on the distinctive properties of affect- affective responses to the target, such as the emotional based judgments and decisions has been accumulating feelings elicited by a political candidate (Abelson, rapidly (see Pham, 2007, for a review), much less Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982) or the excitement attention has been paid to the determinants of the elicited by a new movie, and with feelings that arise reliance on affect in judgments and decisions. In other incidentally, such as feelings from a preexisting mood words, what causes people to rely on their subjective state (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Pham, 1998; The final version of this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.10.001 Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Although different regulation of growth and nurturance needs, and the explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, prevention system, which originates in the regulation several converge toward the notion that subjective of protection and security needs. The major distinction affective responses to a target influence its evaluation between these two systems lies in their strategic because these responses are perceived to provide orientations in goal pursuit: the promotion system diagnostic information about the target (Schwarz & relies primarily on approach-oriented strategies, Clore, 1996). In other words, subjective affective whereas the prevention system relies primarily on responses to a target are often used as a proxy for the avoidance-oriented strategies. Because promotion- target’s value (Damasio, 1994; Pham, 2004; Slovic et focused regulation emphasizes approach-oriented al., 2002). strategies, it is characterized by an eager form of Behavioral decision research has shown that, exploration that encourages the seizing of compared to evaluations based on cognitive opportunities. In signal detection terms, promotion is assessments, evaluations based on such affective geared toward maximizing “hits” and minimizing responses exhibit distinct properties (see Pham, 2007, “misses” ("errors of omission"; see Crowe & Higgins, for a review). First, affect-based evaluations tend to be 1997). In contrast, because prevention-focused more extreme and polarized than cognitive assessments regulation emphasizes avoidance-oriented strategies, it (Ratner & Herbst, 2005; Sinaceur, Heath, & Cole, is characterized by a vigilant form of exploration that 2005; Yeung & Wyer, 2004). Second, affect-based stresses caution against mistakes. In signal detection evaluations tend to be less effortful and reached more terms, prevention is geared toward maximizing rapidly (Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001; Shiv “correct rejections” and minimizing “false alarms” & Fedorikhin, 1999; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, ("errors of commission"; Crowe & Higgins, 1997). The 1998). Third, affect-based evaluations tend to be more relative eagerness of promotion-focused individuals myopic and present-oriented (Loewenstein, 1996; and relative vigilance of prevention-focused McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). individuals is illustrated by the finding that, in Fourth, affect-based evaluations tend to be less recognition tasks, promotion-focused participants sensitive to the numerical magnitude of the target exhibit a risky bias, identifying more items as having object—a phenomenon known as scope-insensitivity appeared in the original list and committing more (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; errors of commission, whereas prevention-focused Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004)—and less sensitive to the participants exhibit a conservative bias, identifying probability that surrounds it—a phenomenon known as fewer items as having appeared in the original list and probability neglect (Loewenstein et al., 2001; committing more errors of omission (Crowe & Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Sunstein, 2003). Finally, Higgins, 1997). Similarly, in simple drawing tasks, affect-based evaluations tend to be more reference- promotion-focused individuals exhibit greater speed dependent in that they are more sensitive to outcome but lower accuracy, whereas prevention-focused comparisons (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; individuals exhibit lower speed but greater accuracy Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) and social (Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003). Promotion-focused comparisons (Hsee, Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2003; Tversky & regulation is especially active under the pursuit of Griffin, 1991). ideals, that is, the pursuit of wishes, dreams, and Previous behavioral decision research on affect has aspirations (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & thus mostly focused on analyzing how judgments and Hymes, 1994). Prevention-focused regulation is more decisions based on affect differ from those based on active under the pursuit of oughts, that is, the cognitive reasoning processes. However, a full fulfillment of responsibilities, duties, and obligations understanding of the role of affect in judgment and (Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1994). decision making also calls for an understanding of the It is important to note that promotion and determinants of the reliance on affect as a heuristic. In prevention are motivational states, not personality other words, when are judgments and decisions more traits. Both systems are assumed to coexist in every likely to be based on affect in the first place? Building person and to be independent of each other. However, on recent work by Pham and Avnet (2004), we propose one or the other may be temporarily or chronically that one of these determinants is the decision-maker’s more active in a given individual. A promotion focus regulatory focus. can be temporarily activated,