Intelligence and Anglo/American Close Air Support in the Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-1943 By Brad William Gladman A Thesis Submitted for a Ph.D. Degree in History University College London University of London ProQuest Number: U641970 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest U641970 Published by ProQuest LLC(2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This dissertation examines the role of intelligence in the application of close air support by both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) during the campaigns in the Western Desert and Tunisia during the Second World War. It was in this theatre that the foundations for the organization, control, and direction of close air support for the remainder of the war were laid. It was also the first instance of a combined Anglo/American ground campaign, and many of the problems and solutions first appeared there. More importantly, however, it was a theatre in which intelligence was fundamentally important to both ground and air operations. This dissertation begins with an examination of the interwar doctrines of both the RAF and USAAF, and argues that while neither air force had an evolved close air support doctrine, each possessed a theoretical understanding of the subject and had officers capable of creating a doctrine when the time came. The remaining chapters are chronological, and show how with improved command, control, communication, and intelligence systems, aircrew ability, and the right kind of aircraft, the ability of the RAF and later the Northwest African Tactical Air Force to provide close air support improved dramatically. The dissertation concludes by arguing that both the RAF and USAAF adopted the doctrine evolved in the desert, and this system, which relied heavily on intelligence for its success, continued to govern the control of tactical air power for the rest of the war and beyond. 3 Table of Contents Page(s) Title Page...............................................................................................................................1 Abstract .................................................................................................................................2 Table of Contents............................................................................................................... 3 Introduction................................................................................................................... 4-44 Chapter 1 : The Fall and Rise of Close Air Support Doctrine.......................45-91 Chapter 2: Close Air Support from 'Compass' to 'Crusader' ..................92-155 Chapter 3: Close Air Support from Gazala to the El Alamein Line....... 156-201 Chapter 4: Alam Haifa and El Alamein .........................................................2 02 -2 3 8 Chapter 5: Close Air Support During the Pursuit from El Alamein to Tunisia ...................................................................................................................... 239-263 Chapter 6: Close Air Support During Operation 'Torch'..........................2 6 4-3 0 2 Chapter 7: Close Air Support After the Reorganization of February 1 9 4 3.........................................................................................................................3 03 -3 5 3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 3 5 4-3 7 9 Abbreviations Used ...............................................................................................3 8 0-38 2 Bibliography............................................................................................................ 383-397 Introduction The Western Desert has been aptly described as a tactician's paradise but a quartermaster's hell. Fighting in the desert imposed certain requirements on armed forces engaged there. The seemingly endless desert of sand, dust storms, rock and salt marshes was hard on men and machines alike, and provided none of the resources armies needed to fight or merely survive. The low force-to-space ratios allowed for brilliant mobile operations, but this tactical freedom came at a heavy price. Difficulties in supplying armed forces under such conditions were exacerbated by high consumption rates during mobile operations, where deficiencies in supply were keenly felt. Military operations thus had to be cost-effective, as neither side could afford to waste resources. Areas of Tunisia, by contrast, were mountainous and the force to space ratios were much higher, although there were areas where mobile operations were possible. In either case, intelligence had the potential to increase dramatically the cost-effectiveness of operations, but the highly fluid battles in the Western Desert and parts of Tunisia made acquiring accurate intelligence in real-time difficult. In the mountainous regions of the rest of Tunisia, geographical considerations posed different challenges to intelligence use. In both cases, an efficient system of command, control, and communications was required to make use of intelligence. The studies dealing with these campaigns have missed this important 5 aspect, and thus fundamentally misunderstand how close air support functioned and its requirements for success. The literature dealing with the air war in the West is heavily slanted towards the strategic bombing campaign against Germany.’ This trend is not surprising given the moral enormity of the strategic air offensive. The Allied powers have held the moral high ground for the Second World War against Nazi Germany and Japan, yet this stands in contrast to the destruction visited on these two nations by those professing to have been fighting 'the good fight'. There are many general works on the air war that include the Western Desert and Tunisian campaigns, but they offer little in the way of a thorough understanding of how close air support functioned and the role of intelligence in its success. John Terraine's work illuminates some of the important aspects of air power in the desert and Tunisia.^ Richard Ovary's book is one of the few that even mentions intelligence, but the scope of the work does not allow the author to pursue the issue.^ The RAF's official history, written by Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, goes into some detail about the day-to-day operations of the RAF and later the Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force.* It offers insights ’ For examples of this trend see: Sir C. Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, (London, 1961), Tami Davis Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942-1945" International History Review, Vol. XXI No.3 (1999), Sebastian Cox (ed.). The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939-45, (London, 1998), John Gooch (ed.). Air Power: Theory and Practice, (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1995). ^ John Terrains, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European W arl 939-1945, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985). ^ Richard Overy, The Air War 1939-1945, (London: Europa, 1980). * Denis Richards and Hilary St. G. Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939-1945, Vols. I and II, (London: into what was required for successful tactical air operations, but neglects the important issue of intelligence. The official history of the USAAF, written by Wesley F. Craven and James Lea Cate, offers a good narrative of the Tunisian campaign, but generally gives little notice to close air support.® The literature dealing specifically with close air support during the campaigns in the Western Desert and Tunisia is missing vital aspects of how it functioned. Indeed, the only work that deals in any depth with the development of a system for the delivery of close air support during the campaigns in the Western Desert is a 1955 Air Historical Branch monograph.® Most other works focus on the Tunisian campaign, while tending to discount the difference between the methods of air support practiced in Britain compared with that in the desert. The most relevant studies in addition to the Air Historical Branch monograph are works by Richard Hallion, Benjamin F. Cooling, Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, and Daniel Mortensen.? HMSG, 1953). ® Wesley Craven and James Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War Two, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). ® Air Historical Branch Monograph. Close Air Support, (London: HMSO, 1955). ’ Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1989), Richard Hallion, "Battlefield Air Support - A Retrospective Assessment", Air Power Journal. Vol.4 No.1 (1990), B.F. Cooling (ed.). Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1990), Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern For Joint Operations, (Washington: Office of Air Force History), and