Author’s accepted version; final version published in The Routledge Companion to Media and Scandal (eds: Tumber and Waisbord, 2019) UNREPORTED SCANDALS The power of personality and legal bluster Judith Townend In the summer of 2018, a twentieth-century scandal recaptured the British public’s imagination, prompted by a new television dramatisation of events that took place 40 years earlier. The BBC mini-series, and the book on which it was based, portrayed the political downfall of Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberal Party from 1967 to 1976, who was prosecuted and acquitted of the gravest charge ever brought against an active Member of Parliament: conspiracy to murder. The BBC also used the opportunity to air, for the first time, a Panorama documentary made in 1979 about the scandal. This investigation, updated with new material, questioned the protection of Thorpe by ‘powerful political forces’ before and after the trial. The ‘protection’ included not only members of government and police, but also the media: why were the mass media reticent to report allegations in the early stages of the scandal? Why did the BBC decide not to air its documentary contemporaneously? Why did ITV, which had prepared its own programme to broadcast post-trial, also refuse to air its account and lock away all its copies and source material (Crick 2018)? One explanation lies in English law, part of the so-called ‘chilling effect’ in which the media are deterred from reporting stories for fear of legal action.i Richard Ingrams, former editor of Private Eye, has described how Thorpe threatened ‘the big stick’ of criminal libel against the media (Naughtie 2018). The threat was not empty. Following a story published by Private Eye prior to his arrest and prosecution, Thorpe is reported to have issued a libel writ and referred the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney General on grounds of contempt of court (Macqueen 2011, 82). It is also alleged that Thorpe considered threatening his former lover Norman Scott with defamation action (Preston 2016, 10). Onerous defamation laws cannot, however, provide a full explanation. As an article in the New York Times contemporaneous with Thorpe’s trial observed, many powerful and high profile gay men (at a Author’s accepted version; final version published in The Routledge Companion to Media and Scandal (eds: Tumber and Waisbord, 2019) time when homosexuality was illegal) maintained privacy of their sexual orientation and activity partly because of ‘stringent libel laws’ but also because of the deference of the British police to the upper classes: British newspapers and the police ‘intruded very little upon this world’ at the time (Apple 1978). This interpretation suggests it was the combination of both legal and social factors that deterred such reporting. When the Thorpe affair is considered alongside other ‘unreported’ events in other high profile scandals, it is clear that legal factors do not alone explain why journalists and the media avoid the publication of particular facts concerning the dishonest, abusive and corrupt behaviour of high profile individuals. Their social and political relationships must also be considered: some of these individuals have been generous charitable donors and even described as ‘national treasures’. They have powerful charisma and extensive personal networks, which have secured them favourable column and screen space. These protagonists of scandal wield social power with the assistance of the British media, and this power helps protect them from being exposed. The sociology of media can be drawn upon to understand the way in which scandal is reported (or unreported), but theoretical explanations of newsgathering decisions have often overlooked the specific characteristics and relevance of the law and legal threats.ii Benson (2010, 619) suggests that while ‘forces shaping news production are often intertwined and inter-related’, a ‘simple lumping together of factors’ would limit insight into national news systems. In his view, it is important to isolate and test variables, such as the effect of libel (2010, 621). What follows is a preliminary effort to identify common features in two UK case studies, which can help us understand the media’s role in reporting scandal more generally. Case study one: Jimmy Savile It is ‘chilling’ in a different sense that Jimmy Savile, the popular and eccentric British television and radio presenter awarded both an OBE and knighthood, did not face prosecution for widespread sexual crimes during his lifetime. Although it is too late to prove any allegation against him in a court of law, it is accepted in official accounts that he was ‘one of the UK’s most prolific known sexual predators’ with a level of formally recorded criminal allegations thought to be ‘unprecedented in the UK’ (Gray and Watt 2013, 24). Various reviews conducted posthumously show that numerous allegations were reported against him before his death but that he escaped full police investigation and scrutiny by other relevant institutions – including the national media. The evidence, assessed with the benefit of hindsight, shows that Savile deployed an audacious and manipulative strategy of hiding in plain sight until his death in Author’s accepted version; final version published in The Routledge Companion to Media and Scandal (eds: Tumber and Waisbord, 2019) 2011; astonishingly, it was successful. The media played a part in his non-exposure by first creating a persona behind which he was able to hide, and second, by not reporting critical allegations. As the television critic Sam Wollaston observes, numerous institutions, including the press, were duped: Somehow – incredibly, appallingly – Savile used his celebrity and his influence, his connections, his charity work, his instinct for vulnerability and choice of victims, the times he operated in, his eccentricity, that bloody cigar – to put up a thick smoke screen, and get away with it until after his death. (Wollaston 2016) Case study two: Lance Armstrong The Lance Armstrong doping scandal provides a relevant example to compare and contrast. Like Savile, the American cyclist Armstrong had a strong media personality and reputation for extensive charitable work, which helped suppress allegations of doping activity in cycling races, to which he later admitted. Despite the radically different nature of the allegations in each case study, it is not the first time the comparison has been made. Armstrong and Savile were ‘brothers of sorts’, according to Simon Kuper, writing in the Financial Times in 2012. In his analysis, ‘each man’s story illuminates the other’s’ (2012). In the sections that follow, examples from each case study are used in a discussion of the common factors that facilitate the non-reporting of a potential scandal. National treasures Readers of the satirical magazine Private Eye will be familiar with journalists’ tendency to bestow ‘national treasure’ status on high profile figures, for particular sporting or cultural achievements coupled with apparent public approval. When Savile died, this unofficial honour was awarded by numerous media outlets for his extensive charity work and unconventional personality: ‘tributes poured in for national treasure Sir Jimmy Savile’, according to the Sunday Mirror; while the Sunday People reported that a national treasure had been ‘lost’ (Marsh 2013). Lance Armstrong had a similarly favourable profile in the media owing to cycling triumphs and his charity work, notably setting up the Lance Armstrong Foundation which provides support to those suffering from cancer. He received glowing endorsement from the British and American media: the ‘onetime “Golden Boy of American Cycling”’ (Forde and Diamond 2005). Author’s accepted version; final version published in The Routledge Companion to Media and Scandal (eds: Tumber and Waisbord, 2019) The revered status of these men was not without a darker edge: for Savile, there were hints of allegations of child abuse (alluded to briefly, but not fully explored in Louis Theroux’s documentary on Savile aired in 2000, for example); and for Armstrong, speculation that he had blood doped and used performance enhancing drugs. But such rumours were overshadowed by overwhelmingly positive coverage of their perceived achievements in their respective professional fields and for their charitable deeds. When they did eventually and unequivocally fall out of favour, the national treasure and golden boy monikers were repeated again in the media, to describe how they had been previously perceived and publicised. Libel threats Despite what is now revealed to be extensive evidence supporting allegations of wrongdoing in both cases, Savile and Armstrong received minimal negative attention for many years, before the final exposés that led to their falls from grace. The treasure and golden status may have partially cushioned them, but they were also protected through the spectre of the law, and their deep pockets. Both used libel law to threaten their accusers. The researching of ‘unreported’ stories and libel presents a problem: it is often difficult to collect hard evidence of reported threats against journalists, and to ascertain claims of threats against the media and other individuals. However, documents released during the aftermath of the Savile scandal did provide such hard evidence, such as the transcript of a Surrey Police interview with Savile at Stoke Mandeville Hospital conducted in 2009 – an exchange later assessed by the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary to be ‘Savile-led rather than police-led’ (HMIC 2013, 27). The transcript recorded Savile’s boast that he threatened legal action to deter newspapers from publishing allegations of sexual abuse. Outlining his ‘policy’ towards allegations, Savile described how he had previously reached settlements out of court with five newspapers (Surrey Police 2009, 3). Savile then appears to threaten similar legal action on the basis of the allegations in the interview, that he has a ‘policy’ which will ‘swing into action’ in the face of allegations. Tellingly, he explains that he has never actually sued, ‘because they all run away and say “shush pay him up”’ (ibid., 4).