Working Paper Research Division International Security Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Claudia Major/Eva Strickmann You can’t always get what you want – Logistical Challenges in EU Military Operations FG03-WP No 03 June 2011 Berlin Table of Contents You can’t always get what you want –Logistical SWP Challenges in EU Military Operations 1 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute The EU’s military crisis management context 2 for International and Security Affairs Logistics in EU operations 3 Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 Strategic and tactical lift 3 10719 Berlin Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Leasing and coordination 4 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org The costs of logistics 4 [email protected] SWP Working Papers are online Privatisation and outsourcing 5 publications of SWP's research divisions which have not been Conclusions and the way ahead 6 formally reviewed by the Institute. Please do not cite them without the permission of the authors or editors. Eva Strickmann is PhD candidate at Kings College London Dr Claudia Major is researcher at the SWP International Security Division SWP-Berlin Logistical Challenges in EU Military Operations June 2011 1 You can’t always get what you want – has positioned itself as a crisis management actor on Logistical Challenges in EU Military the international scene. Crisis management opera- Operations tions have become a driver for the institutional and conceptual development of CSDP. CSDP is not primar- Within the framework of its Common Security and ily concerned with defence policy in its classical sense Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has to date carried out (i.e. territorial defence), as the name might suggest. It seven military crisis management operations. While focuses on security and defence cooperation among two missions were launched in the EU’s immediate European states, and between the EU’s institutions neighbourhood (Concordia in the Former Yugoslav and partner organisations such as the United Nations Republic of Macedonia in 2003 and EUFOR Althea in or African Union. Its overall objective is to strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004), the remaining the Union’s autonomous crisis management capaci- five operations targeted conflict hot spots on the Afri- ties. can continent. Two of these operations were carried The spectrum of the EU’s crisis management mis- out in the DR Congo (Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR RD sions was first set out by the Western European Union Congo in 2006), a third operation was launched in in its 1992 Petersberg Declaration and was later inte- Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR grated into the Treaty on European Union (TEU), by Tchad/RCA in 2008-2009), and the two most recent and amendments made with the Treaty of Amsterdam. The ongoing operations seek to address regional conflict so-called Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and patterns in the Horn of Africa (EU NAVFOR Somalia rescue operations, peacekeeping missions and tasks of since 2009 and EUTM Somalia since 2010). While the combat forces in crisis management, including background of and parameters for these operations peacemaking operations.1 The 2003 European Security were of course different, they have all been particu- Strategy suggested to broaden the understanding of larly challenging. Among a variety of factors, the EU the EU’s crisis management tasks and to expand the struggled in each case with the complexity and re- Petersberg spectrum to joint disarmament operations, gional implications of the conflicts, special require- security sector reform and support for third countries ments and adaptations in the area of operation, weak in fighting terrorism.2 These recommendations and infrastructure, vague and often short-sighted man- further revisions were incorporated into the Treaty of dates, inefficient cooperation schemes with other Lisbon. Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty defines the task actors in the field, and limited political will on the spectrum as follows: “The tasks (…), in the course of side of EU member states. As a consequence, the effec- which the Union may use civilian and military means, tiveness of the EU’s crisis management efforts has shall include joint disarmament operations, humani- often been scrutinised. tarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance This article focuses on logistical challenges and tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, points to the experience of different EU operations in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, includ- Africa. It starts with a brief overview of the context in ing peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All which EU military crisis management operations are these tasks may contribute to the fight against terror- carried out. A second section introduces the field of ism, including by supporting third countries in com- logistics in crisis management and identifies logistical bating terrorism in their territories.“3 challenges – namely strategic and tactical airlift, the The EU has so far operated across almost the full costs of logistics and the outsourcing of logistics. A task spectrum, except for the very high end (tasks of concluding part suggests recommendations on how the logistics performance of the EU could be im- 1 See Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union. This article proved. was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which had been signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. The EU’s military crisis management context 2 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, p.13. 3 The EU’s Security and Defence Policy became opera- Official Journal of the European Union, Consolidated Ver- sion of the Treaty on European Union, C115/13, May 2008, p. tional in 2003. Since then, the EU has enhanced its 27. See also: Claudia Major, Auβen- Sicherheits- und Verteidi- experience in 24 civilian and military operations and gungspolitik der EU nach Lissabon. Neue Möglichkeiten, aber kein grundlegender Wandel. SWP Aktuell 7, Januar 2010. SWP-Berlin Logistical Challenges in EU Military Operations June 2011 2 combat forces, peacemaking). Most of the military Logistics in EU operations operations were carried out autonomously, relying on assets and capabilities of the EU and its member states Before identifying the main logistical challenges in EU (except for Concordia and EUFOR Althea which were military crisis management operations, it is helpful to launched under the Berlin Plus arrangements with approach the field of logistics in a general under- recourse to NATO assets). The idea of responding standing. Logistics deals with the management (plan- autonomously to crises has also been a driver for the ning and implementation) of the movement of re- development of CSDP, shaped by the experience of the sources and support for the armed forces from the Balkan wars and the EU’s inability to act as mediator point of origin to the theatre of operation and, once or security actor in its own backyard. A further char- the operation has been concluded, back to the point of acteristic of the EU’s past autonomous operations is origin. This includes the areas of transport; mainte- that they were all launched following a request of the nance; supply (e.g. subsistence, ammunition, cloth- United Nations, and often paved the way for follow-on ing); service life support (e.g. waste, camp operation, UN missions. guarding and security); infrastructure engineering The following details need to be kept in mind when support (e.g. camp construction and civil engineering discussing the logistics of EU military crisis manage- support); health and medical support, and other ser- ment operations: vices such as the provision and maintenance of com- Firstly, CSDP is an intergovernmental policy. Deci- munication networks or surveillance. Logistics is es- sions on EU operations are taken by unanimous vote sential for the success of crisis management opera- and can be vetoed by all EU member states, with the tions. The timely and adequate provision of services is exception of Denmark.4 While EU member states have a crucial element of logistics. An operation will from created a number of institutions in the field of CSDP the start struggle to fulfil its mandate if the troops and conferred certain competences upon them, final and equipment are not in the area of operation in control and decision-making powers lie with national time, if the force cannot be moved once deployed or if governments. No EU member state can be obligated to supplies such as food and drinking water are not de- participate in a crisis management operation. The livered in time. Moreover, sustainability is an impor- deployment of troops and provision of capacities de- tant aspect: the flow of of goods and services needs to pend on voluntary contributions of EU member states be guaranteed. Logistics implies a chain of services and third countries (non-EU troop contributing coun- whose interruption has immediate consequences on tries). the efficiency and overall effectiveness of an opera- Secondly, the EU’s crisis management operations tion. are multinational endeavours. It usually proves diffi- The main challenges in the field of logistics are of- cult to reach agreement on the mission’s parameters ten summarised in the so-called 4D formula: demand, in multinational frameworks. Multinational opera- duration, distance and destination.5 These aspects tions imply different national caveats such as varying need to be taken into account when planning the constitutional and legal procedures for the deploy- logistics of an operation and anticipating challenges. ment of troops but also different Rules of Engagement The logistical parameters differ for each crisis man- (ROE) or standards for equipment and logistics. It is agement context and need to be adjusted to the reali- challenging to harmonise national strategic cultures ties in the area of operation and to frictions in the and logistical cultures.