1 THE PROBABILITY OF GRAY’S RMA LIFE-CYCLE IN INDONESIA By: Muradi Abstract: Permasalahan utama dari implementasi Revolution in Miliatry Affairs (RMA) di luar Amerika Serikat dan negara-negara maju di Eropa adalah ketidaksiapan infrastruktur dan suprastruktur. Di Asia, China menjadi salah negara yang telah mempraktikkan RMA dengan karakter yang berbeda dengan yang dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat dan negara Eropa. Kecuali Israel, tahapan dari modernisasi pertahanan di Asia baru sebatas pada pemenuhan kebutuhan Alutsista dan system pertahanan. Indonesia, sebagai salah satu negara besar di Asia, dan pernah menjadi salah satu kekuatan militer yang disegani di kawasan Asia dan Pasifik masih terjebak pada penataan kelembagaan pertahanan. Formulasi yang ditawarkan Gray dalam tahapan-tahapan yang harus dilalui oleh suatu negara untuk dapat mengimplementasikan RMA di militernya menarik untuk diterapkan di Indonesia. Tahapan-tahapan tersebut akan melihat sampai di mana pemerintah dan TNI merespon reformasi dan modernisasi pertahanan, sebagai salah satu prasyarat dari penerapan RMA di Indonesia. Keywords: RMA, Indonesia Armed Force (TNI), Military Reform, , Strategic Industry, Political Intervention I. Introduction This paper discusses the probability theory of Gray’s RMA Life-Cycle in Indonesia is. The implementation of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Indonesia became a “hot issue” when China carried out a transformation in defence affairs and its characteristics. For a while, Indonesia is far behind, at least when related to the effort in modernizing military force after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime. The reform in military is carried out because of pressures from society demanding a new professional military force with focused power at defence tasks. It is important to know that since the independence of Indonesia, Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) have experienced various roles besides defence. This was assured by the emergence of the “Middle Way” concept by General Nasution in 1958 1 , where Armed Forces have been legitimized to do various roles besides their core task in defence. As the biggest country in South East Asia, Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto was tend to occupy with internal settlement, including the defence Muradi adalah Dosen Tetap Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan, FISIP UNPAD, Bandung. Mendapatkan gelar akademik S1dari Jurusan Sejarah,UNPAD, Bandung, gelar M.Si dari Departemen Ilmu Politik, Pasca Sarjana Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, dan M.Ss dari S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Jurusan Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapura. 1 More about Middle Way Concept’s Nasution, see, Daniel S. Lev. “The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter 1953-1964) pp. 350-354. See also, Ruth T. McVey. “The Post Revolution Transformation of Indonesian Army” Indonesia, Vol. 11 (April, 1971). Pp. 2 reform. The momentum becomes an important part in developing the new Indonesia military. For the last thirty years of Soeharto and New Order Regime, military played the role of a political machine to support the ruling power. After the fall of Soeharto, TNI has articulated various demands to be a professional institution. During the last ten years, civil government in Indonesia and TNI have done various internal and external correction, so that Indonesia military returns to the main duty in function of defence only, and make Indonesia become respecting and influential country in South East Asia2. However, the various corrections and responses for reform are still at the surface level, real problems which become the main concept of modernizing the armed forces is not yet touched. One of the ideas for example, is the use of sophisticated information technology as one of prerequisites in modernizing the armed forces. Transformation in defence that happened has just touched the defence posture with various limitations of appliance in weapon system, as part of the core of the process. The nine steps introduced by Colin Gray in development and implementation of RMA, there are only four steps implemented in Indonesia: preparation, strategic moment, institutional agency, and instruments. These are implemented with few notes, and not circular of perfection, while the rest are not yet realized due to various limitations and constraints. The four conditions and steps in Indonesia are still separated problems. Indonesia truly had a golden period of when Soekarno become the first President of Indonesia3. At that time, Indonesia became one of the most influential countries, not only within the Asia and Pacific nations, but also in the world4. One of the reason was the military budget and strength as one of modern and biggest military country in the world. It was a good turn by Soviet Union to support various military requirements of Indonesia Armed Forces at the time, so that Indonesia would become one of the powerful allies against the United States domination in Pacific and Asia5. 2 See “Military Claims Its Claims Reform Slow Due to Lack of Money” http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2003/03/10/military-claims-its-reform-slow-due-lack- money.html (accessed May, 16 2008), see also Mietzner, Marcus. 2006. The Politics of Military Reform in Post Soeharto Indonesia: Elit Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance. Washington: East-West Center. 3 See Herbert Feith ”President Soekarno, the Army and the Communist: The Triangle Changes Shape” Asian Survey, Vol.4, No.8 (August 1964). University of California Press. pp. 982-990, also see Josef Silverstein “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia” Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 8 (Mar, 1982) University of California Press. pp. 280-282. 4 See C. A. Fisher.”Indonesia: A Giant Stir” The Geographical Journal. Vol. 138. No. 2 (Jun, 1972) The Royal Geographical Society. See also Robert Conkling.”Power and Change in an Indonesia Government Office” America Ethnologist. Vol. 11, No. 2 (May 1984) American Antrophological Society. 5 See Herbert. S. Dinnerstein. “The Soviet Employment of Military Strenght for Political Purposes” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 318. Asia and Future World Leadership (Jul, 1958). Sage Publications. Pp. 106-110. 3 This paper explains how the Colin Gray theory in steps in implementation of RMA in a state is. Indonesia as one of the core nation in South-East Asia, and have the influence in the past, was able to push its armed forces modernization by implementing RMA. This paper also will see how to face limitation and constraints in Indonesia based on Gray's RMA Life-Cycle Theory. II. Gray’s RMA Life-Cycle in Indonesia: Constraints and Limitation The desire to modernize the armed forces has not yet become the government’s priority for the last ten years, especially after Soeharto and the New Order Regime collapsed. The government is still busy with democracy consolidation in building an effective political position, and bringing the armed forces as an instrument of defence so they shall no longer got mixed up with various non-defence activities, which have been carried out for the last forty years6. The problems of military reform in Indonesia for the last ten years is how Indonesia military really leave their interferences in social, politics, and economics field. There are doubts, since the character and culture of the institution of civil government in making the reform of Armed Forces walk tardily. This matter is marked by letting the military reform in Indonesia to be carried out by military leaders, while the government and parliament only giving fringes and hoping the process runs better7. At political area, Indonesia Armed Forces still involve indirectly and directly in practical, at the national and local level. The indirect involvement of military in politics is marked by the effort to push Generals with good potency and character as a candidate in national and local elections, as Parliament members or regional leaders. Even, the number is qualitatively and quantitative decreasing, but some successes are recorded. One example is Major General Prijanto as Deputy Governor of Jakarta. He won the election last year8. Example of indirect involvement is at the influence of various policies related to state regulation in social, economic, and also the unsolved problems of military business until this time. This condition makes the effort to develop the professional Indonesia military tends to be pursued, whereas equivocation of Generals in Armed Forces concerning disinclination delivers the business asset managed in the form of institution, co-operation, limited liability, is striving internal TNI so that it can fulfill prosperity of soldiers, due to the limited state budget for defence. Another is that of the business management also gives 6 For more explanation see Terence Lee.”The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia” Asia Survey, Vol. 40, No.4 (Jul-Aug, 2000), see also Sebastian, Leonard C. 2006. Realpolitik: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force. Singapore: ISEAS. Especially in Chapter V. 7 See Mietzner. Op. cit. p. 12. See also Muradi. 2006. Berpijak Di atas Bara: Kegamangan Politik TNI di Masa Transisi [Difficult to Steps: The Re-Orientation of Political Policy of Indonesia Armed Force During Democratic Transition]. Bandung: University Padjadjaran Press. Especially Chapter IV. 8 See “Fauzi Takes Lead in Jakarta Election Quick Count” http://old.thejakartapost.com/election/index.php?menu=stories&detail=112 (accessed May 17, 2008) 4 advantage and prosperity for society around the housing for soldiers. It is assumed that there is social effectiveness at the management level of military business9. Based on the problems, in fact, there were a few free tests to see the steps of implementation of Gray’s RMA. This matter is caused by empirical difficulties to assure that steps can be fulfilled by Indonesia military in adopting RMA. More than anything else, Gray assures that history have noted that the effective military strategy is not yet suitable to adopt RMA10. It means that Indonesian military’s steps to disband Fast Response Unit will face a long path.