Deliberate Force A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study Edited by Col Robert C. Owen, USAF Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama January 2000 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Deliberate force a case study in effective air campaigning : final report of the Air University Balkans air campaign study / edited by Robert C. Owen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-076-0 1. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Aerial operations. 2. Yugoslav War, 1991– 1995—Campaigns—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Foreign participation. 4. Peacekeeping forces—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Armed Forces—Aviation. 6. Bosnia and Hercegovina— History, Military. I. Owen, Robert C., 1951– DR1313.7.A47 D45 2000 949.703—dc21 99-087096 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . xi ABOUT THE EDITOR . xv PREFACE . xvii 1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . 87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments . 331 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 13 Aspects of Leading and Following: The Human Factors of Deliberate Force . 351 Lt Col John C. Orndorff 14 Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation Deliberate Force . 381 Lt Col Ronald M. Reed 15 Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches to Operation Deliberate Force . 431 Lt Col Robert D. Pollock 16 Summary . 455 Col Robert C. Owen CONTRIBUTORS . 523 INDEX . 527 Illustrations Figure 2.1 UNSCRs and NAC Decisions Leading to Deliberate Force . 40 2.2 NATO Organization . 42 2.3 UN/NATO Command Relationships . 49 iv Figure Page 2.4 Air Strategy to Execution . 51 2.5 Deliberate Force Operational Locations . 54 4.1 Operation Deadeye Key Nodes . 101 4.2 Zones of Action . 104 4.3 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . 108 8.1 Assigned Aircraft by Nationality (30 August 1995) . 203 8.2 Assigned Forces by Nationality (14 September 1995) . 204 10.1 Zones of Action . 283 10.2 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . 284 11.1 BSA Order of Battle . 300 11.2 Deliberate Force Concept of Operations . 308 12.1 National Sortie Distribution . 332 12.2 Overall Sortie Distribution . 332 12.3 Distribution of Penetrating Sorties . 332 12.4 Distribution of Support Sorties . 333 12.5 Deliberate Force Missions . 333 12.6 Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment . 334 12.7 US Joint Sortie Distribution . 335 12.8 Ground- and Air-Abort Summary . 337 12.9 Poststrike Results . 341 12.10 Deadeye Results . 343 v Figure Page 12.11 Targets Remaining . 344 12.12 DMPIs Remaining . 344 14.1 ROE Influences . 383 14.2 Development of ROE . 396 14.3 NATO and UN Chains of Command . 401 14.4 Zones of Action for Deliberate Force . 409 15.1 Warden’s Five Rings . 435 15.2 The Campaign-Planning Model . 441 Photo Richard Holbrooke . 28 Adm Leighton W. Smith . 38 Gen Michael E. Ryan . 47 Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg . 50 Lt Gen Michael C. Short . 183 F-16s . 206 Mirage 2000 . 208 F-14 . 210 F-18 . 211 EA-6B . 212 A-10 . 215 F-15 . 215 vi Photo Page AC-130 . 216 KC-135 . 221 KC-10 . 221 U-2 . 225 Predator UAV . 227 S-3 Viking . 229 P-3 Orion . 230 RC-135 . 230 EF-111 . 232 E-3 airborne warning and control system aircraft . 234 E-2 Hawkeye . 235 MH-53 . 237 C-17s . 238 C-21 . 238 F-15C . 240 B-52 . 242 F-117s . 243 AGM-65 Maverick . 262 GBU-15 . 263 AGM-88 HARM . 266 2.75-inch rocket . 267 vii Photo Page Loading an A-10’s cannon . 268 Serb artillery . 293 Bridge damage . 294 F-18 with HARMs . 312 Gen James Jamerson . 456 Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley . 456 Tables 2.1 NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force . 53 4.1 OPLAN 40101 “Deny Flight” Phases and Objectives . 96 4.2 Example Target Matrix . 109 8.1 Players Available at Onset . 203 8.2 End-State Force Structure (Assigned Aircraft Only) . 205 8.3 Shooter Missions . 207 8.4 Supporter-Mission Sorties . 220 8.5 Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft in Deliberate Force . 247 9.1 Deliberate Force’s Precision Munitions . 258 9.2 Deliberate Force’s Nonprecision Bombs . 265 10.1 Safe-Area Target Sets . 282 10.2 Onset Target and DMPI Data . 290 viii Table Page 11.1 Obscurant Effects on Sensor Performance . 303 11.2 SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force . 313 12.1 Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment . 334 12.2 Deliberate Force Sortie Summary . 337 12.3 Ground- and Air-Abort Summary . 338 12.4 US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis . 339 12.5 Individual Targets Attacked/Destroyed . 342 12.6 Sarajevo ZOA Targets . 342 12.7 Deadeye Targets . 343 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Foreword Every airman or person interested in the art and science of air and space warfare should read this book. True to the direction of Gen James Jamerson, former deputy commander in chief of US European Command, and me, the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) has emerged as a bal- anced and wide-ranging discussion of the Deliberate Force air campaign, which occurred during the fall of 1995. Exploiting the sources and resources available to them, the BACS team members have laid out a mile-wide and foot-deep exploration of the context, theoretical foundations, planning, execution, leadership, and effects of this milestone event. In so doing, they have contributed significantly to our knowledge about the political, military, technical, and human elements that shape air campaigns and influence their outcomes. Moreover, the BACS offers insights into persistent questions of military plan- ners, such as the relationship of diplomacy and war; the syn- ergy of land power, space power, and airpower; and the role of chance and “fog” in the conduct and outcome of air and space warfare. Finally, because the BACS team from the start wrote this report for immediate declassification, virtually the entire report and all of its substantive elements are available here as an open source, only four years after the event. Given its scope, this book should contain material of interest to all aerospace-warfare practitioners and/or thinkers, regardless of their area of expertise. The following are core implications of the BACS: • Deliberate Force was a decisive element in shaping the outcome of the allied intervention into the Bosnian con- flict, but its full effect must be understood in the context of the other political and military developments also un- der way at the time. • The characteristics and weaponry of air and space warfare gave the diplomats and soldiers of the intervention a usable xi tool of great power and flexibility with which to influence events in the Balkans region. • For all of the capabilities of modern information technol- ogy, the scale, pace, human factors (such as leadership, culture, and conceptualization), and other nontechnical elements of Deliberate Force ensured that Clausewitz’s trilogy of fog, friction, and chance remained important in shaping its ultimate outcome. • If Deliberate Force is considered a new form of intervention- ism on behalf of peace, then the experience gained from that operation suggests the need for a review of our concep- tions about the nature of military and diplomatic leadership in such circumstances. • If it is to be useful, doctrine—as formalized advice on what military leaders should do when faced by certain kinds of problems—must be read and understood. But it also must be understood as a guide for thinking through prob- lems ahead of time, rather than a recipe for their solution after the fact. The study makes other important points, of course, and any given reader likely will find things with which to agree and disagree. However, these core implications of the BACS serve to illustrate its value, both as a historical document and as a spark for debate and thought—its real purpose. I would be remiss if I did not commend the dedication and persistence of all the members of the BACS team. When they volunteered to participate in this study, we all understood that it would be a focused effort to capture the most important political and operational events of Deliberate Force and to start an archive of related materials to support further re- search. As they pursued their research, however, the team members soon realized that they had a hold on the tail of a much bigger “elephant” than anyone at Air University origi- nally had expected. Deliberate Force turns out to have been a very complex event, composed of layered political, military, and human elements that all bore some level of examination.