The Bush Administration's Nuclear Strategy: The 'New Triad,' Counterproliferation Doctrine, and Asymmetrical Deterrence by David Stephen McDonough B.A. (Hons.), Simon Fraser University, 2001 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 2003 © David Stephen McDonough, 2003 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of /&/ In ro,/ J?^> 0s> fj>. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date A . r/ 1^ ?0Ol DE-6 (2/88) Abstract This thesis examines the current Bush administration's nuclear weapons strategy. It argues that the current U.S. strategy is based on the concept of asymmetrical deterrence against 'rogue states' that, rather than having a comparable or even minimal nuclear arsenal, have or are developing nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. This form of asymmetrical deterrence can therefore be seen as comparable to the U.S. deterrent posture in the 1940's to 1960's against the Soviet Union, and contrasted with the symmetrical deterrent posture reflected in the context of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In addition, this paper offers some preliminary conclusions on the problems associated with this posture, specifically with regard to the non-proliferation regime and the symmetrical U.S. deterrent posture directed towards Russia and China. Rather than a new strategy, asymmetrical deterrence has been the de facto U.S. policy of the post-Cold War period. This strategy changes the calculus of deterrence by expanding U.S. nuclear strategy to incorporate conventional counterproliferation elements such as conventional strike options, preventive war and missile defense. This development is largely due to the changing U.S. threat perception towards rogue states, which have since replaced the Soviet Union as the most significant strategic threat facing the United States. While a de facto policy throughout the post-Cold War period, it has attained a pre-eminent status under the Bush administration. This has been most explicitly reflected in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, which outlines the strategic concept of the New Triad consisting of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure. Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Acknowledgements iv List of Abbreviations v INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter One — Overview of U.S. Nuclear Strategy During the Cold War 6 NSC-68: Conventional Parity and Nuclear Hedging 7 The New Look's Massive Retaliation and Overkill 12 From Flexible Response to MAD 17 The Post-MAD Period: The Search for a Countervailing Nuclear Posture 23 Chapter Two — A Post-Cold War Asymmetrical Deterrence Nuclear Strategy 35 The Incorporation of Counterproliteration in Nuclear Doctrine and Policy 39 The Strategy of Asymmetrical Deterrence in a Post-Cold War World 55 Chapter Three — The Bush Administration's 'New Triad' Strategic Concept 74 Offensive Strike Systems 78 Defenses (Passive and Active) 87 Revitalized Defense Infrastructure 93 Chapter Four — Implications of an Asymmetrical Deterrence Strategy 97 The Strategic Threat of NBC-armed Rogue States 98 Impact of Asymmetrical Deterrence on Symmetrical Nuclear Relations 109 Strategic Relations with Russia 109 Strategic Relations with China 113 CONCLUSION 117 BIBLIOGRAPHY 122 iii Acknowledgements This thesis could not have been written without the supervision and support of Dr. Brian L. Job. Despite his own busy schedule, Dr. Job has provided extensive comments and feedback on the numerous drafts of my thesis and, through his endeavours, has offered some greatly appreciated guidance for my own thoughts on the subject matter. I would also like to the thank many of my fellow graduate students in the Department of Political Science. They have not only provided some much needed comments and discussion on my research, but have also contributed extensively to what became a stimulating and enjoyable year at the University of British Columbia. Finally, I would like to thank my family, who have consistently supported me in my academic pursuits. iv Abbreviations ABL Airborne Laser ABM anti-ballistic missile ADM Agent Defeat Weapons ASAT anti-satellite BMD ballistic missile defense BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BTWC Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention BW biological weapon Cl Capability 1 C2 Capability 2 C3 Capability 3 C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence CAV Common Aero Vehicle CB chemical or biological CIA Central Intelligence Agency CICBM conventional intercontinental ballistic missile CINC command-in-chief CONPLAN Concept Plan CPI Counterproliferation Initiative CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CW chemical weapon CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DGZ Designated Ground Zero DMZ De-Militarized Zone DNA Defense Nuclear Agency DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea DSP Defense Support Program EPW Earth-Penetrating Warhead FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense HDBT hard and deeply buried target IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JLRSE Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JSOP Joint Strategic Objectives Plan KV kill vehicle LNO Limited Nuclear Option MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MAO Major Attack Option MDA Missile Defense Agency MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System MIRV Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle MNNRV Manoeuvrable Non-Nuclear Reentry Vehicle MSP military space plane NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAW Navy Area Wide NBC nuclear, biological, or chemical NMD national missile defense NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration NNWS non-nuclear weapon states NPR Nuclear Posture Review NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC National Security Council NSDD National Security Decision Directive NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSPD National Security Presidential Directive NTPR Nuclear Targeting Policy Review NTW Navy Theater Wide NUWEP Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy NWC Nuclear Weapons Council NWS nuclear weapon state PAC Patriot Advanced Capability PAAMS Principle Anti-Air Missile System PD Presidential Directive PDD Presidential Decision Directive PGM precision guided munition QDR Quadrennial Defense Review REACT Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting R&D research and development RMA Revolution in Military Affairs RNEP Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator RNO Regional Nuclear Option RV reentry vehicle SAC Strategic Air Command SAM surface-to-air missile SAO Selective Attack Option SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System SBM Sea-based Midcourse Defense SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization SIOP Single Integrated Operating Plan SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SORT U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty SRS SLBM Retargeting System SSBN nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines SPACECOM Space Command STRATCOM Strategic Command STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System SWPS Strategic War Planning System THAAD Theater High Altitude Area Defense TMD theater missile defense UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission WMD weapons of mass destruction Introduction The current Bush administration has brought about significant changes in the nuclear strategy of the United States. Traditionally, the U.S. has maintained a nuclear Triad based on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long- range bombers. This concept was expanded and modified in the Bush administration's classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, completed on January 2002.1 This classified document outlined a 'New Triad' strategic concept, based on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. Following from the recommendations of that report, the U.S. has placed a renewed emphasis on nuclear and non- nuclear targeting of 'rogue states' armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and the development of smaller yield and more accurate nuclear weapons alongside a significant BMD capability. The Bush administration's nuclear strategy subsumes three important and inter-related developments of the post-Cold War period. The first is the growth of the doctrine of counterproliferation as an integral component of American nuclear strategy. During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear doctrine was focused on the threat of the Soviet Union and ranged between two extremes. At one extreme was the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and deterrence of both superpowers. At the other extreme was the idea of nuclear war-fighting, which implied 'escalation dominance,' and ultimately the assured destruction, of the Soviet Union and 'damage limitation' for the United States.2 Although the doctrines were