ANNUAL REPORT 2002 GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICE 2 Foreword By means of this annual report the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) presents an overview of its areas of special attention in 2002 and the focus areas for 2003. In effect, this is to a large extent the annual report of the National Security Service (BVD), the name of which changed with the coming into force of the new Intelligence and Security Services Act on 29 May 2002. Due to the fact that the AIVD received a lot of attention in the media recently, the new name already appears to be catching on. This news value of the AIVD has everything to do with the topicality of security issues such as the threat of international terrorism, tensions between certain groups of the population, and the safety of politicians. It needs to be stated that these threats did not decrease in 2002; on the contrary. It is the government's duty not only to take adequate measures, but also to inform its citizens as well as possible about any threats. After all, the observant citizen plays a crucial role in countering threats. The AIVD's annual report, which has now become compulsory by law, plays an important role in this respect. The annual report contains no information on operational specifics, because this part of our activities is not of a public nature. Such information is provided exclusively to the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Second Chamber and to the supervisory committee instituted together with the new Act. J. W. Remkes Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 3 4 Table of contents Foreword 3 1. Developments relating to national security 9 1.1. Threats to the national security 9 1.2. The role of the AIVD 10 1.2.1. Investigation into threats 10 1.2.2. Security screening 11 1.2.3. Protective security 12 1.2.4. Supervision 12 1.3. Foreign intelligence tasks 12 2. Terrorism 15 2.1. Islamic terrorism 15 2.2. The Netherlands and Islamic terrorism 16 2.2.1. Recruiting activities 16 2.2.2. Support activities 17 2.2.3. Arrests 18 2.2.4. Yemaah Islamiyya 19 2.2.5. Combating terrorism and social polarisation 20 2.3. Migration and terrorism 20 2.4. Other terrorist groups 21 2.4.1. DHKP/C (Revolutionary People´s Liberation Party/Front) 21 2.4.2. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army 21 2.4.3. Mujahedin-e Khalq 21 3. Counterforces of integration 23 3.1. Extreme right-wing groups 23 3.1.1. Movements 24 3.1.2. Extreme right-wing movements and the LPF/Leefbaar movement 25 3.2. Islam and integration 26 3.3. The Moroccan community 27 3.3.1. Radicalisation in and around mosques 27 3.3.2. Radicalisation of Muslim students 28 3.4. The Turkish and Kurdish community 29 3.4.1. The Turkish control network 29 3.4.2. Turkish-Islamic radicalisation 29 3.4.3. KADEK (Congress of Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan) 30 3.5. The Afghan community 30 3.6. Pakistanis and Indians 31 3.7. Chechens 32 3.8. Islamic non-governmental organisations 32 5 4. Politically motivated violent activism 35 4.1. Anti-globalisation 35 4.2. Anti-militarism 36 4.3. Animal rights activism 36 4.4. The Moluccan community 37 5. Unwelcome interference of foreign powers 39 5.1. Russia 39 5.2. The People´s Republic of China 40 5.3. Iran 41 6. International legal order 43 6.1. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undesirable trade in conventional weapons 43 6.1.1. International and national non-proliferation policy 44 6.1.2. Weapons of mass destruction; state involvement 44 6.1.3. NBC terrorism 45 6.2. Imminent war in Iraq 46 6.3. International organisations 47 6.3.1. International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 47 6.3.2. International Criminal Court 47 7. Other fields of interest 49 7.1. The assassination of Pim Fortuyn 49 7.2. Surinam 49 8. Protective security 51 8.1. Protective security special information 51 8.1.1. Working Group Special Information Security 51 8.1.2. Encryption facility 51 8.1.3. Electronic attacks 52 8.1.4. Review of regulations on the protection of state secrets 52 8.1.5. Security scans and recommendations 52 8.1.6. National Security Authority 53 8.2. Protective security vital sectors 54 8.2.1. Project Protection Vital Infrastructure 54 8.2.2. Protection of the Dutch water sector 54 8.2.3. Marine navigation and ports 55 8.2.4. Civil aviation 55 8.2.5. New generation of travel documents 55 8.3. Promoting the integrity of public administration 55 8.3.1. Integrity projects 56 8.3.2. Meeting of experts integrity counsellors 56 8.3.3. Registration of integrity violations 56 8.4. Protective security of (foreign) persons and objects 57 6 8.5. Security investigations 57 8.5.1. Security investigations by the Royal Military Constabulary 58 8.5.2. Security investigations for and by the police forces 58 8.5.3. Overview number of positions and investigations 58 8.5.4. Results 59 8.6. Objection and appeal 60 9. Co-operation 61 9.1. National co-operation 61 9.1.1. Co-operation with the Dutch police 61 9.1.2. Great Evaluation Triangle and Technical Evaluation Committee 62 9.1.3. Co-operation with the Defence Intelligence and Security Service 62 9.1.4. Co-operation against financing terrorism 62 9.1.5. Covenant with Unusual Transactions Reporting Office 63 9.1.6. Contribution to the Financial Expertise Centre 63 9.1.7. Co-operation with actors involved in migration 63 9.2. Co-operation with the overseas territories 63 9.3. International co-operation 64 9.3.1. The AIVD liaison network and bilateral contacts 64 9.3.2. Co-operation groups of European intelligence and security services 64 10. Communication, requests to inspect AIVD files, and complaints 67 10.1. Communication 67 10.2. Requests to inspect AIVD files 67 10.3. Complaints 68 11. Internal management 69 11.1. Personnel 69 11.2. Computerised information 69 11.3. General and technical services 70 11.3.1. Accommodation 70 11.3.2. Purchase of goods and services 70 11.3.3. Environment 70 11.4. Registration, documentation and archives 70 11.5. Quality management 71 11.6. Finance 71 11.7. Management statement 72 Annex 1 Parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2002 73 Annex 2 Oversight 81 7 8 1 Developments relating to national security This chapter first presents an outline of the security situation in the Netherlands, seen from the perspective of the AIVD. This is followed by a discussion of the role played by the AIVD in protecting the national security. In this context, control and supervision over the AIVD are also discussed. The chapter concludes with information on the AIVD's new task in collecting foreign intelligence. 1.1 Threats to the national security The year 2002 was a turbulent year, both for Dutch society and for the AIVD. It became increasingly clear that the treat of international terrorism was not solely an external matter, but was also internal, in view of the increase of the number of potential terrorists living in our country. Also the attack on Pim Fortuyn and the increasing number of threats directed at politicians indicate that our country has lost its innocence and is at any rate less safe than was previously assumed. The attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 made clear to the whole world that terrorism of an Islamic persuasion had developed into a major danger to international peace and security. Despite the continuing fight by the US and their allies in and outside Afghanistan against the Al Qaeda network in particular, this type of terrorism, despite various successful actions, has not been halted. Islamic terrorist networks are capable of carrying out attacks all over the world and thus disrupting entire societies or parts of society. The use of biological or chemical weapons in these attacks can no longer be ruled out. All in all this represents a considerable threat against Europe and the US. Radical-Islamic networks are active in the Netherlands as well. They are involved in support activities of a financial, material or logistic nature. In 2002, the AIVD reported that several dozens of Islamic youths are involved in a recruiting process in the Netherlands, partly as a result of radicalisation within the Islamic community in our country. The investigation into Islamic terrorism requires a major effort from the AIVD and other parties. The fatal attack on Pim Fortuyn shocked society and led to the probing question whether the authorities and services responsible, including the then BVD, had failed in their duties. An independent committee was set up to investigate this and to examine whether the existing system of surveillance and security is adequate. The attack caused much unrest and this resulted in a political climate in which threats to politicians became quite common. The integration of in particular the Islamic community into Dutch society is a process that is not without tension. The risk of polarisation based on ethnic and religious differences, which can damage the cohesion within society, is a real danger. At the same time, there is a danger that a stagnating integration may contribute to the radicalisation of a small part of the Muslim community, which if the worst comes to the worst, may lead to a willingness to participate in terrorist activities.