Maine Policy Review Volume 11 | Issue 1 2002 Term Limits, the Standing Committees, and Institutional Response Matthew .C Moen University of Maine Kenneth Palmer University of Maine, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons Recommended Citation Moen, Matthew C. , and Kenneth Palmer. "Term Limits, the Standing Committees, and Institutional Response." Maine Policy Review 11.1 (2002) : 12 -24, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/vol11/iss1/4. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. TERM LIMITS Term Limits, the Standing Through citizen initiative in 1993, Maine passed a term limits bill that now prevents legislators with eight years of Committees, and consecutive service from seeking reelection. Although touted Institutional as a means of eliminating careerism in public service and as a means of bringing fresh blood and new policy initiative Response to Augusta, many now question whether limits on service By Matthew C. Moen have hampered legislative efficiency through the loss of Kenneth T. Palmer experienced leadership and institutional memory. In this article, Moen and Palmer examine the impact of term limits on the legislature’s standing committees. While noting adverse impacts such as heavier workloads, they also find an institution hard at work to adapt, with leadership seeking new ways to improve operations and to orient new members to a rapidly changing environment. ᳚ 12 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Spring 2002 View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm TERM LIMITS INTRODUCTION With an eight-year limit on consecutive service, erm limits are gradually reshaping the Maine Maine has the most typical term-limits statute. Six TLegislature, but in ways that may not be readily other states share it. Our statute is strict compared to apparent to the casual observer. This article examines several states that allow consecutive terms up to twelve the impact of term limits on our legislature, with a years, but it is lenient compared to seven states with a primary emphasis on explaining what is occurring lifetime ban on further service. Members of the Maine with the committees, but also mentioning how our Legislature can switch chambers or seek reelection after policymakers are taking constructive steps to adapt sitting out one term. to the new environment. Maine was the Term limits took root in Maine in 1993, when fourteenth state to Table 2: voters approved a citizen initiative limiting state legisla- pass term limits for State Legislative Term Limit Provisions tors to a total of four consecutive two-year terms. state legislators. The initiative won easily with 159,785 (67%) to However, because Limitation Consecutive Lifetime 76,732 (33%) votes. This overwhelming margin of of the retroactive 6 House/ Arkansas victory mirrored the national average in the eighteen provision in its 8 Senate California states where voters passed term limits, but it also citizen initiative, Michigan came in an off-year election when voter turnout was in 1996 Maine Oregon unusually low (Moen, 2001a). became the first 8 total Idaho* state to actually Nebraska Table 1: prevent legislators 8 House/ Arizona Missouri in both chambers 8 Senate Colorado Voter Support for State Legislative Term Limits Florida from seeking MAINE State Percent Favoring reelection. It is Montana therefore on the Ohio Wyoming . 77.2% South Dakota Florida . 76.8% cutting edge of Louisiana . 76.0% an issue currently 12 total Oklahoma Missouri . 75.0% affecting eighteen 12 House/ Louisiana Nevada Arizona . 74.2% states. Lessons 12 Senate Utah Colorado . 71.0% learned here might Wyoming Nevada . 70.4% Oregon . 69.6% be applicable to * The Idaho Legislature repealed term limits in 2002. Ohio . 68.4% other states, espe- Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. MAINE . 67.6% cially those with citizen legislatures. Oklahoma . 67.3% NATIONAL AVERAGE . 67.2% TERM LIMITS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Montana . 67.0% South Dakota . 63.5% erm limits for elected officials are not a new idea. Arkansas . 59.9% Idaho . 59.4% TSupport for rotation in office can be traced all the Michigan . 58.8% way back to ancient times, and it was part of discus- Nebraska . 56.0% sions of democratic theory after the Renaissance. The California . 52.2% struggle over term limits in American history surfaced Utah Legislature Passed as early as the Articles of Confederation, which Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. restricted members of Congress to three years of service in any six-year period (Petracca, 1992). At the View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm Spring 2002 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · 13 TERM LIMITS Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Founding to enact term limits were Massachusetts and Maine. Fathers discussed but dismissed term limits, believing When the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down that regular elections and an intricate system of checks its law, Maine became the only state in the entire and balances were sufficient safeguards. Term limits Northeast with term limits. never gained broad appeal, other than for single execu- That term limits took root in Maine is mildly tives, such as governors or presidents. surprising, given the state’s political culture. Our state Developments in the twentieth century began has a moderate and consensus-oriented politics, where to alter this equation. In response to the growing citizens are very good about fulfilling their civic obliga- complexity of public policy issues and the growth tions (Palmer, Taylor, and LaBrizzi, 1992). Maine has of the federal bureaucracy, the U.S. Congress became only occasionally defeated incumbent members of much more professionalized. Members started serving Congress, usually providing them such strong levels longer periods of time, with some turning their of support that members are free to carve out national congressional service into a lifetime career. The institu- roles. Maine is not “anti-politician” or “anti-govern- tion gave itself more resources. Incumbents became ment” compared to many states. almost guaranteed winners in elections, particularly The Maine Legislature also has a track record of in the U.S. House, where average success rates often reflecting citizen opinion on constitutional amendments topped 90% in any given election cycle. (Palmer and Moen, 1999). It has some of the least populous districts among the fifty states, so it is unusu- ally close and responsive to voters. It has the attributes That term limits took root in Maine is mildly of a citizen legislature, such as part-time sessions and modestly compensated members, making it a less attractive target for reform than its more professional- surprising, given the state’s political culture. ized counterparts. Finally, the Maine Legislature had few career politicians in the years leading up to the 1993 citizen This surge in congressional careerism occurred initiative. Turnover in the legislature typically ranged during several decades of control by the Democratic from 23%-35% in the election cycles of the 1980s; Party in the aftermath of World War II. In the late- this gave the Maine House the fifth highest turnover 1980s, Republican political consultants began forming of the fifty state legislatures, while the Maine Senate tax-exempt organizations to promote term limits as was eighth (Benjamin and Malbin, 1992). To the extent an antidote to both congressional careerism and careerism could be said to exist, it was primarily at Democratic control (Rothenberg, 1992). Term limits for the leadership level. Some of those serving on the members of Congress eventually swept through twenty- Legislative Council or as committee chairs had long three states (including Maine), but they were struck service records. down in a 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in Why did a citizen initiative pass in 1993? Many U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton [514 U.S. 779 (1995)]. factors probably contributed to it. The economic slump The spillover effect on state legislatures started in of the late-1980s and early 1990s created unrest with Oklahoma in 1990, when voters passed term limits in government. Miscalculation or misrepresentation of response to a series of state problems and scandals state finances, in combination with strong partisan (Copeland, 1992). Colorado and California followed disagreement over worker’s compensation programs suit later that year, and ten more states passed term and fiscal priorities, led to a virtually unprecedented limits in the 1992 election cycle. With few exceptions, state government shutdown. Involvement of a the states passing term limits were west of the Democratic aide in a ballot tampering scandal tarnished Mississippi River and had provisions for direct initiative leadership in Augusta. Increasing institutional expendi- in their state constitutions. The only northeastern states tures caught the attention of state newspapers, and 14 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Spring 2002 View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm TERM LIMITS resulted in proposals to shrink the total size of the memory (Boucher, 2000). In our previous work (Moen Maine Legislature to save money. The campaign to and Palmer, 2000a; 2000b; forthcoming), we drew a place term limits on the ballot was coordinated by variety of conclusions: professional consultants, who had previously run for political office. An often apolitical Maine philanthropist • Term-limited districts usually elect a member generously financed it. The groundwork was already in from the same political party as the member place in other states, so term limits simply had to be forced out, with thirty-eight of fifty-two adapted to fit Maine. All of those reasons probably (73%) House districts and nine of twelve contributed in some measure to support for term limits. (75%) Senate districts following that pattern In a broader sense, term limits tapped widespread from 1996-2000.