Rorty, Putnam, and the Pragmatist View of Epistemology and Metaphysics Teed Rockwell Although Dewey's influence has remained strong phers like Quine, Sellars and Davidson as "post-analytic amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst philosophers." The pragmatist alternative to positivism is an philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was alternative which many of these post-analytic philosophers unquestionably the most influential figure in American have been drifting towards. But as long as we assume that philosophy until his death in 1952. Almost immediately after the pragmatist's contributions to metaphysics and epistemol- his death, however, Dewey's writings almost completely dis- ogy should be ignored, I believe that we will not be able to appeared from the American philosophy syllabus. They were free ourselves from the last reverberations of the positivist replaced by the analytic philosophers of the logical positivist hangover. tradition, who thought that philosophical problems could be In this paper, I will examine some of the modern debates solved by unraveling puzzles that came from a lack of under- between pragmatism and so-called "realism," especially those standing of proper language use. After several decades, between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that however, the inadequacies of this view became unavoidably many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the obvious, and the next generation of analytically trained pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey's original ideas, philosophers began to find themselves saying things that rather than Rorty's reinterpretations of Dewey, these sounded remarkably like Dewey. Many analytic philosophers problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases began to use the word "pragmatist" to describe some aspect dissolved. of their positions: Quine, Churchland, Davidson, Feyerabend, Rorty, Putnam, among many others. Putnam and Rorty, in The Rorty-Putnam Debate particular, have made a serious effort to restudy the original pragmatist texts, and reinterpret them for use in modern con- texts. Not everyone is satisfied with their reinterpretations, In the debate between pragmatists and realists, Rorty is however. Rorty, in particular has been criticized in some de- currently seen as the most adamant spokesman for pragma- tail by Dewey scholars (see especially Saatkamp, 1995). But tism. Putnam is seen as slightly to the "epistemological right" Rorty admits that his ideas differ significantly from Dewey's, of Rorty, because although he speaks highly of pragmatism, because he is trying to revive only those aspects of Dewey's he considers his position to be less pragmatist, and more ideas which are relevant for our times. I will argue, however, realist, than Rorty's. This balance between pragmatism and that those aspects of pragmatism which Rorty claims are the realism is nicely expressed in the title of Putnam's book most relevant are actually the most out of date, and vice versa. "Realism with a Human Face." This title is not just an historical reference to Czechoslovakian socialism. Putnam's The pragmatists were caught between two different philo- realism acknowledges that knowledge is always from a sophical movements and were equally critical of both. On human's, never a God's eye, view. Reality, in other words, the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical necessarily has a human face, for it makes no sense for us to disputes that had no possibility of being resolved. But on the talk about a reality which is completely independent of our other hand, they were equally critical of the positivist's human lives and activities. However, Putnam differentiates belief that it was possible to not do metaphysics. Nineteenth himself from Rorty by saying that he, unlike Rorty, believes century idealist philosophy is a dead horse in the twenty-first that there is a reality which exists independently of our be- century, and thus the pragmatist's arguments against it are of liefs about it. Putnam argues that we cannot avoid claiming relatively little use today. But analytic philosophy has lived that some beliefs are warranted (i.e., justified, in some sense), under the spell of positivism for over a half a century, and and others are not, and that this distinction only makes sense still has not figured out what should go in its place. Rorty if we accept that reality is somehow independent of our captures this dilemma quite well when he refers to philoso- beliefs about it. Education and Culture Spring, 2003 Vol. XIX No. 14 RORTY, PUTNAM, AND THE PRAGMATIST VIEW 9 Putnam's main argument is that Rorty's position contra- extreme form in the logical positivists and in both the early dicts itself, and other concepts that runs so deeply in us that and late Wittgenstein. Rorty's so-called pragmatism is actu- we cannot possibly think without them (see Putnam, 1990, ally the last gasp of this anti-metaphysical disease, and I pp. 21-24). We cannot say that a warranted belief is merely believe that the epistemological and metaphysical writings what most people believe, because this contradicts the very of James and Dewey could offer something like a cure for it. idea of warrant itself. To say that a belief is warranted must Even the late Wittgenstein believed that the purpose of mean that one should believe it regardless of whether anyone philosophizing was to show how to get the fly out of the fly- else does. Similarly he says that "it is internal to our picture bottle which is metaphysical/epistemological paradox, and of reform that whether the outcome of a change is good (a Rorty is still struggling to get out of that fly bottle. James and reform) or bad (its opposite) is logically independent of Dewey believed that we could never get out of the fly bottle whether it seems good or bad" (p. 24). Putnam admits that and therefore we must learn how to struggle with the meta- the fact that we find it impossible to think without a concept physical/epistemological questions as best we can. does not in itself prove that the concept is valid. But Rorty is Putnam does recognize that to some degree these philo- apparently saying that we should reject traditional realism sophical questions are unavoidable, but he sees this as a real- because it is a bad theory, even though the majority of people ist position that makes him less of a pragmatist. The reason currently believe it. And once he makes this move, Putnam he calls his position "realism with a small r" is that he claims that he contradicts himself "what can 'bad' possibly accepts that "the enterprises of providing a foundation for mean here but 'based on a wrong metaphysical picture'" being and knowledge... are enterprises that have disastrously (P- 22)? failed" (Putnam, 1990, p. 19). But he considers it to be real- I think that Putnam is right that there are conceptual ist, and not pragmatist, to say that that 'reconstructive reflec- incoherencies in Rorty's arguments, and that some of them tion does not lose its value just because the dream of a total do involve the old logical positivist error of formulating a and unique reconstruction of our system of belief is hope- metaphysics/epistemology that denies it is a metaphysics/ lessly Utopian' (ibid., p. 25) and "the illusions that philoso- epistemology. One of the things I will be doing in this paper phy spins are illusions that belong to the nature of human life is providing more detailed arguments to support Putnam's itself (ibid., p. 20). In fact, the original pragmatists would claim that "Just saying 'that's a pseudo-issue' is not of itself actually have agreed with the first of these quotes, and dis- therapeutic; it is an aggressive form of the metaphysical dis- agreed with the second only in a certain sense. They believed ease itself' (ibid., p. 20). But I will also be making two other that human life requires us to accept some sort of philosophi- claims, one of which supports Putnam against Rorty, and the cal 'illusion,' but they did not believe that it was impossible other of which criticizes both Putnam and Rorty almost to escape the particular philosophical positions that have equally. shaped our thinking so far. They thought that reconstructive The first of these claims is that Rorty is guilty of another reflection could produce new philosophical assumptions incoherency besides contradiction: he is using arguments which would make us more at home in the world, and lead us which do not actually support the position he claims they into fewer errors, than the ones we have now, even if those support. Unlike many of Rorty's Critics, Putnam and I both philosophical assumptions were not "the truth" in the realist believe that most Rorty's more controversial premises are sense. They were, in other words, "philosophical revision- true. But I will argue that the inferences from those premises ists" in the sense that Putnam says he is not (ibid., p. 20).[1] that supposedly lead to Rorty's conclusions are actually One is not likely to see this if one uses Rorty as one's invalid. His main argument for the abandonment of the main source for pragmatist insights, for he refers to books questions of epistemology is that a certain answer to these like James' "Essays in Radical Empiricism" and Dewey's questions has been shown to be unsatisfactory. But it does "Experience and Nature," as "pretty useless, to my mind" not follow from this fact that therefore epistemology itself (Rorty, 1994, p. 320n). These books contain some of the best should be abandoned.