Katirai: Rooftop Search and Rescue International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters August 2009, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 167–180. Large-Scale Rooftop Search and Rescue: The Experience of Hurricane Katrina Matin Katirai David M. Simpson Center for Hazard Research and Policy Development University of Louisville Email: [email protected] This article examines issues arising in large-scale rooftop search and rescue operations, in this case following Hurricane Katrina. Few events in the U.S. disaster experience have provided the background or means to prepare for the scale of airlift required following Katrina. Unique characteristics of this event created new challenges, and agencies were operating with little coordination. Observations and recommendations regarding communications and similar means of dealing with these large-scale events are described. Keywords : Search and Rescue, Hurricane Katrina, disaster, airlift rescue Introduction Emergencies are circumstances for which every unit of government makes preparations. Automobile accidents, fires, and hazardous material spills are examples of situations for which procedures are rehearsed and response is practiced. Depending on one’s definition, however, disasters and catastrophes are special circumstances that cannot be dealt with by common measures that are used on daily basis (Dynes 1983). Large floods are special occurrences that would fall in this category, having a wide range of unique factors that create a demanding technical rescue operation (Glassey 2006). Preparedness for disasters is a more complex process, and includes activities such as devising, testing, and implementing disaster plans, providing training for responders, and communicating with the public and others about disaster vulnerability (Mileti 1999). This paper examines the challenges that were faced by four different search-and- rescue (SAR) teams in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Our research sought to gain a better understanding of the responses to large-scale rescue operation in a major urban environment—New Orleans in the flooding after the storm passed. One of 167 Katirai: Rooftop Search and Rescue the more distinctive aspects of this event was the scale—the sheer number of individuals needing rescue from rooftops. While there are many instances each year of riverine or flash flooding that have involved a rooftop (or treetop) rescue, those typically involve just a few cases of airlift response. Multiple thousands were stranded on rooftops following Hurricane Katrina, a scenario for which few have planned. We address these issues in the following four sections. The first section introduces the issues and examines the research context together with current research in the field. The second segment of the paper describes the methodology and components of this study. The third section discusses the results with subheadings of scale, coordination and communication. The final section relates the findings of this study to broader issues in disasters and emergency management and brief recommendations are described, as well as potential areas of future research. The Research Context Hurricane Katrina and the flooding associated with the levee failure in New Orleans created a new and unique situation for emergency response rescue teams. Hurricane Katrina and its effects can be considered a catastrophe because Quarantelli (1997) frames catastrophes as a social crisis where there is a complete disruption of social life and the community no longer functions in any normal sense. This definition fails to capture the complexity of the issues and activities involved. Quarantelli and Perry (2005) have recently updated the definition for a disaster in their book What is a Disaster which brings together various experts in the field to define the term. Perry (2005) offers a summation of term “disaster” from the contributors of the book as an event that is disruptive, inherent in social time as a socially based event, and is not based on any particular agent that is entwined with change. The widespread devastation caused by the flooding in new Orleans produced an exceptional circumstance along with a substantial breakdown in social order. The entire city was inundated with water, forcing thousands to escape to the roofs and attics of their home. Those people stranded in their homes and on their rooftops required assistance because the topography of New Orleans created a situation in which flood waters would not naturally recede, as would ordinarily be the case in communities located above sea level. Many of those stranded on rooftops or in the attics were elderly, and further were faced with dangerously hot weather and contaminated flood water. In an Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) operation, the goal is to locate and deliver aid to the victims as soon as possible in a race against a retreating survival window (Lau, Huang and Gissanayake 2005). Katrina was a nontraditional USAR environment, as USAR usually more commonly involves collapses of concrete or wooden structures where crush syndrome and other issues are important. Due to the scale of the event and 168 Katirai: Rooftop Search and Rescue the amount of flooding, many different organizations were involved in the rescue operations. The rescue efforts, at least in the first hours and days, were not controlled or coordinated, and proceeded in such a fashion as to save as many people as possible in the shortest amount of time. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was a primary actor in the airlift and rescue operations, which to a large degree were helicopter-based. The USCG trains, and is operationally prepared, for this kind of rescue effort. In this case, however, it was a much larger scale than anything previously experienced. The USCG reported on their “Katrina Response” website (no longer active) that there were more than 29,000 total airlift rescues, although it was unclear if this was for all citizen movement (including transport to shelters), and whether it also included multi-agency efforts. The USCG is generally recognized as an expert in SAR because of their standardized training at SAR school, and their extensive use of helicopters for at-sea rescue procedures (Noble 2001). In the Katrina response, rooftop rescues were performed in boats and helicopters by several different agencies in both coordinated and uncoordinated fashion. It should be noted that helicopter rescue, USAR, and water rescue are all related but each requires a different set of skills, knowledge, and abilities. Rescuing individuals from rooftop by boat and helicopter was not limited to people who were trapped in their homes, but was also used to evacuate and relocate many from the hospitals in New Orleans (Rodríguez, Trainor and Quarantelli 2006). Innovations in technology have significantly impacted SAR since the mid-twentieth century. One rescue device, first used in the 1940s, is the helicopter (Nocera 2000). Some 60 years later, helicopters played a vital role in saving countless lives in rooftop rescues in New Orleans. Helicopters are important because of their ability to travel great distances in a short amount of time (as emergency medical care response times are critical) and due to their mobility and flexibility. Studies have shown that risk of death may be decreased if medical attention is provided in the first six hours after a disaster (Schultz, Koenig and Noji 1996). Another SAR advance is the use of tilt wing aircraft, which allows travel at twice the speed of a helicopter to transport the critically ill for medical attention (USCG 1997). The USCG also makes use of other technologies that aid in SAR, such as night vision devices and advanced sensors that can detect life forms. Not all rooftop rescues take place with helicopters, as was seen in the case with the New Orleans flooding. The effectiveness of boat rescue became apparent for those stranded on rooftops. Boats were especially practical for rooftop rescues in New Orleans because of hazards that were faced by helicopters in urban areas, such as electrical and telephone wires, and large trees. Flood rescues are high-risk operations, as one study from the Centers for Disease Control indicated that ten percent of the fatalities in the Hurricane Floyd flooding were rescue workers (Glassey 2006). The traditional SAR use 169 Katirai: Rooftop Search and Rescue for helicopters has been at sea where there are relatively few hazards, other than the elements of nature. In major disasters, there are three types of responders that carry out SAR operations (Dynes 1970). The first set, which usually lacks training, are local residents, family members and other civilians who happen to be in the area (Drabek et al. 1981). These individuals could be referred to as an emergent group because they have no predisaster existence, assist in the situation only because of their proximity to the event, and usually disband after the event (Dynes 1970). Experience with disasters has shown that this first set of responders will conduct SAR whether trained or not, and will continue to do so until told (or forced) by authorities to discontinue their activities. Problems can arise when there are well-intentioned and motivated volunteers who arrive and seek to assist. Without advance planning, these untrained volunteers may create management problems by diverting resources to supervise their activities (Quarantelli 1997). Fritz and Mathewson (1957) and Barton (1969) identify the arrival of personnel and materials to a disaster site to assist in response as convergence . More recently, Watchendorf and Kendra (2004) describe convergence as the mass mobilization of volunteers who assist with disaster recovery efforts, which is typical after a major catastrophic event. The issue of multiple volunteers assisting in SAR efforts in New Orleans did occur as non- traditional agencies that had access to boats became involved in the SAR operations, such as state fish and wildlife agencies or fire fighters who had personal fishing boats and were not trained to perform water rescue decided to volunteer in the rescue efforts without being mobilized.