View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Ghent University Academic Bibliography FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN VAKGROEP STUDIE VAN DE DERDE WERELD The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process and The United States From Hope to Impasse 1991-2000 Ahmad Soltani Nejad June 2004 Dissertation submitted for the degree of doctoral in political Science Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ruddy Doom 2 Table of contents Acknowledgements 3 Maps 4 1. Introduction 7 2. Theoretical Framework 21 3. U.S.-Syrian relations 41 4. The Madrid Peace Conference 67 5. The Oslo Peace Process 90 6. Slow Progress After Oslo Accords (1993-1994) 108 7. Progress on the Syrian-Israeli track (1994- 1996) 124 8. Deadlock in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations (1996- 1999) 138 9. Shepherdstown Talks (January 2000) 155 10. Syrian perspectives on the main issues of the peace process 173 11. Conclusions 193 Documents 211 Bibliography 214 3 Acknowledgements I am greatly indebted to several people and institutions for their assistance in the formation and completion of this study. I am grateful to my supervisor Prof. Ruddy Doom who has always been helpful throughout the conduct of this research. With his generous support I was able to come to the University of Ghent and later on pursue my research at the University of Arizona as an Exchange Visiting Scholar. The Center for Middle Eastern Studies there provided the opportunity for me to pursue my research with specialists at the University and to access the resources that I needed to conduct this research. I am grateful particularly to Prof. Mark Tessler, former Director of the Center, Prof. Michael Bonine, Head of the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Dr. Anne Betteridge, Director of the Center and Dr. Anne Bennett, former Assistant Director of the Center. I am also grateful to Ambassador David Dunford who read this work and offered constructive criticism. Ms. Deborah Beaumont deserves special gratitude for her generous help. She spent many hours reading and editing this work. Her encouragement, support, and enthusiasm never failed. This study was funded in part by a scholarship from the Iranian Ministry of Higher Education. Special thanks to the University of Tarbiat Modares that provided me this opportunity to study abroad. Finally, my special thanks goes to my wife, Hamideh Alamdari, and my children Faezeh, Farideh, and Farimah who through their support, patience and encouragement I was able to continue my studies and to complete this work. 4 5 6 7 Chapter 1 Introduction In the early 1990s, there were a number of developments at the international and regional levels that created a unique opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis to end their decades long animosity. Many of the circumstances that prevented the Arabs and Israelis from negotiating a peaceful resolution to their disputes had changed. The disintegration of the Eastern European regimes in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated dramatic changes in Middle East politics. Along with these changes in the international arena, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent Operation Desert Storm provided an opportunity for the United States to bring the Arabs and Israelis to peace negotiations. In the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, then U.S. President George H. W. Bush raised the hope for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He declared the resolution of this conflict one of the most important U.S. Middle East objectives.1 The establishment of security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, regional arms control of weapons of mass destruction, and promotion of economic development in the region were among other U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The United States, therefore, proposed a peace plan based upon a land for peace formula and the principles of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.2 Thus, the U.S. in cooperation 1. “Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8. 2. In his speech to a joint session of the Congress in March 1991, President Bush said, “a comprehensive peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and 8 with the Soviets invited Israel and its immediate neighbors, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan— in a joint delegation with the Palestinians—to a peace conference in Madrid. Syria, which had long sought an international conference under the United Nations’ auspices based upon these UN resolutions, accepted the invitation and the Madrid peace conference was convened in November 1991. Hafiz al-Asad had accepted a land for peace formula since the early 1970s when he took power in Syria. But throughout the 1980s, Asad opposed negotiations with Israel because he believed that the Arabs were in a position of weakness, and therefore, they could not reach an honorable peace settlement with the Israelis. From Asad's point of view, the strategic imbalance in Israel’s favor was one of the main obstacles for the stable and lasting peace in the Middle East. Syria’s policy in the 1980s was to obstruct any peace initiatives that were based on separate peace plans between Israel and its Arab neighbors. During this decade, Syria insisted on an international conference for peace in the Middle East with a Soviet-American role. Syria wanted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 to be the basis of any peace negotiations and for the United Nations to play an important sponsorship role. Syria also long insisted on a united Arab delegation to demonstrate a common Arab position in dealing with Israeli demands. Moreover, Syria required Israeli commitment to full withdrawal before negotiations could begin, and sought to resist any attempts to exclude Syria from the peace process. However, the Madrid peace conference was the beginning of new peace initiatives, aiming to bring the Arabs and Israelis to both bilateral and multilateral negotiations for comprehensive solutions to their conflicts. The conference was designed to encourage bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It also promoted multilateral negotiations on regional issues with participation of the European Union and the United Nations in order to strengthen confidence-building measures between the parties at the regional level. Although it opposed negotiating regional issues before Israel conceded to the principle of withdrawal from Arab lands, Syria attended the conference at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights.” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.) 9 and agreed to bilateral talks with the Israelis. The United States had a significant role in convincing Syria to attend the conference. In the early 1990s, Hafiz al-Asad made what he called a ‘strategic decision’ to join the Middle East peace process in Madrid. Following the collapse of the East Bloc and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its main benefactors3, and therefore, could not credibly be a serious threat to Israeli security. Syria also was not able to protect its own national interests in such an unacceptable imbalance of power that might come in the aftermath of radical changes in the Middle East. Hence, Syria’s options were highly limited: continuing the 1980s policy of rejectionism or adopting a new policy of integration into the new Middle East after the end of the cold war. The second Gulf crisis—the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—provided Asad with an opportunity to make a strategic decision and at the same time forced him to make an important concession. Hafiz al-Asad decided to join the U.S.-led coalition to fight the Iraqi invasion, and also to participate to the U.S.-Soviet sponsored peace process after the Gulf war in October 1991. These two decisions marked a significant, radical change in Syria’s strategy toward peace in the Middle East. At the same time, it signified the effect of the power imbalance after the collapse of the East Bloc on Syria’s foreign policy: Syria conceded to participate in direct, unconditional, bilateral negotiations with Israel without any Israeli commitment for full withdrawal from the occupied lands. Syria was also forced to accept that Israel would not explicitly accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 requiring Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories. However, Asad's decision was not to abandon Syria’s goal of a just, honorable, and comprehensive peace, but rather to revise his strategy to accept new conditions of non-zero sum games in the Middle East. With the U.S. emphasis on the land for peace formula, and on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the legal basis of peace negotiations, Asad believed that he could reach his goals through negotiations. Asad regarded the 3. Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1991), pp. 112-138. 10 letters of invitation from the United States and the Soviet Union to participate in the Madrid peace conference as assurance that the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the legal basis of the peace process. In the letters, the United States and the Soviet Union announced they were “prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.”4 However, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union promised explicitly that Israel would withdraw from all the occupied lands.